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Abstract
Authenticated encryption refers to a class of cryptographic schemes that simulta-
neously provide message confidentiality and message authenticity. It is an essential
component of almost every cryptographic protocol that is used in practice. In this
thesis we aim to narrow the gap that exists between authenticated encryption as
used in practice, and authenticated encryption as studied in the framework of theo-
retical cryptography. We examine how certain types of attacks are not captured by
the current techniques, and show how this can be remedied by expanding existing
security models to capture a wider array of attacks.
We begin with a case study of IPsec: a widely deployed security protocol for pro-
tecting data across the Internet and other networks. Despite its popularity, IPsec’s
security has not received much formal treatment. As a security protocol it offers a
relatively high degree of configurability, so as to accommodate multiple usage scenar-
ios. We here present a new set of efficient attacks that fully break the confidentiality
of half of the configurations that are permitted by the IPsec standard.
Next we turn our attention to the enhancement of security models. In particular
we consider attacks that exploit distinguishable decryption failures and ciphertext
fragmentation. A number of recent attacks against practical cryptosystems, includ-
ing our attacks on IPsec, fall in one of these two categories. We extend the current
security models to capture such attacks, and formulate new security notions to cap-
ture vulnerabilities that arise in this new setting. We then go on to explore how
these notions relate to each other, and construct authenticated encryption schemes
that satisfy our security notions.
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Introduction
Contents
1.1 The Evolution of Modern Cryptography . . . . . . . . . 7
1.2 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.3 Thesis Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.4 Associated Publications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
This chapter gives an overview of the thesis. We provide the motivation for our
research and describe the overall structure of this thesis.
1.1 The Evolution of Modern Cryptography
In recent years cryptography has flourished and it is increasingly present in various
aspects of our everyday lives. Cryptography dates back to ancient times, when it
mostly dealt with secret communication, but has now grown to span topics such
as digital signatures, anonymity, zero knowledge proofs, secure computation, digital
currency, digital rights management, and electronic voting. Nonetheless in today’s
world, centred on telecommunications, the need for confidentiality has never been as
crucial. For hundreds of years cryptography was an underground black art, studied
and practiced only by few. Cryptography attracted more interest with the advent of
wireless communication and the Second World War, but it remained a taboo subject
and was not studied freely within academia. This started to change towards the late
70’s with the discovery of public-key cryptography [35], and has grown at a drastic
rate ever since.
Once cryptography could be studied and used freely, it attracted the attention of
mathematicians, computer scientists, and engineers. These studied the topic from
different angles, and to some extent took it in different directions. To mathemati-
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cians cryptography offered a set of interesting problems which could be solved using
number theory, combinatorics and coding theory, amongst others. Theoretical com-
puter scientists, mainly complexity theorists, were more interested in fundamental
questions such as the complexity theoretic assumptions that cryptographic appli-
cations could be based on, and which cryptographic protocols are realisable. Fi-
nally, engineers were interested in developing ‘real world’ systems, and were mainly
driven by the need for such systems. However, engineers have often unintentionally
sacrificed security for usability and practicality. While this is a far too simplistic
generalisation, it serves to give an idea of some of the driving forces that shaped
cryptography and which to some extent still exist to this day. In [87] Rogaway gives
an account of his experience at MIT, describing how cryptography was seen as a
branch of theoretical computer science that did not much countenance pragmatic
concerns. To give an idea of the divide that existed between communities, he ex-
plains how after pursuing a PhD in cryptography at MIT he was totally unaware
of Kerberos [76] which was developed by a team of engineers (outside of the theory
group) at MIT.
The distinction between the engineers’ view of cryptography as opposed to the com-
puter scientists’ view is quite clear and more or less translates to the divide between
practitioners and theoreticians. The mathematician’s view lies somewhere in be-
tween and overlaps both ends of the spectrum. In particular, theoretical computer
science is often regarded as a branch of mathematics, which makes this distinc-
tion less clear. Cryptography has undoubtedly benefited immensely from various
branches of mathematics, but often mathematicians have viewed cryptography as
an application of mathematics without much concern about the subject itself. It was
complexity theorists who put the subject on more formal grounds, and established
Modern Cryptography as we know it today. More specifically they developed the
Provable Security approach which is considered to have transformed cryptography
from an art to a science. The key ingredient to this approach is formal security defi-
nitions that permit a rigorous security analysis of cryptographic protocols. Provable
security was formulated using ideas from complexity theory where an algorithm is
considered to be efficient if it runs in polynomial time and security is proven using
reductions. This rendered the provable security approach somewhat esoteric, and
it was perceived by many to be detached from reality. Furthermore provable secu-
rity was not concerned with symmetric key cryptography, which is essential to ‘real
8
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world’ cryptography.
In the 90’s, Bellare and Rogaway set to address this discrepancy in their research
agenda. Their line of research, which they termed practice-oriented provable security
[9, 87], applies the provable security approach to practical cryptographic schemes,
and formulates its results in a way that is more meaningful to practice. Notable con-
tributions of their approach include concrete security, the treatment of symmetric-
key cryptography, and the random oracle methodology [19]. Their starting point
was to abandon asymptotics and instead formulate security in a concrete manner.
This simple alteration was pivotal in permitting the treatment of symmetric key
cryptography, since block ciphers have no security parameter and hence it is not
possible to define their security asymptotically. In addition, in the concrete setting
security theorems are formulated quantitatively rather than qualitatively, allowing
implementers to calculate key lengths and other parameter values for their required
level of security. Another key contribution of their work was to model block ciphers
as pseudorandom permutations. This has now become the accepted basic security
requirement for block ciphers, and has replaced and extended Shannon’s older for-
mulation in terms of confusion and diffusion [89]. The random oracle methodology,
while being a big source of controversy [26], has permitted a formal treatment of
many practical schemes and has encouraged the exploration of security notions for
hash functions that go beyond collision resistance and pre-image resistance. At a
more philosophical level, entrenched in the practice-oriented provable security ap-
proach [87], is the view that cryptography is socially constructed as opposed to a
view of cryptography conforming to scientific realism as the one expressed in [47]
for example.
1.2 Motivation
Despite the efforts associated with practice-oriented provable security, provable secu-
rity remains a source of controversy and divide within the cryptographic community.
One such example is the long-standing controversy that originated from the paper by
Koblitz and Menezes [67]. The authors sustain that the term ‘provable’ in provable
security is misleading and gives a false sense of 100% certainty, concealing the con-
ditional nature of proofs by reduction. In addition they point at cases where proofs
9
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were found to be flawed, reductions were not tight, or provably-secure schemes suc-
cumb to attacks outside the security model. In the conclusion to their paper, Koblitz
and Menezes refer to these cases as ‘evidence’ that cryptographic protocol design
is no more of a science than it is an art, thereby somehow discrediting provable
security. In our view, Koblitz and Menezes raise many valid points but their conclu-
sion is unfair. Reduction tightness and proof validity are evidenced because of the
provable security approach in the first place, and thereby provide a better means for
validating and contrasting the security of cryptographic schemes. The adequacy of
security models [31, 68] on the other hand we believe to be a legitimate concern that
needs to be addressed. The practical utility of provable security results is limited by
the security models that they employ. Our view is that provable security has turned
protocol design into a science, but crafting security definitions remains an art and
security models need to evolve as new practical settings and attacks emerge.
In this thesis we will develop and study security models that are more relevant to
practical settings. Our focus will be authenticated encryption schemes which com-
bine message confidentiality and data origin authenticity. Authenticated encryption
has become an essential component of almost every practical cryptographic pro-
tocol. In particular we will look at authenticated encryption as used in network
protocols. We will first present novel attacks on IPsec that exploit features not
normally captured in current security models. In particular the attacks will exploit
distinguishable decryption failures in authenticated encryption schemes, and one at-
tack will also exploit ciphertext fragmentation. Distinguishable decryption failures
relate to an adversary’s ability to distinguish distinct decryption failure events. Such
a vulnerability is usually inadvertently introduced by implementations and not nor-
mally taken into account in the theoretical analysis. Ciphertext fragmentation on
the other hand, relates to the very nature of the interface presented by IP networks
over which cryptographic protocols operate. In this setting, ciphertexts may be
delivered at the receiver’s end in an arbitrarily fragmented fashion. It turns out
that adapting authenticated encryption schemes to operate in such settings is not
trivial, and this setting raises novel security concerns that are of interest in their
own right. We will provide an extensive formal treatment of both distinguishable
decryption failures and ciphertext fragmentation, by defining appropriate security
notions, establishing relations and separations between security notions, and present
constructions that meet these notions.
10
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1.3 Thesis Structure
Chapter 2 starts with an overview of the provable security approach and the prin-
ciples on which it is based. We then fix the notation and introduce some symmetric
building blocks, namely block ciphers and message authentication schemes. This
is followed by defining symmetric encryption and its security notions together with
some basic block cipher modes of operation. We then look at authenticated encryp-
tion, and how to achieve it through generic composition. The chapter ends with
extensions of security notions for symmetric encryption to the stateful setting.
In Chapter 3 we lay down the practical background required for this thesis. We
start off with a description of the TCP/IP protocol suite with a focus on some of
its intricate aspects that are relevant to our work. We then go on to describe the
three most popular secure network protocols that are in use today: TLS, SSH and
IPsec. The focus of our exposition is primarily on the authenticated encryption
component in each of these protocols. This is followed with a survey of previous
works examining the security of these protocols. We conclude the chapter with a
description of Vaudenay’s padding oracle attack [93] and the SSH attack by Albrecht,
Paterson, and Watson [1].
Chapter 4 presents a set of new attacks on various MAC-then-encrypt configu-
rations of IPsec. We describe in detail three attack strategies, none of which is
universally successful on all IPsec MAC-then-encrypt configurations, but for each
configuration at least one strategy is successful. We also give an account of our
experience in implementing the attacks on an experimental IPsec set-up.
In Chapter 5 we provide a formal treatment of distinguishable decryption failures in
symmetric encryption schemes. We revisit the classic relations for obtaining chosen-
ciphertext security from chosen-plaintext security and integrity of ciphertexts in
the light of distinguishable decryption failures. We establish a number of relations
and separations between security notions in this setting. The chapter ends with
a re-examination of the encrypt-then-MAC and MAC-then-encrypt compositions,
providing further formal grounds for preferring the former composition.
Finally in Chapter 6 we study symmetric encryption schemes supporting ciphertext
11
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fragmentation. We start off by defining the syntax for such schemes. This alone
proves to be non-trivial. We then identify three notions of security, relating to
confidentiality, boundary hiding, and denial of service. For each notion we consider
a weaker variant that can be met by a subclass of schemes that maintain a ‘minimal’
state. The chapter concludes with constructions from standard symmetric primitives
of schemes that meet our notions of security.
1.4 Associated Publications
Chapter 4 is joint work with Kenneth G. Paterson, and was published in the pro-
ceedings of the ACM CCS 2010 conference [30]. Chapters 5 and 6 are based on joint
work with Alexandra Boldyreva, Kenneth G. Paterson, and Martijn Stam. Chap-
ter 5 appeared in FSE 2013 [23], while the material of Chapter 6 was presented at
Eurocrypt 2012 [22]. All authors conributed equally to the above publications.
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Contents
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This chapter lays the required background on symmetric encryption. We present the
basic schemes and define various notions of security.
2.1 Preliminaries
2.1.1 Provable Security
Provable security refers to a paradigm in cryptography which permits us to rigor-
ously analyse and assess the security of cryptographic schemes and protocols. It is
often claimed to have revolutionised cryptography from a ‘black art’ into a science.
The approach borrows ideas from theoretical computer science and is based on two
13
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important concepts which form its heart and soul. The first is the formulation of se-
curity definitions. These specify the goals that cryptographic schemes are intended
to achieve, such as confidentiality and data-origin authenticity, in precise mathemat-
ical terms. A security definition is normally expressed as an experiment played by
an adversary with respect to a cryptographic scheme. Commonly the adversary is
an algorithm parametrised by its computational resources. We are then concerned
with the probability that an adversary has of ‘winning’ the experiment. The secu-
rity of a scheme is expressed in terms of the maximal winning probability over some
class of adversaries. Alternatively we say that a scheme is ‘broken’ if there exists a
‘feasible’ adversary whose winning probability exceeds the acceptible treshold by a
significant amount.
The second pillar of provable security is the reduction proof technique. A proof of
security generally boils down to bounding the winning probability of some class of
adversaries. For most cryptographic schemes and protocols, proving such bounds
without further assumptions appears to be currently beyond our reach. The difficulty
in proving such bounds is related to the hardness of proving that P 6= NP. As a re-
sult security proofs are normally conditional, in that they rely on number-theoretic
assumptions or on the security of the underlying primitives which the scheme is
built on. This is where the reduction proof technique comes in. A reduction trans-
forms an algorithm that solves problem B into an algorithm that solves problem A.
We normally require that the transformation be efficiently computable. If such a
transformation exists we say that problem A reduces to problem B. Now consider a
scheme that is based on a block cipher. In order to prove its security we construct
a reduction that transforms any adversary which breaks the scheme’s security to an
adversary that breaks the security of the block cipher. By assumption the block
cipher is secure. Hence, by a contrapositive argument, it follows that the scheme
is also secure. Put differently, the reduction shows that the only way to break the
scheme is to find a flaw in the underlying primitive, in this case the block cipher.
As a consequence of the reduction we need not bother with the cryptanalysis of the
scheme, and we can focus instead on the cryptanalysis of the underlying primitive.
Block ciphers like AES and DES have been thoroughly analysed for some years now
and we are quite confident about their security. The reductionist approach allows
us to transfer this confidence onto new cryptographic schemes that are built from
them.
14
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It is worth emphasising that such reductions are only possible because we have formal
security definitions that permit a mathematical treatment. The design of security
definitions is an intricate craft that is often underestimated and not given sufficient
attention. Security definitions need to be simple enough to be mathematically man-
ageable while at the same time encompass the lines of attack that are possible in
complex practical settings. Every so often practice points out applications for which
current security definitions turn out to be inadequate and require reconsideration.
This ‘gap’ between theory and practice is a major theme of this thesis. In the fol-
lowing chapters we will see practical settings for which current security notions are
inadequate and we will attempt to resolve this gap. A more in-depth discussion
about the role and impact of definitions in the field of cryptography can be found
in [86].
There are other paradigms in cryptography that fall under the umbrella of provable
security. One such example is the information-theoretic approach, where the term
‘provable’ makes even more sense since such security proofs are unconditional. How-
ever the computational paradigm which we just described tends to be more relevant
to practice and allows for certain types of cryptography, such as public key cryptog-
raphy, that are simply not possible in the information-theoretic setting. The origin
of the computational paradigm is normally attributed to the work of Goldwasser
and Micali from 1982 [50]. Being a field mainly led by the theoretical community it
initially evolved in a complexity-theoretic framework where algorithms are regarded
as ‘efficient’ if they run in polynomial time and adversarial success probabilities are
considered to be ‘acceptable’ if bounded by a negligible function. A security pa-
rameter is normally introduced such that running time and success probabilities can
be expressed as functions of this parameter. Expressed in this framework, provable
security results are not very meaningful to cryptographic practice. For instance,
in symmetric cryptography block ciphers have fixed dimensions, and there is no
security parameter that one can vary in order to obtain the required security level.
A more practically relevant approach was developed in a set of papers by Bellare
and Rogaway [18, 15, 14]. As opposed to the asymptotic approach where a scheme is
secure if all polynomial-time adversaries have a negligible success probability, their
approach quantifies the success probability in terms of the adversary’s resources.
This is often referred to as concrete security. This approach entails a number of
15
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important differences. First and foremost the computational model that is assumed
by the adversary becomes relevant in the concrete setting. Generally some RAM
computational model is assumed as these better capture the architecture of modern
computers. Security is now quantitative rather than just qualitative, and it allows
us to better compare and contrast the security of cryptographic schemes. Another
aspect that is surfaced by the concrete setting is the idea of reduction tightness.
A reduction is essentially an algorithm, and the more efficient it is the tighter the
reduction. In general for a specific scheme, tighter reductions yield better security
bounds and are therefore desirable.
While the provable security paradigm is applicable to many sub-areas of cryptog-
raphy, in this thesis we are mainly concerned with symmetric cryptography. We
now introduce some notation, and then present the primitives and cryptographic
schemes together with their corresponding security definitions that will be used in
later chapters. Our treatment will mainly be in the concrete setting.
2.1.2 Notation
Unless otherwise stated, an algorithm may be randomised. An adversary is an
algorithm. For any algorithm A we use y ← A(x1, x2, . . . ) to denote executing A
with fresh coins on inputs x1, x2, . . . and assigning its output to y. If S is a set then
|S| denotes its size, and y ← $ S denotes the process of selecting an element from
S uniformly at random and assigning it to y. The set of all finite binary strings
is denoted by {0, 1}∗. For any positive integer n and bit b, we denote by bn the
string of n consecutive b’s and {0, 1}n represents the set of all binary strings of
length n. The empty string is represented by ε. For any two strings w and z and
positive integers i and j, w ‖ z denotes their concatenation, w ⊕ z denotes their
bitwise XOR, w  z denotes the greatest common prefix of w and z, w % z denotes
the remainder string of w with respect to w  z (i.e. w = w  z ‖ w % z), and
|w| denotes the length of w. Unless stated otherwise, w[i] denotes the ith bit of w,
and w[i, j] denotes the substring w[i] ‖ w[i + 1] ‖ . . . ‖ w[j]. For any n ∈ N, and
any vector of strings w = [w1, w2, . . . , wn], we define the concatenation orperator as
||(w) = w1 ‖ w2 ‖ . . . ‖ wn. If j is a non-negative integer, then 〈j〉` denotes the
unsigned `-bit binary representation of j. Accordingly 〈·〉−1 represents the inverse
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mapping which maps strings of any length to N. If w is an `-bit string and i is an
integer we use w + i as shorthand for 〈〈w〉−1 + i mod 2`〉`. We use Func(X ,Y) to
denote the set of all functions with domain X and codomain Y. Similarly Perm(X )
denotes the set of all permutations over the domain X . We will often have that
X = {0, 1}` or X = {0, 1}∗, and Y = {0, 1}n for some positive integers ` and
n. Accordingly we abbreviate notation for the corresponding sets of functions and
permutations to Func(`, n), Func(∗, n), and Perm(`) respectively. A list L is a triple
(I,S, f), where I is a set of integers acting as indexes, S is a set containing the
members of the list, and f is a bijection mapping indexes to members of the list.
We use () to denote the empty list, i.e. the list where I = ∅,S = ∅. For an integer i
we denote by Li the element of the list f(i), and use Li ← w to denote the process of
assigning I ← I ∪ {i} and S ← S ∪ {w}, and letting f(i) = w. In addition we may
apply set operators to the list, treating it as the set S. Finally Pr [ P : E ] denotes
the probability of event E occurring after having executed process P .
2.2 Building Blocks
2.2.1 Block Ciphers
Block ciphers are central to symmetric cryptography, and constitute an essential
component of almost any cryptographic protocol that is used in practice. Their
proliferation can probably be best attributed to the fact that they constitute a simple
and yet versatile primitive with efficient implementations. Block-cipher design has
been an active area of research for more than 30 years and is a relatively mature
area of study within cryptography. In addition, popular block ciphers like DES
and AES have been intensively cryptanlysed and to this day no severe security flaw
has been discovered in their design. This serves as empirical evidence to show that
block ciphers can be realised securely in practice and therefore constitute a good
primitive on which to build other schemes. Unfortunately this is the best we have
currently, since as was already alluded to in Section 2.1.1, proving that a block
cipher is unconditionally secure would imply that P 6= NP.
Formally a block cipher is a function E : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n which takes a
k-bit string and an n-bit string as input and returns an n-bit string as its output.
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The key length k and block length n are parameters associated to the block cipher,
and vary according to the block cipher’s design. For each key K ∈ {0, 1}k we let
the function EK : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be defined by EK(X) = E(K,X). Accordingly
we can view a block cipher as a family of functions where each function is identified
by the key. For any block cipher E, and any key K, it is generally required that
the function EK be a permutation, implying the existence of an inverse function
E−1K such that E
−1
K (EK(X)) = X. In terms of security what we normally require
from block ciphers is for them to constitute good pseudorandom functions or good
pseudorandom permutations. Pseudorandom functions were introduced by Goldre-
ich, Goldwasser and Micali in [48, 49], but interestingly it was not until the work of
Bellare, Kilian, and Rogaway that they were used to model block ciphers [15].
Definition 2.1: Pseudorandom Functions. Let F : K × X → Y be a function
family indexed by the set K. Consider an adversary A with oracle access to some
function with domain X and codomain Y, and which returns a single bit as its
output. We define the prf-advantage of adversary A with respect to the function
family F as:
AdvprfF (A) = Pr
[
K ←$K : AFK(·) = 1
]
− Pr
[
f ←$ Func(X ,Y) : Af(·) = 1
]
.
F is said to be a pseudorandom function (PRF), if for every adversary A with
reasonable resources its prf-advantage AdvprfF (A) is small.
Since this is the first security definition that we present, a few remarks are in order.
The advantage represents the adversary’s success probability; in this case its ability
to distinguish between the two experiments. The advantage may be specified with
respect to a single adversary or a class of adversaries. The latter allows us to
quantify the security of a primitive or scheme, by the maximum advantage over
all adversaries with resources bounded by some set of values R . The resources of
interest are usually the number of oracle queries that the adversary makes, the size
of the queries, and the adversary’s running time. By convention [15], the running
time of the adversary includes its actual running time and the length of the RAM
program that describes the adversary. This convention is intended to eliminate
pathologies caused by adversaries which embed arbitrarily large lookup tables in
their description. We will denote the maximum advantage by AdvprfF (R), or simply
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AdvprfF to denote an absolute bound over all adversaries with reasonable resources.
Security theorems will relate the advantage of a scheme to the advantages of its
constituent primitives. It is then up to protocol designers to plug in advantage
estimates for their primitives and interpret small and reasonable according to their
application requirements.
Let us now turn our attention to the intuitive notions that the above security def-
inition aims to capture. Note that picking a function at random from the set Func
is equivalent to assigning f(x) a uniformly random value from the set Y for each
input x ∈ X . The above definition states that a function family F is pseudoran-
dom, if no computationally feasible adversary can distinguish effectively between a
random instance of F and a random function. It then follows that, to an adversary,
the PRF’s output will appear random and uncorrelated both from the input and
from other outputs. Thus pseudorandom functions capture the properties that we
normally require from block ciphers. However a block cipher can be more accurately
described as a collection of permutations; accordingly we can define pseudorandom
permutations in a similar manner.
Definition 2.2: Pseudorandom Permutations. Let Π : K × X → X be a
permutation family indexed by the set K. Consider an adversary A with oracle
access to some permutation over the set X , and which returns a single bit as its
output. We define the prp-advantage of adversary A with respect to the function
family Π as:
AdvprpΠ (A) = Pr
[
K ←$K : AΠK(·) = 1
]
− Pr
[
pi ←$ Perm(X ) : Api(·) = 1
]
.
Π is said to be a pseudorandom permutation (PRP), if for every adversary A with
reasonable resources its prp-advantage AdvprpΠ (A) is small.
Similarly to the previous case, we can think of a random permutation as assigning
a random value to pi(x) for each x ∈ X , with the sole distinction that the output
values are now sampled from X and without replacement. The above notion can
be strengthened by additionally providing the adversary with access to the inverse
permutation (in each case). Permutation families which meet this stronger notion
are called Strong Pseudorandom Permutations (SPRP). While it is more natural
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to model block ciphers as (S)PRPs, often their analysis may be considerably sim-
pler if modelled as PRFs. The following lemma [15] addresses precisely this issue.
In essence it says that for any good block cipher the prp-advantage and the prf-
advantage are always close; i.e. they do not differ by more than the amount given
by the birthday attack. Thus for sufficiently large block sizes, PRPs make good
PRFs.
Result 2.1: PRP/PRF Switching Lemma cf. [15, Proposition 2.5].
Let F : K×X → X be a function family indexed by the set K. Let A be an adversary
that makes at most q queries to its oracle. Then∣∣∣AdvprfF (A)−AdvprpF (A)∣∣∣ ≤ q(q − 1)2|X | .
2.2.2 Message Authentication
Message authentication allows communicating parties who share a secret key to
verify that a received message indeed originates from the party who claims to have
sent it. Apart from providing a solution to this specific cryptographic problem,
message authentication schemes also serve as a useful primitive for constructing
other cryptographic protocols.
A message authentication scheme MA = (K, T ,V) is a triple of algorithms with an
associated message space M ⊆ {0, 1}∗. The randomised key-generation algorithm
K takes no input and returns a secret key K. We will sometimes use K to denote
the set of keys that may be output by the key-generation algorithm. The tagging
algorithm T which may be randomised or stateful, takes as input a secret key K ∈ K,
and a message m ∈M, and returns a tag τ ∈ {0, 1}∗. The deterministic verification
algorithm V takes as input the secret key K ∈ K, a message m ∈M, and a candidate
tag τ ′, to return a symbol v ∈ {valid,⊥} denoting whether τ ′ is a valid tag for m
or not. We require that for any key K ∈ K and any m ∈M
Pr [ τ ← TK(m) : VK(m, τ) = valid ] = 1.
A number `tag ≥ 1 is called the tag length associated to the scheme if for any key
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K ∈ K and any m ∈M
Pr [ τ ← TK(m) : |τ | = `tag ] = 1.
A special type of message authentication scheme which is by far the most common
in practice, is the message authentication code (MAC). A MAC has the additional
property that its tagging algorithm is stateless and deterministic, and its verification
algorithm is given by:
VK(m, τ)
τ ′ ← TK(m)
if (τ ′ = τ) then return valid
return ⊥
The standard security notion for message authentication schemes is existential un-
forgeability under chosen message attacks (UF-CMA). This is an adaptation to the
symmetric setting of the corresponding notion for signature schemes introduced by
Golwasser, Micali, and Rivest [51]. An adversary is allowed to obtain tags for some
number of messages of its choice, and wins if it can output a new message together
with a valid tag. A stronger variant of this notion is termed strong unforgeabily
under chosen message attacks (SUF-CMA). In this variant the adversary is also
granted a ‘win’ if it can forge a new tag for a previously queried message. We define
the two notions more formally below.
Definition 2.3: (S)UF-CMA. LetMA = (K, T ,V) be a message authentication
scheme. For an adversary A, define experiments Expuf-cmaMA (A) and Expsuf-cmaMA (A)
as shown in Figure 2.1. In both experiments, a key K is first generated by calling K .
The adversary A is then given access to a tagging oracle Tag(·) and a verification
oracle Ver(·, ·). In Expuf-cmaMA (A) the adversary wins if it makes a successful verifi-
cation query for some message which it had not previously queried to the tagging
oracle. In Expsuf-cmaMA (A) the adversary wins if it makes a successful verification
query for a message-tag pair that was not previously returned by the tagging oracle.
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Expuf-cmaSE (A) Expsuf-cmaSE (A)
K ← K
L← ∅,win← 0
ATag(·),Ver(·,·)
return win
Tag(m)
τ ← TK(m)
L← L ∪m L← L ∪ (m, τ)
return τ
Ver(m, τ)
v ← VK(m, τ)
if v = valid and m 6∈ L then if v = valid and (m, τ) 6∈ L then
win← 1
return v
Figure 2.1: Experiments to define UF-CMA and SUF-CMA security. For UF-CMA
the boxed code is excluded, whereas for SUF-CMA the boxed code replaces the code
adjacent to it.
For each experiment we define the adversary’s advantage as:
Advuf-cmaMA (A) = Pr
[
Expuf-cmaMA (A) = 1
]
,
Advsuf-cmaMA (A) = Pr
[
Expsuf-cmaMA (A) = 1
]
.
The schemeMA is said to be UF-CMA (or SUF-CMA) secure, if for every adversaryA
with reasonable resources its advantage Advuf-cmaMA (A) (respectively Advsuf-cmaMA (A))
is small.
It is easy to see that SUF-CMA security implies UF-CMA security. Furthermore,
any UF-CMA secure scheme may be amended by appending a redundant bit to its
tags, and letting the verification algorithm ignore this bit. This simple alteration
renders the scheme insecure in the SUF-CMA sense without detriment to its UF-
CMA security, thereby yielding a (conditional) separation showing that SUF-CMA
is a strictly stronger notion. However if we restrict ourselves to MACs, the two
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notions become equivalent. The separation we just sketched does not apply in the
case of MACs. The verification procedure in the amended scheme does not conform
to the MAC definition, and hence it does not qualify as a MAC. One further point to
note about the above definitions is that we allowed the adversary to make multiple
verification queries. In the cryptographic literature analogous notions can be found
where the adversary is allowed only one verification query. It can be shown [13] that
for the case of plain unforgeability, the multiple-query variant is strictly stronger,
whereas for strong unforgeability the two variants are equivalent (up to a factor equal
to the number of verification queries that the adversary is allowed). In recent work
[36], Dodis, Kiltz, Pietrzak, and Wichs present a simple and efficient transformation
yielding a UF-CMA secure message authentication scheme from any scheme that is
unforgeable under a single verification query. Again, for the restricted case of MACs,
security is not qualitatively affected by this variation in the definition.
We conclude this section on message authentication by pointing out a well-known
connection with pseudorandom functions. A PRF with a sufficiently large codomain
trivially yields a UF-CMA MAC, by letting the tagging algorithm be the PRF and
defining the key-generation algorithm to sample a key for the PRF uniformly at
random. This observation provides a pragmatic approach for realising MACs in
practice; i.e. by extending readily-available PRFs (such as block ciphers) to accom-
modate the required domain. In fact many MAC designs like CMAC [91], XOR-
MAC [14], and HMAC [10] can be viewed more simply as techniques for constructing
variable-input-length PRFs from fixed-input-length PRFs.
2.3 Encryption Schemes
2.3.1 Syntax
A symmetric encryption scheme SE = (K, E ,D) is a triple of algorithms with an
associated message space M ⊆ {0, 1}∗ and ciphertext space C ⊆ {0, 1}∗. The
randomised key-generation algorithm K takes no input and returns a secret key K,
an initial encryption state σ0, and an initial decryption state %0. We will sometimes
abuse notation and regard K as a set of keys representing the key space. The
randomised and stateful encryption algorithm E : K × M × Σ → C × Σ takes
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as input the secret key K ∈ K, a plaintext m ∈ M, and the current encryption
state σ ∈ Σ, and returns a ciphertext in C together with an updated state. The
deterministic and stateful decryption algorithm D : K × C × Σ → (M ∪ {⊥}) × Σ
takes as input the secret key K, a ciphertext c ∈ C, and the current decryption state
% to return the corresponding plaintext m ∈M or the special symbol ⊥ (indicating
that the ciphertext is invalid) and an updated state.
For any ` ∈ N and any m = [m1, . . . ,m`] ∈ M`, we write (c, σ) ← EK(m, σ0) as
shorthand for (c1, σ1)← EK(m1, σ0), (c2, σ2)← EK(m2, σ1), . . . (c`, σ`)← EK(m`, σ`−1),
where c = [c1, . . . , c`] and σ = σ`. Similarly we use (m
′, %) ← DK(c, %0) to denote
the analogous process for decryption.
For any symmetric encryption scheme we require that for all (K,σ0, %0) that can
be output by K, all ` ∈ N, and all m ∈ M`, it hold (with probability 1) that if
(c, σ)← EK(m, σ0) and (m′, %)← DK(c, %0), then m′ = m.
The syntax for symmetric encryption that is presented here differs slightly from
that which is commonly adopted in cryptographic literature. Our syntax defines
both encryption and decryption to be stateful algorithms. Nonetheless, this does
not result in any loss of generality. Both encryption and decryption can be made
stateless by having K to always return the empty string for the corresponding initial
state, and let the algorithm ignore (i.e. never update) the state. In later chapters we
will consider practical aspects that will require further adjustments to the syntax of
symmetric encryption schemes. In [85] Rogaway introduced a variation in the syntax
in which encryption and decryption take a nonce as an additional input. While the
nonce-based approach is certainly relevant to practice-oriented cryptography, it is
somewhat orthogonal to the issues addressed in this thesis. For simplicity’s sake we
decided not to incorporate this approach in our analysis, yet it should be possible
to extend most of our work to that setting.
2.3.2 Notions of Confidentiality
Bellare, Desai, Jokipii, and Rogaway were the first to consider formal notions of
confidentiality for symmetric encryption [12]. They considered four candidate defi-
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nitions, which they classified as Find-then-Guess Indistinguishability, Left-or-Right
Indistinguishability, Real-or-Random Indistinguishability, and Semantic Security.
Each notion is defined through an experiment. Find-then-Guess Indistinguisha-
bility is a straightforward adaptation of the well-known IND-CPA notion from the
public-key setting, first introduced under the name ‘polynomial security’ in [50].
Here a two-stage experiment is defined, where in the first stage – the ‘find’ stage
the adversary endeavours to come up with a pair of equal-length messages whose
encryptions it wants to try to tell apart. In the ‘guess’ stage a message from this
pair is chosen at random, and its encryption called the challenge ciphertext is given
to the adversary. The adversary wins if it can tell which message is concealed in
the challenge ciphertext. An encryption scheme is deemed secure if no adversary
consuming reasonable resources can win significantly more than half the time.
Left-or-right indistinguishability is defined through a single-stage experiment which
starts by sampling a bit uniformly at random. The adversary is then given access to
a left-or-right oracle which, when queried on a pair of equal-length messages, returns
the encryption of one of them. The message to be encrypted is chosen according
to the bit sampled at the beginning of the experiment. The experiment ends when
the adversary outputs a guess of the bit. Similarly as before, an encryption scheme
is deemed secure if no adversary consuming reasonable resources can guess the bit
significantly more than half the time. Real-or-random indistinguishability is defined
similarly, except that the adversary is instead given access to a real-or-random oracle,
which takes as input a single message, and according to the value of the sampled
bit, either returns an encryption of the input or an encryption of an equal-length
message sampled uniformly at random. Semantic security is also an adaptation
to the symmetric setting of the notion introduced in [50] under the same name.
All of these notions can be strengthened to capture chosen-ciphertext attacks by
additionally giving the adversary access to a decryption oracle and prohibiting him
from making ‘trivial-win’ queries.
The authors of [12] also establish relations among these four security notions. They
show that left-or-right and real-or-random indistinguishability are equivalent up to
a factor of two in the corresponding advantages. Similarly find-then-guess indistin-
guishability and semantic security are shown to be equivalent up to a constant factor
of two. Finally they show that find-then-guess and left-or-right indistinguishabil-
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ity are also equivalent, but the reduction from left-or-right indistinguishability to
find-then-guess indistinguishability incurs a loss in the advantage by a factor equal
to the number of queries made by the adversary to the left-or-right oracle. Fur-
thermore they present a separation showing that this reduction is tight, and hence
this ‘loss in security’ is inevitable. The above relations apply equally to the chosen-
ciphertext-attack variants of the notions. From the above analysis, left-or-right and
real-or-random indistinguishability emerge as the preferred security notions, since
they are quantitatively stronger. We now present in more detail definitions for
IND-CPA and IND-CCA security in terms of left-or-right indistinguishability.
Definition 2.4: IND-CPA and IND-CCA. Let SE = (K, E ,D) be a sym-
metric encryption scheme. For an adversary A and a bit b, define experiments
Expind-cpa-bSE (A) and Expind-cca-bSE (A) as shown in Figure 2.2. Both experiments
start by calling K to generate a key K and initialise the states. The adversary A is
then given access to a left-or-right encryption oracle LoR(·), and in the latter exper-
iment it is additionally given a decryption oracle Dec(·). No restriction is imposed
on the adversary’s queries, rather if it queries a pair of messages of unequal length
to LoR(·), or if it queries a ciphertext to Dec(·) previously returned by LoR(·), the symbol is returned.
In both experiments, the adversary’s goal is to output a bit b′ as its guess of the
challenge bit b, and the experiment returns b′ as well. The corresponding advantages
of an adversary A are given by:
Advind-cpaSE (A) = Pr
[
Expind-cpa-1SE (A) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Expind-cpa-0SE (A) = 1
]
,
Advind-ccaSE (A) = Pr
[
Expind-cca-1SE (A) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Expind-cca-0SE (A) = 1
]
.
The scheme SE is said to be IND-CPA (or IND-CCA) secure, if for every adversary A
with reasonable resources its advantage Advind-cpaSE (A) (respectively Advind-ccaSE (A))
is small.
Arguably, out of the four formulations of IND-CPA and IND-CCA security, semantic
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Expind-cpa-bSE (A) Expind-cca-bSE (A)
(K,σ, %)← K
i← 0, C← ()
b′ ← ALoR(·) b′ ← ALoR(·),Dec(·)
return b′
LoR((m0,m1))
if |m0| 6= |m1| then return  
(c, σ)← EK(mb, σ)
i← i+ 1, Ci ← c
return c
Dec(c)
(m, %)← DK(c, %)
if c ∈ C then m←  
return m
Figure 2.2: Experiments to define IND-CPA and IND-CCA security. For IND-CPA
the boxed code is excluded, whereas for IND-CCA the boxed code replaces the code
adjacent to it.
security is intuitively the most satisfactory notion of confidentiality. It conveys the
most clear intuition that for an encryption scheme to be secure, it should not leak
any partial information about the plaintext. This intuition is not immediately clear
from the other formulations. On the other hand, the other formulations tend to be
easier to use in security proofs. This further highlights the utility of the equivalence
relations from [12], in that they allow us to get the best of both worlds. Further-
more, the fact that different notions capturing seemingly different intuitive notions
of confidentiality turn out to be equivalent is often considered a good indication that
we have converged to a good security notion.
Symmetric encryption schemes that satisfy left-or-right indistinguishability (IND),
often satisfy a stronger notion of indistinguishability known as indistinguishability
from random bits (IND$). This notion was put forward by Rogaway in [85]. Under
this notion a scheme is secure if ciphertexts cannot be distinguished from random
strings of the same length. Interestingly, for typical schemes, proving IND$ security
often turns out to be slightly simpler than proving IND security. Note however
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that IND$ implies IND only as long as the distribution of ciphertext lengths (for
the scheme under consideration) depends only on the message length (and not the
message itself). Analogous definitions for chosen-plaintext and chosen-ciphertext
security are defined as follows:
Definition 2.5: IND$-CPA and IND$-CCA. Let SE = (K, E ,D) be a sym-
metric encryption scheme. For an adversary A and a bit b, define experiments
Expind$-cpa-bSE (A) and Expind$-cca-bSE (A) as shown in Figure 2.3. Both experiments
start by calling K to generate a key K and initialise the states. The adversary A
is then given access to a special encryption oracle Enc$(·). If b = 1 the oracle re-
turns the encrypted message, otherwise it returns a uniformly-random bit-string of
the same length as the encrypted message. In the latter experiment it is addition-
ally given access to a decryption oracle Dec(·). Trivial-win conditions are avoided
by having the decryption oracle return  in response to any ciphertext that was
previously output by the encryption oracle.
In both experiments, the adversary’s goal is to output a bit b′ as its guess of the
challenge bit b, and the experiment returns b′ as well. The corresponding advantages
of an adversary A are given by:
Advind$-cpaSE (A) = Pr
[
Expind$-cpa-1SE (A) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Expind$-cpa-0SE (A) = 1
]
,
Advind$-ccaSE (A) = Pr
[
Expind$-cca-1SE (A) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Expind$-cca-0SE (A) = 1
]
.
The scheme SE is said to be IND$-CPA (or IND$-CCA) secure, if for every ad-
versary A with reasonable resources its advantage Advind$-cpaSE (A) (respectively
Advind$-ccaSE (A)) is small.
2.3.3 Modes of Operation
We now describe three ubiquitous symmetric encryption schemes that are based on
block ciphers. These are also known as modes of operation, since they are effectively
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Expind$-cpa-bSE (A) Expind$-cca-bSE (A)
(K,σ, %)← K
i← 0, C← ()
b′ ← AEnc$(·) b′ ← AEnc$(·),Dec(·)
return b′
Enc$(m)
(c, σ)← EK(m,σ)
if b = 0 then c←$ {0, 1}|c|
i← i+ 1, Ci ← c
return c
Dec(c)
(m, %)← DK(c, %)
if c ∈ C then m←  
return m
Figure 2.3: Experiments to define IND$-CPA and IND$-CCA security. For IND$-CPA
the boxed code is excluded, whereas for IND$-CCA the boxed code replaces the code
adjacent to it.
ways of operating a block cipher for encrypting data. We assume, in all three cases,
that the message space contains only messages whose length is an integer multiple
of the block length. The simplest mode of operation is the Electronic Code Book
(ECB) mode, in which a message is split into blocks, each block is then fed into the
block cipher, and the outputs are concatenated. Note that this mode of operation is
deterministic, and consequently it cannot be IND-CPA secure irrespective of which
block cipher is used.
A more secure mode of operation is Counter mode. In this mode, the input to the
block cipher is a counter that is incremented after each block cipher call. The outputs
of the block cipher are then concatenated and the resulting string is XORed to the
plaintext in a fashion similar to the one-time pad. We here present two variants
of this mode, of which one is stateful and the other randomised. For any block
cipher E we denote Stateful Counter mode by CTR[E], and Randomised Counter
mode by CTR$[E]. Namely in the stateful variant the counter is maintained as
the encryption state, whereas in the randomised variant a random initial counter is
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CTR-K
K ←$ {0, 1}k
return (K, 0, ε)
CTR-EK(m,σ)
c0 ← σ
for i = 1 to |m|/n
xi ← m[1 + (i− 1)n, in]
ci ← EK(c0 + i)⊕ xi
c← c0 ‖ . . . ‖ c|m|/n
return (c, σ + i)
CTR-DK(c, %)
y0 ← c[1, n]
for i = 1 to |c|/n− 1
yi ← c[1 + in, (i+ 1)n]
mi ← yi ⊕ EK(y0 + i)
m← m1 ‖ . . . ‖ m|c|/n−1
return (m, %)
Figure 2.4: Scheme CTR[E] from a block cipher E : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n.
CTR$-K
K ←$ {0, 1}k
return (K, ε, ε)
CTR$-EK(m,σ)
c0 ←$ {0, 1}n
for i = 1 to |m|/n
xi ← m[1 + (i− 1)n, in]
ci ← EK(c0 + i)⊕ xi
c← c0 ‖ . . . ‖ c|m|/n
return (c, σ)
CTR$-DK(c, %)
y0 ← c[1, n]
for i = 1 to |c|/n− 1
yi ← c[1 + in, (i+ 1)n]
mi ← yi ⊕ EK(y0 + i)
m← m1 ‖ . . . ‖ m|c|/n−1
return (m, %)
Figure 2.5: Scheme CTR$[E] from a block cipher E : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n.
sampled uniformly for each ciphertext. In either case the initial counter is prepended
to the ciphertext. The two modes are specified in Figures 2.4 and 2.5.
A third variant could be defined in which decryption is also stateful. Here the
decryption algorithm maintains its own copy of the counter, and no initial counter
value is prepended to the ciphertext. Note that all three variants can be easily
adapted to support messages of arbitrary length. This is achieved by trimming
the redundant part from the last block cipher output, such that the concatenated
outputs are of the same length as the message.
The third mode of operation that we consider is Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)
mode. In this scheme encryption is stateless and randomised, and decryption is
also stateless. In CBC mode each plaintext block is first XORed with the previous
ciphertext block, and the resulting block is then fed into the block cipher to yield the
corresponding ciphertext block. The first ciphertext block is computed by XORing
the plaintext block with an initial vector, sampled uniformly at random, and the
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result is then fed into the block cipher. This initial vector is prepended to the
ciphertext so that the receiver can decrypt successfully. Decryption is the reverse
process, each ciphertext block is inverted using the inverse block cipher function and
the result is XORed to the preceding ciphertext block (or initial vector) to yield the
corresponding plaintext block. In order to encrypt messages of arbitrary length, a
padding scheme is normally used to extend the message length to an integer multiple
of the block length. The CBC[E] scheme obtained from a block cipher E is specified
in Figure 2.6.
The Counter mode variants and CBC mode were proven secure in [12]. Namely
CTR[E] and CTR$[E] were proven to be IND-CPA secure under the assumption that
E is a pseudorandom function, while CBC[E] was shown to be IND-CPA secure
under the assumption that E is a pseudorandom permutation. All three schemes
suffer from some form of malleability, and as a consequence they cannot meet the
stronger IND-CCA security notion. For both Counter mode variants, flipping a bit
in the ciphertext results in the corresponding plaintext bit being flipped. Similarly
in CBC mode, flipping a bit in a ciphertext block results in the corresponding bit
of the next plaintext block being flipped. In addition if the block cipher is a PRP,
we can expect that the current plaintext block will be randomised if any of the
corresponding ciphertext-block bits are flipped. Thus an adversary can predictably
alter the contents of a plaintext block at the expense of ‘garbling’ the preceding
plaintext block. However the first block can be manipulated by flipping bits in the
initial vector without garbling any other plaintext block. This malleability can be
exploited in the IND-CCA experiment as follows. The adversary submits a message
pair (0n, 1n) to the left-or-right oracle and receives in return a ciphertext c. Using
the techniques just described, it produces a ciphertext c′ that corresponds to m with
its first bit flipped, where m is the message contained in c. It then submits c′ to
the decryption oracle and if the returned message is 1‖0n−1 it outputs 0, else if it
is 0‖1n−1 it outputs 1. Thereby the adversary wins the IND-CCA experiment with
probability 1. In the coming chapters we will make use of this malleability to mount
plaintext-recovery attacks on practical cryptosystems.
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CBC-K
K ←$ {0, 1}k
return (K, ε, ε)
CBC-EK(m,σ)
c0 ←$ {0, 1}n
for i = 1 to |m|/n
xi ← m[1 + (i− 1)n, in]
ci ← EK(ci−1 ⊕ xi)
c← c0 ‖ . . . ‖ c|m|/n
return (c, σ)
CBC-DK(c, %)
y0 ← c[1, n]
for i = 1 to |c|/n− 1
yi ← c[1 + in, (i+ 1)n]
mi ← yi−1 ⊕ E−1K (yi)
m← m1 ‖ . . . ‖ m|c|/n−1
return (m, %)
Figure 2.6: Scheme CBC[E] from a block cipher E : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n.
2.4 Authenticated Encryption
Until now we looked at message authenticity and message confidentiality as sep-
arate goals. In practice however, when two parties communicate over a network,
both goals are desirable. Authenticated encryption refers to schemes which simulta-
neously achieve both message confidentiality and message authenticity. Historically
the lack of authenticated encryption has been a source of problems for practical
cryptosystems. A number of proposed schemes claimed to meet this goal have re-
sulted in disastrous failures. For instance in early drafts of the IPsec protocol suite
[4] it was claimed that schemes such as CBC mode provide both confidentiality and
integrity. This misconception was in part due to a lack of formal security definitions,
where message integrity and message authenticity (in the symmetric setting) were
perceived to be different [84]. Another popular example is that of the WEP cryp-
tosystem in the IEEE 802.11 standard, where a Cyclic Redundancy Checksum was
combined with a stream cipher in an attempt to provide authenticated encryption.
Both cases were later shown to be inadequate for message authenticity as well as
message privacy [20, 29, 25]. These two examples (together with many others) raise a
number of issues that are worth pointing out. Firstly, they highlight the importance
of the provable security approach to cryptographic practice, as opposed to claims of
security (as in [4]) based solely on intuition. Secondly they show that, at least at the
time, it was not at all obvious how to construct authenticated encryptions schemes.
Thirdly they also show that practical cryptographic applications often necessitate
stronger confidentiality than that guaranteed by IND-CPA security.
Bellare and Namprempre [17] were amongst the first to provide a formal analysis
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of authenticated encryption. We now summarise some of their results. An au-
thenticated encryption scheme is syntactically equivalent to a symmetric encryption
scheme; its characterisation derives instead from the additional property that it si-
multaneously meets some appropriate notions of message confidentiality and message
authenticity. Bellare and Namprempre identify IND-CCA security as the appropriate
confidentiality notion, and define message authenticity in terms of the integrity of
plaintexts (INT-PTXT) notion. They also consider a closely-related notion called
integrity of ciphertexts (INT-CTXT). We now define both.
Definition 2.6: INT-PTXT and INT-CTXT. Let SE = (K, E ,D) be a sym-
metric encryption scheme. For an adversaryA define the experiments Expint-ptxtSE (A)
and Expint-ctxtSE (A) as shown in Figure 2.7. Both experiments start by calling K to
generate a key K and initialise the states. The adversary A is then given access to
an encryption oracle Enc(·), and a try oracle Try(·). When queried on a ciphertext,
the try oracle returns whether that ciphertext is valid or not.
In the INT-PTXT experiment the adversary wins if it submits to the try oracle a
valid ciphertext that does not correspond to a plaintext previously queried to the
encryption oracle. In the INT-CTXT experiment however, the adversary wins if it
submits to the try oracle a valid ciphertext not previously returned by the encryption
oracle. For each experiment we define the advantage of an adversary A as:
Advint-ptxtSE (A) = Pr
[
Expint-ptxtSE (A) = 1
]
,
Advint-ctxtSE (A) = Pr
[
Expint-ctxtSE (A) = 1
]
.
The scheme SE is said to be INT-PTXT (or INT-CTXT) secure, if for every adversary
A with reasonable resources its advantage Advint-ptxtSE (A) (respectively Advint-ctxtSE (A))
is small.
It is easy to see that for any symmetric encryption scheme, if it satisfies integrity of ci-
phertexts it will also satisfy integrity of plaintexts. More simply we say that integrity
of ciphertexts implies integrity of plaintexts, which we denote by INT-CTXT −→
INT-PTXT. Integrity of plaintexts is perhaps the more natural security require-
ment, but integrity of ciphertexts is interesting, at least in part, due to the following
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Expint-ptxtSE (A) Expint-ctxtSE (A)
(K,σ, %)← K
win← 0, L← ∅
AEnc(·),Try(·)
return win
Enc(m)
(c, σ)← EK(m,σ)
L← L ∪m L← L ∪ c
return c
Try(c)
(m, %)← DK(c, %)
if m 6∈ L and m 6=⊥ if c 6∈ L and m 6=⊥
then win← 1
if m 6=⊥ then m←  
return m
Figure 2.7: Experiments to define INT-PTXT and INT-CTXT security. For INT-
PTXT the boxed code is excluded, whereas for INT-CTXT the boxed code replaces
the code adjacent to it.
result from [17].
Theorem 2.2: IND-CPA ∧ INT-CTXT −→ IND-CCA. Let SE = (K, E ,D) be a
symmetric encryption scheme. For any IND-CCA adversary Acca there exist adver-
saries Acpa and Aint, comsuming similar resources to Acca, such that:
Advind-ccaSE (Acca) ≤ Advind-cpaSE (Acpa) + 2 ·Advint-ctxtSE (Aint) . (2.1)
Informally, the above theorem states that weak confidentiality (IND-CPA) together
with ciphertext integrity, yields strong confidentiality (IND-CCA). Thus in order to
obtain an authenticated encryption scheme it suffices to construct a scheme that
is both IND-CPA secure and INT-CTXT secure. Bellare and Namprempre go on to
show, by means of a separation, that an analogous implication where ciphertext
integrity is replaced with plaintext integrity does not hold. They also show that
IND-CCA does not guarantee INT-PTXT, and hence the converse of Theorem 2.2
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does not hold either.
We have not yet given any example of an authenticated encryption scheme. A
natural attempt at constructing one would be to somehow combine a message au-
thentication scheme with a symmetric encryption scheme. This is known as generic
composition. Three natural ways of combining the two primitives emerge, and as we
shall see in the next chapter, all three have been deployed in practical cryptosystems.
These are: Authenticate-then-Encrypt (AtE), Encrypt-then-Authenticate (EtA),
and Encrypt-and-Authenticate (E&A). They are informally defined as follows:
Authenticate-then-Encrypt (AtE): The sender computes a tag on the plain-
text, the tag is appended to the plaintext, and the resulting string is then
encrypted. The receiver decrypts the ciphertext, recovers the tag and the
plaintext, and if the tag verifies correctly it returns the plaintext, otherwise it
returns ⊥.
Encrypt-then-Authenticate (EtA): The sender encrypts the plaintext, com-
putes a tag on the ciphertext, and appends the tag to the ciphertext. The
receiver recovers the tag and the ciphertext. If the tag verifies correctly, the
receiver goes on to decrypt the ciphertext and returns the plaintext, otherwise
it returns ⊥.
Encrypt-and-Authenticate (E&A): The sender computes a tag on the plain-
text. It then encrypts the plaintext, and appends the tag to the ciphertext.
The receiver recovers the tag and the ciphertext, and decrypts the ciphertext.
If the tag on the resulting plaintext verifies correctly the plaintext is returned,
otherwise it returns ⊥.
Bellare and Nampremrpre [17] analysed these three compositions and showed that,
for any IND-CPA secure encryption scheme and any SUF-CMA message authentica-
tion scheme, only encrypt-then-authenticate guarantees that the resulting scheme
will be IND-CCA secure. Moreover, if the message authentication scheme is SUF-
CMA secure it follows rather trivially that the EtA composition is INT-CTXT se-
cure. Thus for any two primitives that satisfy these basic security requirements,
EtA always yields an authenticated encryption scheme. Of course this does not
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mean that the other two compositions can never yield an authenticated encryption
scheme; rather it says that the security mean that the other two compositions can
never yield an authenticated encryption scheme; rather it says that the security of
these compositions does not immediately follow from the IND-CPA and SUF-CMA
security of the underlying primitives. In the case of encrypt-and-authenticate, the
message authentication scheme may leak information about the plaintext and yet
be SUF-CMA secure. Hence the composed scheme may not even be IND-CPA secure.
As regards authenticate-then-encrypt, the encryption scheme may be susceptible to
some form of malleability which allows an attacker to maul a ciphertext without
altering the underlying plaintext and tag. Consequently the resulting composition
cannot be IND-CCA secure. This intuitive argument can be formalised to yield a
counterexample showing that AtE (and equally to E&A) does not guarantee IND-
CCA security in general, as well as to prove the aforementioned separation, namely
IND-CPA ∧ INT-PTXT 6−→ IND-CCA.
Following the work of Bellare and Namprempre, a fair amount of research has been
dedicated to various aspects of authenticated encryption. In particular, there has
been an effort to construct dedicated schemes whose performance surpasses that of
generic composition schemes. Examples of dedicated schemes are Integrity-Aware
CBC (IACBC) [59], Counter mode with CBC-MAC (CCM) [97], Galois Counter
Mode (GCM) [75], and Offset CodeBook (OCB) [88]. The design specifics of such
dedicated schemes are beyond the scope of this thesis and we do not discuss them
any further.
We conclude this section by presenting a security notion, put forward by Shrimpton
[90], that elegantly combines IND-CPA and INT-CTXT into a single notion. This
notion is known as IND-CCA3 or simply as AE security.
Definition 2.7: IND-CCA3. Let SE = (K, E ,D) be a symmetric encryption
scheme. For an adversary A, and a bit b, define the experiment Expind-cca3-bSE (A)
as shown in Figure 2.8. First K is called to generate a key K, an initial encryption
state σ, and an initial decryption state %. The adversary A is then given access to
a special encryption oracle EncR(·) and a special decryption oracle Dec∅(·). When
b = 1 both oracles behave as normal encryption and decryption oracles. Contrarily,
if b = 0 then EncR(·) will return the encryption of a random string of the same length
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Expind-cca3-bSE (A)
(K,σ, %)← K
i← 0, C← ()
b′ ← AEncR(·),Dec∅(·)
return (b′)
EncR(m)
if b = 0 then m←$ {0, 1}|m|
(c, σ)← EK(m,σ)
i← i+ 1, Ci ← c
return c
Dec∅(c)
(m, %)← DK(c, %)
if b = 0 then m←⊥
if c ∈ C then m←  
return m
Figure 2.8: Experiment to define IND-CCA3 security.
as the message, and Dec∅(·) will always return ⊥ (unless the queried ciphertext was
output by EncR(·), in which case it will return  ).
The adversary’s goal is to output a bit b′ as its guess of the challenge bit b, and the
experiment returns b′ as well. The advantage of the adversary A is defined as:
Advind-cca3SE (A) = Pr
[
Expind-cca3-1SE (A) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Expind-cca3-0SE (A) = 1
]
.
The scheme SE is said to be IND-CCA3 secure, if for every adversary A with rea-
sonable resources its advantage Advind$-cca3SE (A) is small.
For a proof of the equivalence between IND-CCA3 and IND-CPA ∧ INT-CTXT the
reader is referred to [90]. Note that the IND-CCA3 notion is formulated using real-
or-random indistinguishability. An analogous IND$-CCA3 notion which combines
IND$-CPA and INT-CTXT, can be similarly defined by replacing the EncR(·) oracle
with the Enc$(·) oracle from Definition 2.5.
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2.5 Stateful Security
A main security concern in practical cryptosystems is that of replay and re-ordering
attacks. These are attacks characterised by an adversary’s ability to replay and
to re-order ciphertexts during their transmission. Consider for instance an online
banking application where a message may constitute a payment instruction. By
replaying the ciphertext that corresponds to a payment instruction, an adversary
may be able to force the payment to occur multiple times. Alternatively consider the
case where for transmission purposes messages need to be split into smaller message
segments, which are then encrypted separately. By reordering the corresponding
ciphertexts an adversary may be able to forge new reconstructed messages at the
receiver side. These examples obviously constitute a breach of integrity, yet neither
constitutes an attack under the notions of integrity that we have presented so far.
The ability to replay and re-order ciphertext can also impact confidentiality. Con-
sider again the last example where an application transmits application messages
in smaller segments over a network, and each message segment is encrypted sepa-
rately. Further assume that the application leaks (by means of some side-channel)
to the adversary a small amount of information about the received message. Now
by re-ordering and replaying ciphertexts, an adversary may be able to inject new
application messages that bear some relation to the original application message,
and thereby amplify the amount of information leaked through the side-channel. Of
course the cryptosystem cannot prevent the upper-layer application from leaking
information to the adversary. However it can ensure for instance that replayed and
re-ordered ciphertexts do not decrypt successfully and hence prevent further leakage
of information from adversarially manipulated traffic. Note that IND-CCA secu-
rity does not capture these security goals, and consequently it does not guarantee
security against replay and re-ordering attacks.
As a tool in their analysis of SSH [16], Bellare, Kohno, and Namprempre extended
chosen-ciphertext security and integrity of ciphertexts to additionally protect against
replay and re-ordering of ciphertext. Their security notions, IND-sfCCA and INT-
sfCTXT, can be seen as ‘strengthened’ variations of their standard counterparts.
That is IND-sfCCA −→ IND-CCA and INT-sfCTXT −→ INT-CTXT. These definitions
consider whether the adversary’s decryption queries are in-sync with its encryption
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queries. Namely, as long as the sequence of ciphertexts queried for decryption (or
to the Try oracle) is a prefix of the ciphertext sequence returned by the encryption
(or left-or-right) oracle, the decryption queries are said to be in-sync. Alternatively
as soon as a decryption query is made such that this relation no longer holds, the
decryption queries are said to have become out-of-sync. Intuitively this can inter-
preted to say that as long as the decryption queries are in-sync the adversary is
acting passively. Conversely if the decryption queries have become out-of-sync, it
means that the adversary has tampered with the traffic flow between the sender
and the receiver. IND-sfCCA is then defined analogously to IND-CCA except that
the output of the decryption algorithm is only returned once the decryption queries
have become out-of-sync. Note that this is less restrictive on the adversary than the
IND-CCA restriction that ciphertexts returned by the left-or-right oracle cannot be
queried to the decryption oracle so IND-sfCCA is a stronger security notion. Simi-
larly in INT-sfCTXT any out-of-sync ciphertext that decrypts correctly is considered
a ciphertext forgery. Thus, and in contrast to INT-CTXT, a replay of a ciphertext
previously output by the encryption oracle can result in a ‘win’ for the adversary.
We now define more formally the two notions.
Definition 2.8: INT-sfCTXT. Let SE = (K, E ,D) be a symmetric encryption
scheme. For an adversary A define the experiment Expint-sfctxtSE (A) as shown in
Figure 2.9. The experiment starts by calling K to generate a key K and initialise
the states. An adversary A is then given access to an encryption oracle Enc(·), and
a stateful try oracle sfTry(·). When queried on a ciphertext, the try oracle returns if the queried ciphertext is valid or it is in-sync, and returns ⊥ if it is invalid.
The adversary’s goal is to make a valid out-of-sync try query, and its advantage is
defined as:
Advint-sfctxtSE (A) = Pr
[
Expint-sfctxtSE (A) = 1
]
.
The scheme SE is said to be INT-sfCTXT secure, if for every adversary A consuming
reasonable resources, its advantage Advint-sfctxtSE (A) is small.
Definition 2.9: IND-sfCCA. Let SE = (K, E ,D) be a symmetric encryption
scheme. For an adversary A and a bit b, define the experiment Expind-sfcca-bSE (A)
as shown in Figure 2.9. The experiment starts by calling K to generate a key K
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Expint-sfctxtSE (A)
(K,σ, %)← K
i← 0, j ← 0
C← (), sync← 1,win← 0
AEnc(·),sfTry(·)
return win
Enc(m)
(c, σ)← EK(m,σ)
i← i+ 1, Ci ← c
return c
sfTry(c)
j ← j + 1, (m, %)← DK(c, %)
if j > i or c 6= Cj
then sync← 0
if sync = 0 and m 6=⊥
then win← 1
if m 6=⊥ then m←  
return m
Expind-sfcca-bSE (A)
(K,σ, %)← K
i← 0, j ← 0
C← (), sync← 1
b′ ← ALoR(·),sfDec(·)
return b′
LoR((m0,m1))
if |m0| 6= |m1| then return  
(c, σ)← EK(mb, σ)
i← i+ 1, Ci ← c
return c
sfDec(c)
j ← j + 1, (m, %)← DK(c, %)
if j > i or c 6= Cj then sync← 0
if sync = 1 then m←  
return m
Figure 2.9: Experiments to define INT-sfCTXT and IND-sfCCA security.
and initialise the states. The adversary A is then given access to a left-or-right
encryption oracle LoR(·), and a stateful decryption oracle sfDec(·). This decryption
oracle returns the decrypted ciphertexts only for out-of-sync queries, and returns  
otherwise. The adversary’s goal is to output a bit b′, as its guess of the challenge bit
b, and the experiment returns b′ as well. We define the advantage of an adversary
A as:
Advind-sfccaSE (A) = Pr
[
Expind-sfcca-1SE (A) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Expind-sfcca-0SE (A) = 1
]
.
The scheme SE is said to be IND-sfCCA secure, if for every adversary A with rea-
sonable resources its advantage Advind-sfccaSE (A) is small.
For a scheme to meet either of these notions, its decryption algorithm must be
stateful. The ‘sf’ in the notion designations, which stands for ‘stateful’, can be
attributed to the fact that the decryption and try oracles in the corresponding
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experiments are themselves stateful. A further contribution from the work of Bellare,
Kohno, and Namprempre is to extend Theorem 2.2 to the stateful setting. This is
stated formally in the following theorem.
Theorem 2.3: IND-CPA ∧ INT-sfCTXT −→ IND-sfCCA. Let SE = (K, E ,D) be
a symmetric encryption scheme. For any IND-sfCCA adversary Asfcca there exist
adversaries Acpa and Aint consuming similar resources to Acca such that:
Advind-sfccaSE (Asfcca) ≤ Advind-cpaSE (Acpa) + 2 ·Advint-sfctxtSE (Aint) . (2.2)
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This chapter introduces the necessary background on secure network protocols. We
start with an overview of TCP/IP and a description of the three most used secure
network protocols. We then look at some of the previous works that analysed the
security of these protocols.
3.1 The TCP/IP Protocol Suite
At a very high level, the Internet can perhaps be best described as a network of
computer networks. At its core is the TCP/IP protocol suite, which allows millions
of computer networks based on different networking technologies to operate as one
big computer network. Distinct computer networks are connected by means of
gateways. A gateway is a special machine that has a physical network interface
on more than one network, and can relay data from one network to the other. The
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Internet Protocol (IP) is mainly responsible for relaying data across physical network
boundaries. Central to its operation is the IP addressing scheme, which organises
in a neat and hierarchical manner all the machines on the Internet. In essence
every machine on the Internet is assigned an IP address that uniquely identifies
the machine and its location. An IP address is structured hierarchically so that
address prefixes identify sets of machines (i.e. logical networks) in which the machine
is contained. For each of these logical networks there will be a router which is
responsible for routing traffic between that set of machines and the rest of the
Internet. Every logical network can in turn be split into smaller logical subnetworks
for which other routers will be responsible. Internet data will commonly travel
through several routers until it reaches its intended recipient. Thus the task of
delivering data from one end to the other is distributed among several routers, each
of which needs to have only a ‘partial view’ of the Internet.
3.1.1 IP
Data over the Internet travels in the form of IP packets. In order to travel within any
physical network an IP packet must be encapsulated in a data frame that conforms
to the link-layer technology of that network. When forwarding IP packets from
one network to another, the gateway takes care of stripping off the old frame and
encapsulating the IP packet in a new frame. An IP packet consists of an IP header
followed by the data payload. Figure 3.1 depicts the format of an IP packet in more
detail. Both the IP header and the data payload can vary in length as necessary.
The Header Length field (HLEN) indicates the IP header length in 32-bit words
whereas the Total Length field indicates the combined length of the payload and IP
header in bytes. The source IP address field indicates the IP address of the machine
from which the packet originates. Similarly the destination IP address field indicates
the intended recipient of the IP packet, and is used by the intermediate routers to
successfully deliver the packet. The first four bits of the header indicate the version
of the IP protocol that was used to create the packet. This is the first field that
any IP software will inspect in order to determine how to interpret the rest of the
packet. To date IP Version 4 remains the most widely deployed version, but support
for IP version 6 is growing in popularity. In this thesis we will restrict ourselves to
IP version 4, and accordingly the packet format depicted in Figure 3.1 corresponds
43
3.1 The TCP/IP Protocol Suite
to this version.
0 8 16 24 32
TOTAL LENGTH 
SOURCE IP ADDRESS
IP OPTIONS (IF ANY) PADDING
VERS HLEN
19
DESTINATION IP ADDRESS
DATA PAYLOAD
FRAGMENT OFFSET FLAGSIDENTIFICATION 
TIME TO LIVE PROTOCOL HEADER CHECKSUM 
SERVICE TYPE 
Figure 3.1: The structure of an IP packet.
The Protocol field contains a 8-bit value that indicates the type of data that is
contained in the payload. Thus once the IP processing at the receiver is complete,
this field indicates to which upper-layer protocol the payload should be forwarded
to. Examples of such upper-layer protocols are TCP, UDP, and ICMP which we will
describe shortly. The protocol number assignments are administered by a central
authority: the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA). The Time To Live
(TTL) field is essentially a counter that determines the life time of an IP packet.
Typically the sender initialises this field to an integer value less than 256, and each
intermediate router that forwards the packet decrements this counter by one. Thus
the TTL fields acts as a ‘hop count’ rather than a timer in seconds as it was originally
intended. When the counter reaches zero the router drops the packet and sends a
‘time to live exceeded’ (ICMP) error message to the sender. The Header Checksum
field is used to detect errors in the IP header. The sender computes the checksum
value by treating the header as a sequence of 16-bit integer values and adding them
together using one’s compliment arithmetic, and then taking the one’s complement
of the result. When computing the checksum, the Header Checksum field is assumed
to contain zero.
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In IP, errors are reported to communicating parties using the Internet Control Mes-
sage Protocol (ICMP). ICMP specifies a separate format for ICMP messages which
are then encapsulated in an IP packet. However, while ICMP uses the basic support
of IP as if it were a higher level protocol, it is actually an integral part of IP that
must be implemented by every IP module. ICMP messages contain a Type field and
a Code field, both of which are a byte long, and together identify the exact error
message. For instance the ‘time to live exceeded’ ICMP message is identified by type
11 and code 0. Similarly if the Protocol field in an IP packet indicates a protocol
that is not supported by the receiver, a ‘destination protocol unreachable’ (type 3,
code 2) ICMP message is returned to the sender. The contents of the ICMP payload
depends on the type of ICMP message, but it will generally contain a portion of the
IP packet that caused the error to occur. This is intended to help the sender better
diagnose the cause of the error.
As we already mentioned, an IP packet may need to traverse different physical
networks in order to reach its destination. Normally, physical networks can only
carry data payloads below a certain size. This size limit is known as the Maximum
Transmission Unit (MTU) of the network, and it varies according to the network’s
technology. This raises the question as to what happens when an IP packet is to tra-
verse a physical network whose MTU is smaller than the IP packet size. Essentially
the gateway in question will split the IP packets into a number of smaller IP packets.
This mechanism is known as fragmentation, and accordingly the smaller packets are
known as IP fragments. The IP fragments will then travel as independent IP packets,
and will normally be reassembled by the receiver to recover the original IP packet.
When a gateway fragments an IP packet into smaller fragments, the header contents
of the original IP packet are copied into those of the smaller fragments. Three fields
in the IP header, Identification, Flags, and Fragment Offset, control packet frag-
mentation and reassembly. The Identification field contains a unique integer that
identifies the packet. This allows the receiver to identify fragments belonging to the
same packet. The Fragment Offset field indicates the offset in the original packet
of the data contained in the fragment. This is specified in eight-byte units, starting
from offset zero, thereby enabling the receiver to reassemble the fragments in the
correct order. The low-order bit of the Flags field is called the More Fragments
(MF) bit, and it indicates whether the fragment is the last in the sequence. Thus if
the MF bit is set or the Fragment Offset is not zero, it indicates that the IP packet
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is actually a fragment of a larger IP packet. Together the two fields also allow the
receiver to determine whether all fragments belonging to a certain packet have been
received. As soon as the first fragment reaches the receiver, a reassembly timer is
started, and if it expires before all fragments are received, an ICMP ‘time exceeded’
(type 11, code 1) message is sent to the sender and the remaining fragments are
discarded.
The TCP/IP protocol suite follows a layered architecture where one protocol builds
on top of another. We have seen how IP builds on an aggregate of heterogeneous
networks to yield a single uniform logical network. However the interface that IP
provides is still rather rudimentary and is not immediately usable by applications.
Accordingly a transport protocol that operates on top of IP is introduced to offer
basic communication functionalities and present a simpler high-level interface to ap-
plications. Transport protocols are normally responsible for (a subset of) reliability,
flow control, congestion control, multiplexing communication among different appli-
cations, and connection-oriented communication. The Transport Control Protocol
(TCP), one of the core transport protocols in the TCP/IP protocol suite, offers all
of these services. Transport protocols encapsulate application data into segments,
which in turn are encapsulated in IP packets. TCP segments are also partitioned
into a header and a data payload. We do not cover the TCP format in detail, but
rather highlight the salient aspects which are relevant to this thesis.
3.1.2 TCP and UDP
The TCP protocol is a connection-oriented protocol, meaning that in order for two
parties to communicate they first have to establish a connection. A connection
provides applications with an interface similar to a data stream, as opposed to the
datagram-oriented interface that IP provides. This means that an application does
not have to deal with lost datagrams and sorting datagrams in the right order.
Instead this is handled by TCP through sequence numbers in the segment headers,
and its acknowledgement mechanism which handles the retransmission of segments.
This is combined with a moderate error detection capability through a checksum field
(similarly to IP) which is computed over the complete segment (rather than just the
header). To each side of a TCP connection is associated a 16-bit port number which
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is reserved by the sending or receiving application. This port mechanism allows
the multiplexing of multiple connections between the same pair of machines. Better
still it allows any pair of communicating applications to share multiple connections.
The TCP segment header includes two fields indicating the source port and the
destination port. Thus the receiver can identify to which TCP connection a TCP
segment belongs, from the sender and receiver IP addresses in the IP header, and
the source and destination ports in the TCP segment header. Either party can
terminate the connection at any point. This can happen gracefully, as is the case
when all data has been sent and the connection is no longer needed, or otherwise in
the event of an application error for instance, where the connection is torn down and
any received data that has not yet been forwarded to the application is discarded.
The User Datagram Protocol (UDP) is another transport protocol which constitutes
a core component of the TCP/IP protocol suite. It can be seen as a lightweight
alternative to TCP for applications where a reliable service is not necessary. UDP
offers an unreliable datagram-oriented application interface. It is unreliable in the
sense that it does not handle the retransmission of lost or corrupted messages, and
messages may be delivered out-of-order to the application. It is datagram-oriented
in that communication takes the form of independent messages rather than a data
stream as in connection-oriented communication. A port mechanism similar to that
of TCP is employed to multiplex communication between applications.
The lower end of port numbers 0–1023 (TCP and UDP) is the well-known ports
range which is reserved for specific services on which server applications listen for
connection requests from clients. Typical examples are TCP port 80 for HTTP,
TCP port 25 for SMTP, and UDP port 161 for SNMP. The range of port numbers
from 1024 to 49151 are the registered ports. They are assigned by IANA for specific
service upon application by a requesting entity. For instance, port number 1433 is
reserved for Microsoft SQL and port 3690 is reserved for the SVN version control
system. The range 49152-65535 contains dynamic or private ports that cannot
be registered with IANA. This range is used for custom or temporary purposes,
Client applications normally use source port numbers in this range for instance. If
a TCP segment or UDP datagram is received with a destination port on which no
application is listening, an ICMP ‘destination port unreachable’ (type 3, code 3) is
returned to the sender.
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Note that the TCP/IP protocol suite is a fairly elaborate set of protocols, and in this
section we only covered basic aspects of it. The reader is referred to [28] for a more
in-depth treatment, or the corresponding protocol specification documents known
as RFCs, which are maintained by the Internet Engineering Taskforce (IETF).
3.2 Three Ubiquitous Security Protocols
We now turn our attention to security protocols intended to secure communication
over the Internet and TCP/IP in general. Such protocols normally use an array
of cryptographic primitives to provide a secure channel over which applications can
communicate. We focus on three specific protocols, which are probably the most
popular security protocols in use today.
3.2.1 TLS
As the name implies, Transport Layer Security (TLS), is a protocol for securing
Internet communication at the transport layer of the TCP/IP stack. Its predecessor,
Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), was developed by Netscape in the mid-1990s. In 1999,
the protocol was adopted by the IETF and specified as TLS 1.0 in RFC 2246 [32]. It
has since evolved through TLS 1.1 [33] to the current version TLS 1.2 [34]. Various
other RFCs define additional TLS cryptographic algorithms and extensions.
TLS actually consists of four separate protocols: the Handshake Protocol, the Alert
Protocol, the Change Cipher Spec Protocol, and the Record Protocol. We will
be mainly concerned with the Record Protocol, which uses symmetric-key crypto-
graphic primitives to yield a secure channel for use by the application layer. The
other three protocols are collectively referred to as the TLS handshaking protocols.
Among other things they are responsible for negotiating a ciphersuite (i.e. a set of
cryptographic primitives), authenticating the parties involved to each other, estab-
lishing a shared secret from which key material is derived, and handling error mes-
sages. The Record Protocol uses a stateful variant of the authenticate-then-encrypt
composition that we described in Section 2.4. The supported MAC algorithms are
all HMAC-based, with MD5, SHA-1 and SHA-256 being the allowed hash algo-
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rithms in TLS 1.2 [34]. The encryption component can be either of the following:
AES in CBC mode, 3DES in CBC mode, or the stream cipher RC4. The latest
TLS specification [34] introduced support for dedicated authenticated encryption
schemes, but as of the time of writing these have not yet received wide support in
TLS implementations.
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Figure 3.2: Cryptographic processing of a TLS record.
Data to be protected by TLS is received from the application and is fragmented into
TLS plaintext records carrying data in chunks of 214 bytes or less. A TLS record
consists of a 5-byte header HDR, and a payload portion containing the application
data. The record header consists of a 2-byte version field, a 1-byte type field, and a
2-byte length field. Before any cryptographic processing takes place the payload may
be compressed, if this option was negotiated during the handshake phase. Figure 3.2
depicts the cryptographic processing that takes place on the TLS plaintext record
to produce a TLS ciphertext record, which is then forwarded to the TCP layer
for transmission. The sender maintains an 8-byte sequence number SQN which is
incremented for each record sent. A MAC is then computed over the TLS record
prepended with this 8-byte sequence number. The payload portion is then appended
with the MAC tag, and if CBC encryption is to be used, this is in turn appended
with a sequence of padding bytes. The length of the padding is such that the
combined length of the payload, MAC tag, and padding is an integer multiple of
the block size of the selected block cipher. The padding must consist of p + 1
copies of some byte value p, where 0 ≤ p ≤ 255. Furthermore, at least one byte of
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padding must always be added (if CBC encryption is to be used). The padding may
extend over multiple blocks, and receivers must support the removal of such extended
padding. The resulting string, consisting of the concatenation of the payload, MAC
tag, and possibly the padding, is then encrypted using CBC encryption or RC4.
The transmitted TLS record is formed by prepended the resulting ciphertext with
the header HDR. Note that the sequence number is not transmitted as part of the
TLS record.
We conclude this section by briefly mentioning a variant of TLS known as Datagram
Transport Layer Security (DTLS). The DTLS protocol is a developed from TLS by
making minimal changes so as to allow it to operate over UDP instead of TCP. Its
latest version, DTLS 1.2, which builds on TLS 1.2 [34], is defined in RFC 6347 [83].
3.2.2 SSH
Secure Shell (SSH) was originally designed as a secure alternative to remote login
procedures such as telnet, rlogin, and rsh. It has since become a general purpose
tool for securing Internet traffic. SSH was first created in 1995 by Tatu Ylo¨nen a
researcher at Helsinki University of Technology. Following a series of vulnerabilities
that had been discovered, a major revision of SSH was released as SSHv2 by the
IETF in a collection of RFCs [100, 98, 101, 99]. We here focus on SSHv2, and use
SSH as a shorthand to refer to this version throughout this thesis.
The SSH protocol consists of three major components: the Transport Layer Proto-
col, the User Authentication Protocol, and the Connection Protocol. The Transport
Layer Protocol operates over TCP, and it is responsible for the server host au-
thentication and initial key exchange, as well as protecting the confidentiality and
integrity of the subsequently transmitted data. The User Authentication Protocol
operates over the the Transport Layer Protocol and is responsible for authenticating
the user to the server. It offers different mechanisms for accomplishing this, such
as password-based and public-key-based schemes. A single SSH connection may
be shared among different applications. The Connection Protocol is responsible
for multiplexing the secure channel, between the client and the server, into several
logical channels. In this thesis we are mainly interested in the Binary Packet Proto-
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col (BPP), the Transport Layer Protocol component responsible for authenticated
encryption.
MAC tag
Padding
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SSH Ciphertext Packet
PayloadLENSQN
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Figure 3.3: Cryptographic processing of an SSH BPP packet.
Figure 3.3 depicts the cryptographic processing employed by the Binary Packet
Protocol. A payload message is first encoded by prepending a packet length field and
padding length field, and appending some padding. The packet length field LEN is
4 bytes long and contains the total length (in bytes) of the encoded packet excluding
the packet length field itself. The padding length field PL is 1 byte long and contains
the total number of padding bytes. A minimum of 4 padding bytes must be added,
up to a maximum of 255 bytes. Furthermore the padding should be random, and
such that the encoded data ends on a block boundary. This encoded message is then
encrypted, and a MAC tag is appended to the ciphertext to produce the final SSH
Ciphertext Packet. The MAC value is computed over the concatenation of a 32-bit
packet sequence number SQN, and the encoded (but not encrypted) message. The
sequence number is set to zero at the start of an SSH connection, and is incremented
after each packet. It is not sent over the channel but is maintained separately by
both communicating parties.
The SSH RFC [101] mandates support for CBC using 3DES, recommends support
for CBC using AES, and lists a further 12 block cipher variants in CBC mode as
being optional. Only one optional stream cipher is listed, ARCFOUR. The RFC
mandates that CBC mode with initial packet chaining be used throughout an SSH
connection. In this variant of CBC mode, the last block of ciphertext from one
packet is used as the IV for CBC mode for the next packet. Thus there is only one
initial vector, and the packets on a connection form a single data stream. A later
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RFC [8] defines a stateful version of counter mode encryption for use with SSH. For
message authentication, it is required that HMAC using SHA1 be supported, with
HMAC using MD5 also being listed as an option.
3.2.3 IPsec
Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) is a suite of protocols designed by the IETF. It
offers security at the IP layer of the TCP/IP protocol stack, meaning that IPsec
provides cryptographic protection for IP packets (or their payloads). IPsec was
first specified in 1995, and the third and most recent version is specified in RFCs
4301–4309, released in 2005. It is deployed widely to build Virtual Private Networks
(VPNs) and secure remote access solutions. In addition it is also a mandatory com-
ponent of IPv6, and is part of the Universal Mobile Telecommunications System
(UMTS) standard – used for securing the backbone network. The main constituent
protocols of IPsec are the Authentication Header (AH), the Encapsulating Security
Payload (ESP), and the Internet Key Exchange (IKE). Each protocol supports mul-
tiple configurations, and the three protocols can be combined in various ways. This
high degree of configurability is what makes IPsec notoriously complex, and also
makes it harder to analyse its security.
The AH protocol provides integrity protection, data origin authentication and anti-
replay services for IP packets through the application of MAC algorithms and the
inclusion of sequence numbers. The ESP protocol provides similar services to AH
(though the coverage of integrity protection is more limited) and in addition pro-
vides confidentiality and traffic flow confidentiality services through symmetric key
encryption and variable length padding of packets. Each of AH and ESP can be op-
erated either in transport mode or in tunnel mode. Transport mode can be thought
of as the basic way of using AH and ESP to protect IP packets. Tunnel mode
processing can then be described as follows. The IP packet to be protected is first
encapsulated in another IP packet, and AH or ESP (transport mode) processing is
then applied to this new IP packet. Tunnel mode is typically used in VPNs, where
the IPsec processing is applied by a gateway. In contrast, transport mode, is typi-
cally used in settings where end-to-end security is needed. The IPsec processing is
thus applied by the host from which the IP packet originates. The IKE protocol
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Figure 3.4: AH processing of an IP packet in transport mode.
employs a Diffie-Hellman protocol to exchange keys between IPsec parties. Alter-
natively keys can be set manually, which is normally simpler to configure in small
networks. Another important component of every IPsec implementation is the Se-
curity Policy Database (SPD). This is a set of policies defining the processing rules
for each type of IP traffic.
In this thesis we will be mainly concerned with the specifics of the AH and ESP
protocols. We will assume that the necessary policies and key material are already
in place. We now go onto describe these in more detail. For a more complete and yet
accessible coverage of the cryptographic processing in IPsec, the interested reader
can consult [77].
The AH protocol adds its cryptographic protection by inserting a bit sequence called
the Authentication Header into IP packets. This is depicted in Figure 3.4 for trans-
port mode. The exact format of the Authentication Header is shown in Figure 3.5.
The Integrity Check Value (ICV) field contains the MAC tag used to authenticate
the packet. The scope of the MAC calculation includes the IP payload, the IP header
and the Authentication Header itself. Certain fields of the IP packet header, such as
the TTL and checksum fields, cannot be input to the MAC calculation because they
may change during the packet’s transit across a network and so are unpredictable
to the receiver. These mutable fields and the ICV field are both set to zero for
the purposes of MAC calculation and verification. The length of the MAC tag de-
pends on the particular MAC algorithm in use. Restrictions are that the MAC value
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must be an integral number of 32 bits in length and that the overall authentication
header must be a multiple of 32 bits in length for IPv4. Typical MAC algorithms are
HMAC-SHA1-96 [70] and AES-XCBC-MAC-96 [45], both having 96-bit long tags.
Next(Header Payload(Len Reserved
0 8 16 24 32
Security(Parameter(Index(kSPIV
Sequence(Number(Field
Integrity(Check(Value(-(ICV(kvariableV
Figure 3.5: Authentication Header format according to RFC 4302 [61].
At the receiver, the MAC is checked and the packet discarded if the MAC is incorrect.
In addition, when replay protection is enabled, the 32-bit sequence number carried
by AH is compared to a sliding window of recently received sequence numbers. The
packet is again rejected if the sequence number has already been received or if it is
deemed to be too old by falling to the left of the current window. A packet having
a valid MAC and a sequence number greater than the largest previously accepted
will always be accepted, causing the window to be shifted to the right. RFC 4302
[61] also supports the use of 64-bit extended sequence numbers.
The Next Header field in AH is a one byte (8-bit) field indicating the type of the
payload following the Authentication Header. For example, a value of 4 indicates
that what follows is an IPv4 packet (as would be the case in tunnel mode), while
a value of 6 indicates TCP. The Payload Length field indicates the length of the
Authentication Header in 32-bit words, minus 2. It is needed because the ICV field
may vary in length. The Security Parameters Index (SPI) field is a 32 bit value
identifying the cryptographic parameters (such as the MAC key) that were used
during outbound AH processing. The SPI is shared between sender and recipient,
and allows the recipient to quickly obtain the cryptographic parameters necessary
to perform inbound processing.
54
3.2 Three Ubiquitous Security Protocols
IP header IP payload ESP trailer
ESP headerIP header
in
out
Encrypt
Original IP packet
Encrypted inner packet
ICV
EncryptMAC
Figure 3.6: Encapsulating Security Payload processing of an IP packet in tunnel
mode.
It is clear from the evolution of ESP that its primary purpose is to provide a con-
fidentiality service. In its original version in [4], it only supported encryption with
integrity protection coming from AH. In its second version [63] it was extended
to support one or both (but not neither) of an encryption algorithm and a MAC
algorithm. RFC 4303 extended ESP to additionally support combined mode al-
gorithms (discussed in Section 2.4) that simultaneously provide confidentiality and
authenticity.
In transport mode, an ESP trailer is first appended to the IP packet’s payload and
the result is encrypted. An ESP header is then inserted between the encrypted IP
payload and the IP header. If the packet is to be integrity protected as well, a MAC
is computed over the concatenation of the ESP header and the ciphertext, and the
tag (ICV) is appended to the ciphertext. In tunnel mode, the original IP packet
is first encapsulated in an outer IP packet, and this outer packet is then processed
similarly. Note that in this case, since the inner packet constitutes the payload of
the outer packet, the entire original packet is protected (including its header). The
ESP processing of an IP packet in tunnel mode is illustrated in Figure 3.6, and
Figure 3.7 shows the ESP format in more detail. Note, however, that Figure 3.7
does not apply for combined mode algorithms, which may not have explicit IV or
ICV fields, for example.
The ESP header consists of the SPI and Sequence Number Fields, which are mainly
used in the same way as in AH. However, if integrity protection is not enabled, the
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Figure 3.7: Encapsulating Security Payload format according to RFC 4303 [62].
sequence numbers must be ignored by the recipient. The ESP trailer serves mainly
to ensure that when it is appended to the packet’s payload, the combined length is
an integer multiple of the block size. It consists of the padding, followed by a Pad
Length field and a Next Header field. The Pad Length field indicates the number
of padding bytes present, whereas the Next Header field serves the same purpose as
in AH. It is permissible for the padding to be of variable length and to extend over
multiple blocks. An ESP encryption algorithm may specify its own padding rule;
otherwise a default rule is specified in [62, Section 2.4]. This default padding method
is what is universally used in practice. The default padding consists of either a null
string or t bytes of the form 1, 2, . . . , t for some t with 1 ≤ t ≤ 255.
RFC 4303 introduced two mechanisms for providing traffic flow confidentiality, that
is, the provision of spurious traffic to frustrate an attacker’s attempts to gather
information from the mere existence of IPsec protected traffic, or from statistics
concerning that traffic. These include the optional TFC padding and dummy pack-
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ets. TFC padding can be inserted after the payload data. This is in addition to
the normal ESP padding. However, TFC padding can only be used if the receiver is
able to unambiguously remove it using information about the proper payload length
that is embedded in the payload itself. This will be possible, for example, in tunnel
mode, where the Total Length field in the inner packet header gives the needed
information. In transport mode, this relies on the upper layer protocol format in-
cluding a length field which can be used for the same purpose. Dummy packets
can be indicated simply by using 59 for the protocol value in the Next Header field
and otherwise creating a normal ESP header and trailer. According to RFC 4303,
a receiver must discard any such packet without generating an error message.
RFC 4305 specifies TripleDES-CBC [82] and the NULL algorithm [46] as the manda-
tory encryption algorithms, and recommends support for AES-CBC [44] and AES-
CTR [54]. As for integrity protection, it mandates support for HMAC-SHA1-96
[70] and the NULL algorithm, and recommends support for AES-XCBC-MAC-96
[45]. Other algorithms are allowed; a number of RFCs, such as [94, 55, 74, 66],
specify additional algorithms that could be used with ESP. As already mentioned,
RFC 4303 prohibits that the encryption algorithm and the integrity algorithm be
both set to NULL. RFC 3686 states that if AES-CTR is used in ESP, then it must
be accompanied by a non-NULL integrity protection algorithm. This is because
AES-CTR is vulnerable to simple plaintext manipulation without some additional
integrity protection. Note that RFC 3602 makes no such requirement for AES-
CBC. This appears to be yet another incarnation of a long-standing issue in the
IPsec RFCs [84, 20, 81, 29], in which CBC mode is perceived to offer some form
of integrity protection, and is therefore less prone to plaintext manipulation (and
related attacks).
3.3 Related Theoretical Analysis
Shortly after the work of Bellare and Namprempre on generic composition (dis-
cussed in Section 2.4), Krawczyk published a paper [69] titled ‘The Order of En-
cryption and Authentication for Protecting Communications (or: How Secure Is
SSL?)’. Krawczyk analysed two instantiations of authenticate-then-encrypt, one
where the encryption component is a one-time-pad and CBC encryption in the other.
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He showed that these schemes satisfy IND-CPA security and a one-time variant of
INT-CTXT in which the adversary is only allowed one query to the try oracle. In
[13] it is shown that this one-time variant of INT-CTXT is equivalent to INT-CTXT
up to a factor of qt, where qt is the number of try queries. It thus follows from
Krawczyk’s proof that these two instantiations are secure in the AE sense. However,
in the case of CBC encryption, this result is of limited applicability to SSL/TLS.
Krawczyk’s analysis considers an instantiation in which the message must be a mul-
tiple of the block size, the tag length is equal to block size, and no padding is used.
Unfortunately, this does not cover any usage case of TLS.
Maurer and Tackmann [73] analyse an authenticate-then-encode-then-encrypt com-
position, where the encoding step is meant to model any intermediate formatting
– such as padding. They consider a secure channel formulation of security, within
the framework of constructive cryptography [72]. They show that this composition,
when instantiated with CBC encryption or the one-time-pad, yields a secure channel
when the encoding step is a function. Thus their result only applies in the restricted
case where only minimal padding is allowed.
A more accurate representation of the TLS Record Protocol was recently analysed
by Paterson, Ristenpart and Shrimpton [78]. They consider a security notion called
Length-Hiding Authenticated Encryption (LHAE), extending the AE notion with
the intention to capture a scheme’s limited ability of concealing plaintext lengths.
Their results point out an interesting aspect of the authenticate-then-encode-then-
encrypt composition as used in TLS with CBC encryption (MEE-TLS-CBC). More
specifically they show that the tag size of the MAC, in relation to the block size,
plays a crucial role in the security of the scheme. Their first contribution is a
distinguishing attack against MEE-TLS-CBC that is successful whenever the tag
size is smaller than the block size. The attack exploits variable length padding and
is therefore outside the model of TLS used in [69, 73]. On the other hand, they show
that this composition is LHAE secure as long as the sum of the minimum message
length and the tag size is greater or equal to the block size. Note that in TLS the
minimum message length is zero. An important assumption that is required for their
proof is that decoding errors and MAC verification failures be indistinguishable to
the adversary.
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An analysis of the SSH Binary Packet Protocol was given by Bellare, Kohno and
Namprempre in [16]. They consider several variants of the SSH BPP. They denote
by SSH-IPC (SSH with interpacket chaining) the SSH BPP using CBC mode as
defined in [101]. They present a chosen-plaintext attack against SSH-IPC, which
is attributed to Wei Dai. Next they consider SSH-NPC, which refers to the SSH
BPP using CBC mode without packet chaining, using a fresh, random IV for each
packet, but with a fixed padding format. While this variant is IND-CPA secure, it
is not secure in the IND-CCA sense, as it is vulnerable to a reaction attack1. They
then go on to propose three variants SSH-$NPC, SSH-CTRIV-CBC and SSH-CTR,
which they prove secure in the sense of IND-CPA and INT-sfCTXT, and hence by
Theorem 2.3 is also IND-sfCCA secure. SSH-$NPC refers to the SSH BPP using CBC
mode with random per packet IVs and random padding. SSH-CTRIV-CBC refers
to using CBC mode with IVs generated by encrypting a counter. In this proposal,
the IVs are not transmitted, and the encryption and decryption are stateful. SSH-
CTR refers to the SSH-BPP with counter mode encryption, where the counter is
maintained by the sender and the receiver rather than being transmitted at the start
of the packet.
As we shall see later on, the analysis of Bellare, Kohno, and Namprempre misses
an important practical aspect of the SSH protocol. This relates to the fact that
over the Internet, an SSH ciphertext packet may be delivered in a piecewise fashion.
This gives rise to a new line of attack which turns out to be fatal for the security of
SSH-$NPC [1]. We will give more details about this attack in Section 3.5. Paterson
and Watson [79] look at SSH-CTR as implemented in the OpenSSH distribution.
They prove its security in a model which grants the adversary the ability to deliver
ciphertexts in a piecewise fashion, thereby showing that it is immune to the attack
in [1].
IPsec has not received much formal treatment, probably in part due to its higher
degree of complexity. As we saw in the previous section, when integrity protection
and confidentiality are both enabled in ESP, they are combined in an encrypt-then-
authenticate fashion. Alternatively, it is also possible to compose AH and ESP
both in encrypt-then-authenticate and authenticate-then-encrypt modes. Encrypt-
1In a reaction attack an attacker is able to gain information about a target ciphertext, solely
from learning whether other related but distinct ciphertexts are valid or not.
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then-authenticate was shown in [17] to always yield AE security (if the constituent
primitives meet standard security requirements), albeit the composition they con-
sider omits many specifics of the IPsec encrypt-then-authenticate realisations. As
for authenticate-then-encrypt, none of the aforementioned analyses are relevant to
the IPsec setting. The analysis of [69] omits any intermediate encoding steps, and
it does not consider tag sizes that match the ones used in IPsec. As explained in
Section 3.2.3, the paddings used in IPsec are not required to be minimal, which
means that the results of [73] also do not apply. As for the analysis in [78], even
though they consider non-minimal padding, their results are specific to TLS and
the padding format it uses. In Chapter 4 we will present new results on the secu-
rity of authenticate-then-encrypt in IPsec. Finally, the IPsec RFCs [62] also allow
ESP to be operated with CBC mode encryption only, i.e. without any additional
integrity protection. As early as 1996, Bellovin [20] had sketched a number of at-
tacks to highlight the problems of permitting such a configuration. Nonetheless
these attacks omitted many practical details and their practicality remains ques-
tionable. Later in [81], Paterson and Yau discovered and implemented a series of
plaintext-recovery attacks against the Linux IPsec implementation. However, the
Linux IPsec implementation omitted certain policy checks that were mandated by
the RFCs which would have prevented these attacks. Thus their attack did not pose
a threat to any RFC-compliant IPsec implementation, and was perceived as high-
lighting a vulnerability in Linux rather than in the IPsec standard. The matter was
later settled in [29] by Degabriele and Paterson, who discovered and implemented
full-plaintext recovery attacks against the OpenSolaris IPsec implementation, which
does conform to the IPsec RFCs. Their attack exploits padding oracles, which we
discuss in the next section. Despite such incontestable evidence on the insecurity
of ESP in encryption-only, to this day, this configuration is still permitted by the
IPsec RFCs.
3.4 Padding Oracle Attacks
Padding oracle attacks were first introduced by Vaudenay in [93], and are mostly
specific to CBC encryption2. As we saw earlier, in practice data needs to be padded
2It is possible to extend these attacks to similar modes of operation, such as HCBC [11], but
that is beyond our scope.
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according to some rule before it can be encrypted using CBC mode. Many padding
schemes that are used in practice are susceptible to padding oracle attacks. Padding
oracle attacks assume a setting in which the attacker has access to a special oracle
O(·) that reveals whether a ciphertext is correctly padded or not. This attack model
was first considered by Bleichenbacher [21], in the public-key setting, to attack
PKCS#1 v1.5 a padding scheme suited to RSA encryption. Vaudenay showed that
for many widely-used padding schemes, a padding oracle can be leveraged by an
attacker to decrypt CBC-encrypted ciphertexts, using a relatively small number of
queries to the oracle.
For concreteness consider the padding scheme employed in TLS. Here, a correctly
padded ciphertext means that the CBC decryption of the ciphertext is a byte string
ending in one of the valid padding patterns “0x00”, “0x00 ‖ 0x01”, etc. Let c∗
be the target ciphertext that an attacker wishes to decrypt, and denote by c∗i the
ith block of this ciphertext. For any ciphertext block c, we index its bytes by cj
for 0 ≥ j ≤ b − 1 starting with the leftmost byte, where b is the block size in
bytes. Vaudenay’s padding oracle attack proceeds as follows. The attacker forges
a new ciphertext r ‖ c∗i by appending the target ciphertext block c∗i to a block r
that it picks uniformly at random. It then submits this ciphertext to the padding
oracle. Due to the block r being random, the decryption of this ciphertext will
yield a random block of plaintext. As such, it is unlikely that this plaintext block
will be correctly padded. However, in the event that it is, the most likely case is
when the last byte is “0x00”. The probability of this event occurring is 2−8. The
attacker can however iterate through all possible values of this last byte by iterating
through all possible values of r[b− 1]. When a value for r[b− 1] is found such that
O(r ‖ c∗i ) returns valid, it means that r[b − 1]⊕DK(c∗i )[b − 1] = “0x00”. Next
the attacker aims to find a ciphertext that terminates with the padding “0x01 ‖
0x01”. It thus sets r[b − 1] such that the last byte of the decrypted ciphertext is
“0x01”, and iterates through all possible values of r[b− 2] until the padding oracle
returns valid again. The attacker continues this process, extending the padding
byte by byte, until the padding fills the complete block. At this point it knows
that r ⊕DK(c∗i ) = “0x(b− 1) ‖ . . . ‖ 0x(b− 1)”. Since it knows r, it can compute
the block DK(c∗i ). It can then recover the plaintext block corresponding to c∗i by
computing DK(c∗i )⊕ c∗i−1. All other blocks in the target ciphertext can be recovered
similarly, requiring at most b× 28 oracle queries per block.
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In the above we have assumed that the first validly padded ciphertext that is found
by the attacker corresponds to the shortest padding pattern. The odd cases where
this does not hold are easy to detect, and are in fact desirable as they reduce the
overall complexity of the attack. In addition it is easy to see that the attack can
be easily adapted to other padding schemes of similar formats. What remains to
address is how to realise the padding oracle itself. In [93] Vaudenay conjectured
that padding oracles could possibly be realised for TLS, IPsec and SSH. In the case
of TLS for instance, he outlined how error messages from a TLS server could be
used to leak the validity of padding in ciphertexts. Such errors however are fatal, in
that they result in the TLS connection being torn down, which prevents the above
attack. Thus the attack as described in [93] remains theoretical in nature. Later
works [27, 29, 30, 37, 57, 2, 3] managed to overcome such practical limitations, and
realised variants of Vaudenay’s attack against practical cryptosystems such as TLS,
IPsec, ASP.NET, XML encryption and DTLS. We will not cover the details of these
attacks at this point, but we will return back to them later on in this thesis. In
particular we will cover in depth some attacks against IPsec that were published in
[30] in Chapter 4.
3.5 A Ciphertext Fragmentation Attack on SSH
We conclude this chapter by presenting an attack against SSH due to Albrecht,
Paterson and Watson [1]. The attack works only when SSH is used with CBC
mode encryption, and can recover up to 32 bits of plaintext from any ciphertext
block. In order to understand the attack, let us first consider how decryption takes
place in the SSH BPP. Remember that over a TCP/IP network, a BPP packet
may be fragmented and delivered in a piecewise fashion. Since there is no length
indicator for a BPP packet other than the content of the packet length field, any
SSH implementation must decrypt the first ciphertext block to obtain that field
and use it to determine how much data to accept before deciding that a complete
BPP packet has arrived and moving on to perform the MAC check. Thus an SSH
implementation will await further data, unless sufficient data has already arrived to
complete the packet.
An attacker can exploit this step in the decryption process as follows. Given any
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target ciphertext block c∗i , an attacker can obtain the first 4 bytes of the correspond-
ing plaintext block. Let c∗i−1 denote the block preceding c
∗
i in the ciphertext stream,
and let c` denote the last ciphertext block transmitted. The attacker sends to the
receiver as a first fragment of ciphertext the block c∗i , so that it is interpreted as
the block containing the length field. Then the attacker feeds a sequence of random
1-block fragments to the receiver, until an (encrypted) error message is returned and
the SSH session is terminated. At this point, the attacker knows that the MAC has
been checked, and so knows that the complete ciphertext has been received by the
decryption oracle. The number of 1-block fragments needed to trigger this event,
then, reveals the value of the length field which corresponds to the first 4 bytes of
DK(c∗i )⊕ c`. The attacker can then use this to compute the first 4 bytes of the
target plaintext block DK(c∗i )⊕ c∗i−1.
The above exposition omits a number of important details; what happens for in-
stance if the length field in DK(c∗i )⊕ c` is not a multiple of the block length? Upon
recovering the length field, the decryption algorithm performs a number of checks
to verify its validity. The OpenSSH implementation for instance would check3 that
the length field is not less than 5 or greater than 218. The latter bound is intended
to mitigate against certain Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks that relate to ciphertext
fragmentation4. If this check fails the session is terminated and an error message
is sent over the connection. The OpenSSH implementation then verifies that the
total number of bytes expected in the packet is a multiple of the block size. This
check is also fatal, in that if it fails the SSH session is terminated, but no error
message is sent. However the attacker can detect such an event, as it will result in a
termination of the TCP connection over which the SSH session is running. Thus, if
after injecting c∗i , the TCP connection over which the SSH connection is running is
terminated without an SSH error message (indicating a failure of the second length
check) or the SSH connection enters a state in which it is waiting for more data,
then the attacker knows that the decrypted block has passed the first length check.
This implies that the first 14 bits of the decrypted block are all zero. At this point
the attacker can already recover the first 14 bits, and it succeeds with probability
2−14 − 5/218 ≈ 2−14. If the SSH connection enters a wait state, then both checks
have passed and the attacker can continue as described above by injecting 1-block
3After that the attack in [1] was reported, these validation checks have been amended in later
versions of OpenSSH.
4We will elaborate more on such DoS attacks in Chapter 6.
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fragments until a MAC-related error message is triggered. This allows the attacker
to recover all 4 bytes, but the attack succeeds only with a probability of roughly
2−18 (assuming a block size of 128 bits).
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In this chapter we present new attacks against authenticate-then-encrypt configura-
tions of IPsec. We elaborate on the practical details and our experience in imple-
menting the attacks.
4.1 Introduction
IPsec is a notoriously complex protocol suite, but one of great importance in today’s
Internet. Part of IPsec’s complexity arises from a deliberate attempt by IPsec’s de-
signers to provide a flexible and highly configurable approach to providing security
services for IP traffic. The RFCs specifying the major component protocols ESP,
AH, IKE [61, 62, 60] and that describing the IPsec architecture [65] offer only limited
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guidance to end users about how best to configure IPsec to achieve their desired se-
curity goals. Moreover, little security analysis of IPsec seems to have been published.
In particular, whilst it is by now well-established that using ESP in encryption-only
configurations is insecure in general [20, 81, 29], there appears to have been no sys-
tematic security evaluation of the many different ways of combining encryption and
integrity protection that are allowed by IPsec:
• ESP may provide its own integrity protection, in which case it is provided by
a MAC algorithm that is applied after ESP’s encryption – an encrypt-then-
authenticate construction.
• Alternatively, AH can be used to provide the protection, again using a MAC
algorithm, though with the MAC algorithm having a greater scope than in
ESP. In this case, packets may be first integrity protected by AH and then
encrypted using ESP, or first encrypted by ESP and then integrity protected
by AH (where now the extended scope of AH’s integrity protection means
that more fields of the IP header are protected than would be the case with
ESP-provided integrity protection).
• It is even possible to achieve an authenticate-then-encrypt construction using
two layers of ESP processing.
• Further, the current version of ESP allows combined-mode algorithms to be
used, wherein encryption and integrity protection are rolled into a single pro-
cessing step.
• In all of the above configurations, AH and/or ESP may each be applied in
either tunnel mode or transport mode.
• To add a final dimension, both AH and ESP allow sequence number checking
to be performed as an option, in order to provide protection against replay
attacks. This replay protection service should be disabled if manual keying
is used (see [61, Section 5] and [62, Section 3.3.3]), is recommended to be
disabled for multicast traffic ([62, Section 3.4.3]), and may be problematic
when differentiated classes of traffic are protected by a single SA ([65, Section
4.1]). As we shall see, whether the replay protection service is disabled or not
has a significant impact on some of our attacks.
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It is notable that the previous version of the IPsec architecture [64] was more specific
about which combinations must or must not be supported in IPsec implementations
than is the current version [65]: the former required support for some basic config-
urations and explicitly outlawed the combination of AH followed by ESP both in
transport mode, while the latter makes no prohibitions.
What guidance can be extracted from the literature? Theoretical support for the
encrypt-then-MAC options comes from [17, 69], where it is shown that this approach
generically provides IND-CCA security if the component encryption algorithm is IND-
CPA secure (as is the case, for example, for CBC mode encryption with a random
IV — see Section 2.3.3) and the component MAC algorithm is strongly unforgeable.
Concerning authenticate-then-encrypt options, it is noted in [65] that “an under-
lying integrity service, such as AH, applied before encryption does not necessarily
protect the encryption-only confidentiality against active attackers”, suggesting that
such configurations should be avoided. Here, [65] cites [69] for theoretical support.
However, a closer examination of [69] shows that it contains positive security results
about the authenticate-then-encrypt construction when the encryption scheme is
implemented using either a secure stream cipher or CBC mode of a block cipher.
These are the primary encryption schemes currently supported by IPsec standards.
Moreover, the known examples in [17, 69] showing that authenticate-then-encrypt
constructions are not generically secure are rather artificial. Thus the results of
[69] could be interpreted as providing support for authenticate-then-encrypt config-
urations of IPsec. Further support comes from a widely-cited critique of IPsec by
Schneier and Ferguson [39], which states “When both encryption and authentication
are provided, IPsec performs the encryption first, and authenticates the ciphertext.
In our opinion this is the wrong order” and later goes on to say “The ordering of
encryption and authentication in IPsec is dangerous.” In [39] the argument is made
that a protocol should authenticate what was meant, not what was said, with SSL
as analysed in [95] being given as an example of a protocol adopting the “correct”
approach of authenticate-then-encrypt. Moreover, a putative attack against encrypt-
then-authenticate configurations of IPsec is given in [39], lending further support to
the authenticate-then-encrypt choice for IPsec1. A standard textbook on network
1However this attack requires the receiver to use the wrong key when decrypting, and it is hard
to envisage the circumstances under which this could occur in IPsec, except perhaps with re-use of
SPIs in a manually-keyed deployment.
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security [92] discusses several benefits that accrue from using an authenticate-then-
encrypt configuration of IPsec, including the ability to store MAC values along with
plaintexts for later checking. A textbook aimed at implementers of cryptography [40]
extensively discusses the merits and demerits of the MAC-then-encrypt approach to
building secure channels, and eventually recommends this construction over other
choices.
In summary there seems to be no solid argument about the security of authenticate-
then-encrypt configurations in IPsec. Theoretical results appear to be ‘too coarse’
to be meaningful for the case of IPsec, while all claims found in the literature that
are specific to IPsec are heuristic in nature. In addition, given the arguments on
both sides, and in the absence of firm guidance from the RFCs or other sources,
it seems plausible that a network administrator might well be tempted into select-
ing a authenticate-then-encrypt configuration of IPsec. In what follows we settle
this matter in the negative. We present a series of practical attacks against all
authenticate-then-encrypt IPsec configurations.
4.2 Preliminaries
Our attacks build on Vaudenay’s padding oracle attack [93], and exploit the interplay
between IP and IPsec in order to realise the padding oracle. For concreteness, we
study the common use case of using IPsec to build a simple site-to-site VPN, such
as the one illustrated in Figure 4.1. We assume that all cryptographic processing is
carried out at a pair of security gateways, but our attacks also extend to situations
where AH processing is carried out at hosts behind the gateways. Our attacks
come in three basic flavours, each with two main variants depending on whether
IPsec’s optional replay protection is enabled or not. Our attacks are powerful in
the sense that they can be used to recover plaintext from arbitrary IPsec-protected
packets. But they each have different characteristics in terms of their complexity,
their requirements for the attacker’s degree of control over the network, and their
plaintext requirements.
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IPsec tunnel
Gateway G Gateway G
A
B
A B
Host H
Host H
Figure 4.1: Network set-up.
4.2.1 IP and IPsec
Introductions to IP and IPsec, sufficient to understand the material in this chapter,
were presented in Section 3.1 and in Section 3.2.3 respectively. We now highlight
some of the finer details that relate to our attacks. Our exposition of the attacks
will initially assume an authenticate-then-encrypt configuration in which AH is first
applied in transport mode, followed by (encryption-only) ESP in tunnel mode. The
resulting packet format is illustrated in Figure 4.2. We will then elaborate on how
the attacks can be extended to the other configurations. Throughout we will assume
that CBC encryption is in use. A modification of our attacks would work against
AES-CTR, if it were not for the fact that [54] specifying AES-CTR requires that it
must be used in combination with ESP-provided integrity protection, implicitly in
an encrypt-then-authenticate construction. For ease of exposition we assume 64-bit
extended sequence numbers are not selected, but our attacks still work if they are.
AH IP payload ESP trailerESP headerIP header out IP header in
encryption scope
authentication scope
Figure 4.2: IPsec packet format assumed in the exposition of our attacks.
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In our attacks we assume that the relevant RFCs have been carefully followed by
an implementer. For example, our attacks exploit the recommendation of the ESP
RFC [62] to perform full padding checks when decrypting, and two of them rely on
support for Traffic Flow Confidentiality (TFC) padding that is mandated in [62].
One of the attacks depends on the details of IPsec’s treatment of fragmented packets,
while all depend on the manner in which IPsec handles ICMP traffic. Our attacks
are developed with the RFC specifications in mind, but previous work [29] has shown
that IPsec implementations do deviate significantly from the RFCs in ways that can
stop attacks from working in practice. To compensate for this, we report on the
experimental validation of our attacks against the OpenSolaris implementation of
IPsec, showing that two out of three of our attacks ‘on paper’ can be converted
into working attacks against a real implementation. Our choice of OpenSolaris was
driven by the high quality of its code and its close adherence to the IPsec RFCs, and
not because it has any particular weaknesses that we wanted to exploit. We believe
that our attacks would apply to any comparably careful implementation of IPsec.
The IPsec architectural RFC [65] explains in detail how IPsec should handle ICMP
messages, distinguishing between error and non-error messages. Our attacks use
ICMP messages of both types, and the specific messages used in our attacks are not
blocked by IPsec. However, they are only visible to the attacker in encrypted form
and so typically need to be detected by their characteristic (though implementation-
dependent) lengths, or via timing correlation.
4.2.2 Mauling IPsec-Protected Packets
In our attacks, we will flip certain bits in the headers of inner datagrams, by flipping
bits in the initial vectors of ciphertexts (explained in Section 2.3.3). Any such mod-
ifications will require further compensation to be made elsewhere in the header so
that the Header Checksum (calculated as the 1’s complement of the 1’s complement
sum of the 16-bit words in the IP header) is still correct – otherwise the inner data-
gram will be silently dropped. In [29, 81], a number of techniques were developed
for ‘correcting’ checksums in an efficient manner. We need to further develop these
techniques so that our attacks are efficient for the IPsec configurations considered
here.
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Considering each 16-bit field in the IP header as an unsigned integer, suppose we
wish to subtract the value δ from one of these 16-bit fields. Let S represent the 1’s
complement sum of all the 16-bit fields over which the checksum is computed, then
the IP header checksum is given by S (the complement of S). Thus the new value of
the IP header checksum should be set to (S  δ) where  denotes 1’s complement
addition. Then we need to select a 16-bit value mask such that:
mask⊕ S = (S  δ)
and XOR this value mask to the appropriate field in the IV. We can rewrite this
equation as:
mask = S ⊕ (S  δ) = S ⊕ (S  δ).
Hence we can, for a fixed value of δ, compute all possible solutions mask to the
above equation along with their probabilities of success in correcting the checksum,
assuming that S is a uniformly distributed 16-bit value. We then use the list of
possible values mask in order of decreasing probability when trying to correct the
checksum.
An example is in order. Suppose we wish to decrease the TTL field from a known
value 0xFF to the value 0x00 and correct the checksum. Because of the position
of the TTL field in the IP header, this implies a 16-bit value δ = 0xFF00. Some
of the resulting 66 masks having non-zero probability are shown in Table 4.1 along
with their probabilities, which were calculated by exhaustive search over S. In this
case, the number of trials required is decreased from the average of 215 that would
be needed using the methods of [29, 81] to an average of only 6.75. On the other
hand, assuming nothing about the TTL field except that it is uniformly distributed,
then a simple calculation using a variant of this approach shows that the expected
number of trials needed to set the TTL field to 0x00 and correct the checksum is
only 382.
This idea can be combined with the idea from [29] of using the ID field to compensate
for the bit flips, rather than the checksum field itself. Because of the location of this
field in the second 32-bit word of the IP header, this allows the above improvements
to be deployed even for a 64-bit block cipher.
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mask probability
0000 0001 0000 0001 2−2
0000 0011 0000 0001 2−3
0000 0001 0000 0011 2−3
0000 0111 0000 0001 2−4
0000 0011 0000 0011 2−4
0000 0001 0000 0111 2−4
0000 0001 0000 1111 2−5
...
...
1111 1111 1111 1111 2−16
Table 4.1: Table of masks and probabilities for δ = 0xFF00
4.2.3 ESP Trailer Oracles
Our attacks will make use of ESP trailer oracles, a concept introduced in [29] as an
extension of the padding oracle concept from [93]. Such an oracle tells the attacker
whether or not the trailer fields (including padding, pad length and NH bytes) of an
encryption-only ESP-protected packet are correctly formatted — see Section 3.2.3
for the ESP trailer format. It is shown in [29] how repeated access to such an oracle
allows an attacker to decrypt ESP-protected ciphertext blocks in a byte-by-byte
fashion, at a cost of at most 216 queries to the oracle to extract the rightmost 2
bytes of the target block and at most 28 queries for each remaining byte of the
target block. We next outline how the ideas from Section 3.4 can be adapted to the
case of IPsec.
Suppose we have a carrier packet that is protected by encryption-only ESP in tunnel
mode, and a target ciphertext block c∗i (from any packet protected by the same key
K). The rightmost 2 bytes of c∗i are extracted as follows. We splice blocks r, c
∗
i onto
the end of the carrier packet, and submit this new packet to the oracle. Here r is
a randomly selected block. By varying the rightmost 2 bytes of r in a systematic
fashion, we can explore all possible values of the rightmost 2 plaintext bytes in the
block r⊕DK(c∗i ); these are interpreted as the Pad Length and Next Header bytes of
the ESP trailer by the oracle, and it is argued in [29] that, with high probability, only
the values 00,04 for these bytes will produce a positive response from the oracle.
Once the oracle responds positively, the corresponding original plaintext bytes from
ci−1⊕DK(c∗i ) can be easily recovered by simple XOR arithmetic. The attack is then
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extended to plaintext bytes further to the left in the block by trying to construct
longer valid trailer byte patterns, starting with 01,01,04.
This leaves the question of how to construct an ESP trailer oracle. This problem
was solved in [29] for the encryption-only case by constructing a special packet that,
providing the packet was not dropped because of a failure of ESP’s padding checks,
always generated some kind of error response. Usually this takes the form of an
ICMP message. In [29], for tunnel mode, encryption only ESP, this was done by
using CBC bit flipping and checksum correction to create a packet whose inner
packet had an unsupported protocol field. The resulting ICMP message is usually
transmitted in encrypted form on the IPsec tunnel, but it was shown in [29] how such
messages can be detected based on characteristic lengths or via timing correlation.
In summary, to mount this kind of attack, we need a carrier packet that produces
a detectable response whenever ESP’s trailer formatting checks pass. In [29], this
required modification of IP header fields in the inner packet. This clearly creates
a problem when the inner packet is protected by AH, as it is in the situations we
are interested in here: now modifications to header fields may be detected by AH
processing and the packets dropped, causing the oracle to be lost. An extra level
of complication arises if AH’s replay protection is enabled: now, each carefully-
constructed carrier packet can only be used once, since if it were to be repeated, its
inner packet would be deemed to be a replay during AH processing and so dropped,
again causing the ESP trailer oracle to be lost. Finally, we also want to consider
transport mode configurations of IPsec, and additional ideas are needed to cater for
this.
As we explain in the sections that follow, all of these problems can be overcome and
appropriate ESP trailer oracles constructed.
4.3 The Attacks
We begin by describing our three basic attack ideas in the context of the IPsec
configuration depicted in Figure 4.2 that first applies AH in transport mode and
then ESP (encryption only) in tunnel mode to packets flowing from GA to GB. This
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seems to us to be the most natural MAC-then-encrypt configuration, and it also
turns out to be the easiest to attack. We then go on to explain how to extend the
attacks to other MAC-then-encrypt configurations. In each case, we explain how to
recover the plaintext block corresponding to a single target ciphertext block c∗i . Of
course, all of the attacks extend to multiple blocks in the obvious way.
4.3.1 Attack 1: A Chosen Plaintext Attack
Our first attack requires a single chosen plaintext and can recover arbitrary IPsec-
protected plaintext. The attack exploits the fact that neither TFC padding nor
ESP’s normal encryption padding are protected by AH’s MAC, and that, in accor-
dance with [62], these bytes are discarded by the receiver before the inner packet is
passed to AH.
Suppose for now that AH replay protection is disabled, and recall that ESP replay
protection will always be disabled in this configuration. Suppose the attacker has
available a single IPsec-protected packet of the form depicted in Figure 4.2, for
which the inner IP packet has as its payload an ICMP echo request, which can be
directed either to the gateway GB itself or to a host behind that gateway. Clearly,
if this packet is injected into the network towards GB, we will see an (encrypted)
ICMP echo reply message in the reverse direction on the VPN between GA and GB.
Moreover, because AH and ESP sequence number checking is disabled, this packet,
if repeatedly injected into the network, will always cause such a response. This
packet can be used directly as a carrier in an ESP trailer oracle attack, as described
in Section 4.2.3. Here, ESP’s handling of TFC bytes ensures that the inner packet
presented to AH after ESP processing at GB always passes AH’s MAC check, even
after the blocks r, c∗i have been spliced onto the carrier packet. This is because after
the ESP trailer is checked and removed, any remaining plaintext resulting from the
spliced blocks together with the original ESP trailer will be interpreted as TFC
padding and discarded. Moreover, none of these discarded bytes are covered by
AH’s MAC. So, with a single chosen plaintext and an average of slightly more than
215 trial packet injections, any complete block of plaintext can be recovered.
This attack applies no matter what are the key-size and block-size of ESP’s encryp-
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tion algorithm. It can also be applied if the inner IP packet carries TCP instead of
ICMP: now every received TCP segment provokes a TCP ACK packet of some type
in response, so every modified carrier packet that passes ESP processing at GB will
generate a detectable message in the reverse direction. Even if the TCP connection
for the TCP segment in the carrier packet is already closed, a TCP RST packet will
be sent in response, so our attacker will always get the response he requires. This
applies whether the endpoints for the TCP connection are the gateways themselves
or hosts behind these gateways. Assuming that the inner IP payload carries a TCP
message is a mild chosen plaintext assumption. This can be replaced by an even
weaker assumption by simply observing packets to see which ones generate replies,
and then using one of those packets as the carrier packet.
Attack 1 with AH replay protection enabled We can extend the above attack
to the case where sequence number checking is on. The attacker first gathers, for
each byte (or pair of bytes in case of the rightmost bytes) of plaintext that he wishes
to extract, a packet that is expected to generate a reply. These packets might carry
ICMP or TCP, for example. We make the assumption that the attacker can put
these carrier packets in order of (roughly) increasing AH sequence number. This is
reasonable, since they are likely to be intercepted in such an order. The attacker also
needs to control the flow of packets on the network so that the sequence numbers
in his carrier packets are always seen as being ‘fresh’ during any AH processing
at GB for the duration of his attack. This can be achieved by firstly blocking
all other packets from GA to GB except the attacker’s carrier packets during the
attack, and secondly by switching to the next carrier packet each time a response
packet is detected on the VPN between GA and GB. The latter step coupled with
our assumption about AH sequence number ordering ensures that, each time ESP
trailer processing completes and AH processing is done, packets are not rejected by
AH because they have repeated (or old) sequence numbers. Otherwise, the attack
is as before.
For ease of presentation, we have described a simple version of the attack that
requires the attacker to control the flow of traffic during the attack. It can be
adapted to be less disruptive to traffic flow by making use of carrier packets as they
become available to the attacker, but this would be more complex to implement.
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The only drawbacks of Attack 1 are its very mild assumptions about the nature of
plaintexts, its consumption of multiple carrier packets when AH replay protection is
enabled, and the complexity of implementing the attack in a non-disruptive manner
in this case.
4.3.2 Attack 2: TTL Expiry
Our second attack exploits the fact that the AH MAC cannot cover all the fields of
the inner IP header. In particular, the TTL and checksum fields are unprotected and
so can be manipulated by the attacker. This attack allows us to relax the plaintext
requirements in comparison to the previous attack. However, we require that IP
packets on the VPN are directed to hosts behind GB. Again, we begin by assuming
that AH replay protection is disabled.
Attack 2, Step 1 We begin with a one-time preparation step. Suppose the
attacker captures an arbitrary IPsec-protected packet intended for a host behind
GB. The attacker can manipulate bits in the IV of the CBC-mode ciphertext after
the ESP header, with the effect of reducing the TTL field in the inner header to 0.
This requires the header checksum to be corrected, and here we rely on the improved
method described in Section 4.2.2. For example, supposing the TTL field’s original
value is 0x40, then on average 2 trials are needed, while if the original value is 0xFF,
then on average 6.75 trials are needed. Alternatively, we might only assume that
the TTL field is uniformly distributed; then, by carefully scheduling the bit flips
applied to the TTL and checksum fields in an extension of the method of Section
4.2.2, we can simultaneously reduce the TTL field to 0 and correct the checksum
using an expected number of 382 trials.
In each case, after a certain expected number of trials, the attacker succeeds in
creating an IPsec-protected packet for which the TTL field in the inner IP header
is 0, the checksum in the inner IP header is correct, and the AH MAC on the inner
packet verifies. Because the inner packet should be forwarded to a host behind
the gateway GB, such an IP packet should always induce GB to produce an ICMP
response (of type 11 and code 0). We will use this IP packet in step 2 as a carrier
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packet. In the case when the starting value of the TTL field is not known, we need
to be careful to distinguish this ICMP response from any other replies that may
arise when the IP header checksum is correct but the TTL has not been successfully
set to 0.
Attack 2, Step 2 The attacker now mounts an ESP trailer oracle attack using the
carrier packet constructed in step 1, splicing blocks r, c∗i onto the end of the carrier
packet for different values r, starting with the 216 variants in the rightmost 2 bytes
of r. As with Attack 1, we rely on ESP’s handling of TFC bytes to ensure that the
inner packet presented to AH after successful ESP processing at GB always passes
AH’s MAC check, even with the blocks r, c∗i spliced onto the carrier packet. On
average, after 215 trials, an ICMP response will be detected in the reverse direction
on the VPN between GA and GB. This indicates a particular value of r for which
the packet ending in r, c∗i passed the ESP trailer checks. The attack now continues
in the usual way.
This attack only applies for encryption algorithms with 128-bit block size, because
we must be able to manipulate the TTL field in the inner IP header, and this is
located beyond the first 64 bits of the header. In step 2, the attack requires an
average of 215 + 14 · 27 trial packet injections to recover any complete 128-bit block
of plaintext.
Attack 2 with AH replay protection enabled We can modify the above attack
to cope with the situation where AH replay protection is enabled. The main differ-
ence is that we can no longer re-use a single carrier packet constructed in a first step,
because once AH processing has been triggered (after successful ESP processing),
a fixed carrier packet’s AH sequence number would always be rejected thereafter.
To overcome this, we combine the carrier packet generation and ESP trailer oracle
steps. Thus, for each choice of r used in a normal attack, we must splice r, c∗i onto a
sequence of trial packets, with each trial starting with a base packet and attempting
to manipulate the TTL field, correct the checksum, pass ESP trailer processing,
pass AH processing, and finally generate an ICMP message. Clearly, for each suc-
cess in this endeavour, the attacker can extract 2 or 1 plaintext bytes (depending
on whether the rightmost bytes are being targeted or not), and must move on to a
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new base packet with a fresh sequence number for each success.
For an assumed inner TTL field of, say 0xFF, an average of 6.25×216 trials are needed
to extract the rightmost 2 bytes of any block, and an average of 6.25 × 28 trials
for each byte thereafter. Extracting each block of plaintext requires the attacker
to have gathered 16 IPsec-protected packets with roughly increasing AH sequence
numbers, and also to block other traffic on the VPN while the attack is in progress.
If nothing is assumed about the starting TTL value, then the attacker would first
conduct a reconnaissance phase to ascertain likely TTL values (since only a few
possible different values would be expected, depending on the particular OS involved
and the number of hops between the end host generating the inner packet and
the gateway GA). This would involve testing possible TTL value and checksum
correction masks in a systematic manner in an effort to produce an ICMP response,
with an expected number of 382 trials being needed (assuming the TTL field is
uniformly distributed). Once the likely TTL values have been determined, the attack
can proceed as just described for known TTL values. The attack can still be mounted
without a reconnaissance phase, or with unstable inner TTL field values, but it
becomes rather expensive in terms of the number of packet injections needed.
4.3.3 Attack 3: Fragmentation
In the previous two attacks we endeavoured not to tamper with authenticated por-
tions of payloads, instead making use of intercepted packets that generate some form
of reply at the receiver, or by manipulating portions of the ESP payload that are not
protected by AH. Our third attack adopts a different approach, managing to avoid
the plaintext requirements of the previous two attacks. We now craft packets that
will generate replies whilst completely bypassing AH processing at the receiver. The
basic idea is that, after ESP decapsulation of a crafted packet, the receiver discovers
that the ESP payload contains only a fragment of the packet that was originally
protected by AH; since AH’s MAC cannot be verified unless the receiver has the
complete packet, the MAC check will not occur and AH will enter a state in which
it waits for further fragments. Eventually, this state will time-out, and generate an
error message that is detected by the adversary.
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Attack 3, Step 1 We begin with a one-time preparation step. Suppose the
attacker captures an arbitrary IPsec-protected packet intended for GB. The attacker
can manipulate bits in the ID field and the MF and DF bits by flipping bits in the
IV of the CBC-mode ciphertext after the ESP header, with the effect of turning the
inner packet (that is still protected by AH) into something that is interpreted by the
receiver as a fragment. Here, we need to set the MF bit, possibly unset the DF bit,
and then use the ID field to compensate the checksum, as discussed in Section 4.2.2.
(Alternatively, we can manipulate the fragment offset and ID fields with similar
results.) This can be done even for a block cipher having a 64-bit block, and with a
small number of trial masks to determine how to flip bits in the IV. In fact, because
of the specific bit flips involved, at most 17 trial packets are needed. This is because
for a single bit flip in the IP header, there correspond 17 possible masks, of which
only one will result in a valid checksum. The attacker injects all the trial packets in
rapid succession, then waits. All the packets will be successfully processed by ESP
at GB, where all but one will have incorrect checksums and be dropped silently by
the gateway. The one that has a correct checksum will be interpreted as a fragment,
so IPsec will wait for the arrival of further fragments in an attempt to reassemble
the original packets before any further AH processing takes place at GB. Eventually,
because the further fragments never arrive, the first remaining fragment provokes
the production of an ICMP fragment reassembly time exceeded message (of type
11 and code 1) in the reverse direction on the VPN between GA and GB, as per
Section 3.1. Because of the predictability of the time-out interval, the attacker can
correlate the time of appearance of this packet with the time of injection of the
trial packets to determine exactly which trial packet was the first one with a correct
checksum. This trial packet will be the attacker’s carrier packet for the second step
in the attack. Note that, whenever this packet is injected into the network towards
GB, it will eventually produce an ICMP response after a suitable time-out period.
Attack 3, Step 2 Now that the preparation phase is complete, the attacker has
a carrier packet that can be used to create an ESP trailer oracle. This step works
largely as before: the attacker splices blocks r, c∗i onto the end of the carrier packet
for different values r, starting with the 216 variants in the rightmost 2 bytes of r.
Here c∗i is any target block. He injects these 2
16 trial packets into the network
towards GB, looking for an ICMP message in the reverse direction. He correlates
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the appearance time of the ICMP message with the injection time of trial packets in
order to identify the value of r which led to the ICMP message being produced, again
using the predictable nature of the fragmentation time-out. The packet with this
value of r must have passed ESP processing, indicating that its trailer field ended
with the bytes 00,04. From this, the rightmost 2 bytes of c∗i can be deduced in the
usual way. The attacker now continues to extract bytes further to the left, again by
modifying r, creating trial packets, injecting them and correlating the appearance
time of the ICMP message with the injection time of trial packets to identify the
successful value of r. Each subsequent plaintext byte that is extracted needs the
injection of 28 trial packets.
The modifications made to the inner packet in this attack do not cause any problems
for AH processing, because the attack bypasses this processing. In this sense, the
attack exploits the non-atomic nature of IPsec processing, and the complexities
arising from IPsec needing to support IP fragmentation. It works for 64-bit and
128-bit ciphers (using the fact that checksums can be corrected by manipulating the
ID field for the 64-bit case). It has no known or chosen plaintext requirements and
extracts complete plaintext blocks. Its only disadvantage is that, no matter how
fast the attacker can inject the (roughly) 216 trial packets needed, he must wait for
the IP fragmentation time-out after each pair of bytes/individual byte. As noted
previously, this time-out is recommended to be 60-120 seconds, though it is only 15
seconds in the OpenSolaris implementation. This, then, is the limiting factor for the
rate at which the attacker can extract plaintext.
Attack 3 with AH replay protection enabled The key feature of this attack
is that AH processing is bypassed altogether. Thus, the carrier packet created in
step 1 of the attack continues to produce IP fragmentation time-outs even when
used repeatedly in step 2. So, in this case, enabling AH replay protection does not
present any additional barrier to the attack. In fact this attack is much easier to
mount than our first two attacks when AH replay protection is enabled, because it
has no chosen plaintext assumptions, only a single packet is needed in the attack,
no control over the traffic flow is needed, and it avoids the complications required
to implement the previous attacks without disrupting the traffic flow.
80
4.4 Attacking Other Configurations
4.4 Attacking Other Configurations
Having given a detailed discussion of three different attack types against the ‘AH
Transport + ESP Tunnel’ configuration, we move on to other configurations in which
AH is followed by encryption-only ESP. We omit discussion of ‘ESP (auth only) +
ESP (enc only)’ configurations: since the scope of AH’s integrity protection is always
greater than that of ESP, it is easy to see that any attack against some ‘AH + ESP’
configuration will also apply to the corresponding ‘ESP (auth only) + ESP (enc
only)’ configuration.
AH Tunnel + ESP Tunnel: In this configuration the IPsec-protected packets
now contain a total of 3 IP headers, since the tunnel processing is applied twice.
Here, Attacks 1 and 3 still work with simple modifications, but Attack 2 does not,
since the TTL field that needs to be manipulated is the one in the innermost IP
header, and this is protected by AH (and cannot be reached from ESP’s IV any
more).
AH Tunnel + ESP Transport: Here, Attack 2 does not work, since this attack
needs to manipulate fields in the inner IP header which can no longer be reached
from ESP’s IV because of the intervening AH bytes. In Attack 3 we forge an ESP
datagram whose payload contains only a fragment of an AH-authenticated IP packet.
This is only allowed to happen when ESP is in tunnel mode; in fact there is no way
of indicating such an instance when ESP in transport mode is used. As such, Attack
3 cannot be mounted either.
Attack 1 requires some extra assumptions to make it work in this configuration.
Firstly, the ‘expected’ value of the NH byte in the ESP trailer is 51, indicating AH
as the next protocol, rather than 04 as before. However, it may be that more byte
values are accepted here by IPsec processing, depending on how liberal the IPsec
policies are at the gateway. This increases the success probability when extracting
the rightmost 2 bytes, but may leave some uncertainty about the exact value of the
rightmost byte of the recovered plaintext block. In practice, only 51 for the NH
byte will lead to the production of a response message, since other values will lead
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to the AH data bytes being misinterpreted as coming from a different upper layer
protocol, and the data will most likely not be correctly formatted for that protocol.
Secondly, the attacker relies on ESP processing at GB to interpret the original data
in the ESP trailer and some of the bytes in the spliced blocks r, c∗i as being TFC
padding, and to be able to remove these bytes before submitting the resulting packet
to AH processing. For, otherwise, the packet would contain extra bytes and these
would cause the AH MAC verification to fail. This requires the ESP implementation
at GB to support TFC padding for transport mode ESP, and to know how to inspect
the AH and the inner IP length fields to calculate how many bytes of data should
remain after TFC padding has been removed. This places greater expectations on the
IPsec implementation, though [62, Section 2.7] states that an IPsec implementation
SHOULD be capable of this behaviour.
AH Transport + ESP Transport Here the IPsec-protected packets will only
contain a single IP header. This configuration was explicitly ruled out in the previ-
ous IPsec architecture [65], and so is not supported by some implementations (e.g.
OpenSolaris) but is by others (e.g. Linux). Here Attack 2 fails because there is no
inner IP header to manipulate, and Attack 3 does not work, since ESP is in transport
mode.
Attack 1 requires some modification in order to work. As with the previous attack,
the NH byte in ESP trailer is now expected to have value 51, and the attacker must
rely on ESP processing at GB to accurately handle TFC padding. This requires
the ESP implementation at GB to support TFC padding for transport mode ESP
and the upper layer protocol to include an explicit length field, ruling out the use
of TCP in the payload of the carrier packet. This means that we are restricted to
using ICMP (or perhaps some kind of UDP packet that always produces a response).
Otherwise, the attack works as described previously.
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4.5 Experimental Results
Having described how our attacks should operate for an RFC-compliant implemen-
tation of the RFCs, we now turn to their experimental validation.
Our experimental set-up is composed of two desktop machines acting as the two
stand-alone gateways, a laptop acting as the attacker’s platform, and a 10 Mbit Hub.
The gateways run OpenSolaris build 134, whereas the attacker’s platform runs Linux
2.6. We implemented our attacks in Python 2.6.4 and used the Scapy 2.0 library
to intercept and manipulate IP packets and to re-inject them into the network. We
decided to use OpenSolaris because it can be configured to perform full padding
checks on ESP-protected packets as recommended by [62]. In our experiments, the
two gateways were configured to protect their communications using AH in transport
mode followed by ESP in tunnel mode, as in the example configuration of Section
4.3. We have not tested our attacks on the other MAC-then-encrypt configurations,
but we see no reason why they should not be successful.
We successfully implemented Attacks 1 and 3 on the aforementioned configuration,
with the AH replay protection service both disabled and enabled. In OpenSolaris,
when keys are set up manually, then replay protection is disabled and there is no
way of enabling it (in conformance with [65]). Thus we used manual keying for the
scenario where replay protection is disabled, and enabled automated key exchange
using IKE in order to turn on the replay protection service. Attack 2 works by
generating an ICMP message at the point where the IPsec gateway is about to
forward the decrypted packet to the end host in the protected network. As mentioned
above, this attack works only when AH is applied in transport mode followed by
ESP in tunnel mode. However we discovered that in OpenSolaris, it is not possible
to forward packets that are protected by AH in transport mode, preventing us from
testing Attack 2 in our experimental set-up. This seems to be a design decision by
the OpenSolaris developers: such configurations are perfectly in line with the IPsec
RFCs.
All of our attacks rely on the production of ICMP messages, so one might be con-
cerned about the effects of ICMP rate limitation. However, this is not an issue in
practice because of the relatively slow speed at which the ICMP packets are pro-
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duced. In fact the main complication that arises in practice for our attacks is the
problem of distinguishing the desired response packets from other IPsec-protected
traffic on the VPN. This of course depends on the amount of traffic present on the
network. As a first step, if the attacker is able to predict the length of the response
packet, then he can filter out all packets whose length does not match this value,
and thereby significantly reduce the rate of false positives. If length filtering is not
enough or not possible, then one can filter on the basis of ‘causation’: assuming
no network congestion, a response is expected to be seen almost instantly after the
packet that caused it was received by the gateway. That is, with sufficiently high
probability, the attacker can expect to observe the response within a short time in-
terval of the packet having a correct ESP trailer being sent. The time interval should
be short enough that the probability of a false positive appearing within the interval
is low. Thus the attacker allows a time interval δ between each attack packet that
he sends. Once the attacker has detected what he suspects to be a response packet,
he can confirm that this was indeed the case by retesting and checking whether a
response is again sent within time δ (this will require the use of a fresh carrier packet
whenever replay protection is enabled). This can be repeated multiple times in or-
der to boost the confidence of the detection procedure. Thus in scenarios with high
network traffic levels, the attacks may still be realised at the expense of efficiency.
Alternatively, if replay protection is disabled or Attack 3 based on fragmentation is
used, the attacker can simply capture the packets that are of interest to him and
wait for a period of low network traffic in order to carry out his attack.
In our set-up we had minimal spurious network traffic and thus basic filtering based
on packet lengths was sufficient. The most computationally intense part of each
attack is to extract the rightmost two bytes of the target ciphertext block. Given
that we could distinguish a response packet from other traffic accurately enough, we
adopted the following strategy in order to speed up the Attack 1: we transmitted all
216 packets at a rate almost equal to the network’s capacity. As soon as a response
packet was detected, we replayed the last few packets spaced at a greater interval, in
order to pinpoint the exact packet which generated the response. We also followed
this approach in order to extract the rest of the bytes. On a 10Mbit hub, Attack
1 took on average 70 seconds to recover a 128-bit block of plaintext using a 140-
byte carrier packet. It should be noted that if replay protection is enabled, then
Attack 1 needs 30 fresh packets to recover a block of plaintext in the manner just
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described. On the other hand it is possible to sacrifice the attack’s time efficiency
by transmitting packets at a lower rate such that a packet generating a response can
be immediately identified, thereby requiring only 15 fresh packets per 128-bit block
of plaintext.
For Attack 3, a similar strategy was adopted. Now the oracle response is only output
after the IP fragment reassembly has timed out. In OpenSolaris the default time-out
value is 15 seconds. In order to match a response to the packet that generated it,
we keep a list of the time instants at which each packet was sent. Then if a response
is seen at some time t we search our list for packets that were sent near to the time
t − ttime-out. This scheme was combined with the method described above where
packets are initially sent in a burst, and then two replies are required to accurately
locate the packet generating the response. In our experiments, we could locate the
packet to lie within a range of roughly 20 packets with the first response, and then
replay each packet at intervals of 0.2 seconds and use the second response to locate
the desired packet exactly. Following this approach with our experimental set-up
Attack 3 recovered a 128-bit block of plaintext in roughly 10 minutes.
4.6 Summary
We have demonstrated attacks against all MAC-then-encrypt configurations of IPsec.
These show that such configurations should be avoided in IPsec deployments. We
have not found any attacks against encrypt-then-MAC configurations of IPsec.
Our attacks demonstrate the dangers inherent in exposing cryptographic flexibility
to users. IPsec in particular places a significant burden on network administrators,
requiring them to have sufficient cryptographic expertise in order to select secure
configurations. Nothing prevents curious administrators from going “off piste” or
protects them from bad advice, such as that to be found in [39, 40, 92] for exam-
ple. We hope that the attacks given here will illustrate some of the dangers in an
accessible form.
Our view of IPsec echoes that expressed in [39]: IPsec, in attempting to be “all things
to all men” ends up compromising on security. It would be helpful to standardise
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IPsec profiles addressing particular application scenarios rather than allowing a set
of components that can be combined and configured in different ways to achieve
arbitrary goals. This is because predicting the combined security of distinct crypto-
graphic primitives is quite difficult and requires thorough analysis. While theoretical
cryptography has much that is useful to say on this subject [17, 69], it currently falls
short of being able to give truly meaningful security guarantees for cryptographic
primitives as they are deployed in real protocols. The focus of the next chapters is
to address this gap between theory and practice.
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In this chapter we consider security models for symmetric encryption where an ad-
versary can distinguish among distinct decryption failures. Our main purpose is to
build models that better reflect the reality of cryptographic implementations, and to
surface the security issues that arise from doing so.
5.1 Motivation
Encryption schemes meeting strong notions of security typically introduce redun-
dancy into their ciphertexts, and as a consequence ciphertexts may be deemed in-
valid during decryption. A scheme’s correctness ensures that honestly generated
ciphertexts will always decrypt correctly, hence we expect decryption to ‘fail’ only
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for ciphertexts that are corrupted during transmission or are adversarially gener-
ated. Typically, protocols making use of an encryption scheme report decryption
failures to the sender through error messages, and thus the fact that a decryption
failure has occurred becomes known to the adversary. After Bleichenbacher’s at-
tack on RSA PKCS#1 [21], it became recognised in the academic community that
these decryption failures (and the attendant error messages) may leak significant in-
formation to an adversary, undermining schemes’ confidentiality properties. Other
examples in the asymmetric setting were subsequently discovered [52, 71] and called
reaction attacks. In a very broad sense, Vaudenay’s padding oracle attack that we
described in Section 3.4 can be seen as an adaptation of Bleichenbacher’s attack to
the symmetric setting. Vaudenay’s ideas were later extended to produce significant
attacks against (among others) SSL/TLS [27, 78, 3], IPsec [29, 30], ASP.NET [37],
XML encryption [57] and DTLS [2]. The SSH attack by Albrecht, Paterson, and
Watson from Section 3.5 also depends in a crucial way on the error messages that
are returned by the receiver during decryption.
At a very high level the above-mentioned attacks on symmetric schemes have the
common feature that during decryption some information about the plaintext is
leaked, due to error messages, their timing, or some other aspect of the implementa-
tion. The leaked information is normally quite small, and the power of these attacks
really comes from the adversary’s ability to amplify this leakage through iteration.
That is, given a target ciphertext, an adversary is able to produce a sequence of re-
lated ciphertexts which when decrypted will leak more information about the target
plaintext. If we now compare this to the IND-CCA security model, it appears that
such attacks should be fully accounted for and prevented, given the very conserva-
tive approach adopted in this model. Indeed, in the IND-CCA model, the adversary
is given full access to a decryption oracle to which it can query any ciphertext ex-
cept the target ciphertext, and learns either the corresponding plaintext or the fact
that decryption fails; and yet this should not leak any information about the target
plaintext. Thus if a scheme is IND-CCA-secure, the only information an adversary
can gather from a ciphertext is the information leaked during the decryption of that
same ciphertext. That is, an adversary is not able to amplify the information leakage
through iteration.
The above argument can fail, when information is leaked through decryption failures,
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as in the attacks in [27, 3, 29, 30, 2]. The decryption algorithm may perform a variety
of checks while decrypting a ciphertext, and if any of these checks fail the ciphertext
will be deemed invalid. Knowing why decryption failed may be more informative to
the adversary than the mere fact that decryption failed. Thus attacks that exploit
distinguishable decryption failures are more powerful than reaction attacks, which
only exploit the knowledge of whether a ciphertext is valid or not. While reaction
attacks are accounted for in the IND-CCA model, the same cannot be said about
distinguishable decryption failure attacks. This is mainly due to the commonly
employed formalism where decryption failures always return the same error message
(⊥), and hence an adversary can learn nothing from invalid ciphertexts in the IND-
CCA model. In contrast, in several of the attacks above, an adversary can recover
the full plaintext without ever querying a valid ciphertext for decryption, which
shows that in practice an adversary can gain information from invalid ciphertexts.
SSL/TLS makes an instructive case study. At a high level, it most commonly uses
a Mac-then-Encrypt (MtE) construction, with either a stream cipher or CBC-mode
encryption of a block cipher as the encryption scheme. Thus SSL/TLS is covered
by Krawczyk’s result [69], and one might reasonably conclude that its symmetric
encryption scheme is IND-CCA secure. Yet Canvel et al. [27] presented plaintext-
recovering attacks against the OpenSSL implementation of SSL/TLS when CBC-
mode is used, in which the attacker does nothing other than submit certain cipher-
texts for decryption and analyse the results (i.e. the attacker ostensibly operates
within the IND-CCA model). The key point, however, is that at the time of Canvel
et al.’s attacks in 2003, it was possible to discern whether decryption had failed
because the underlying padding needed by CBC-mode was incorrectly formatted or
because of a MAC failure. This was possible because they were indicated by different
error messages, which even though they were encrypted, were produced at different
times during the decryption process. This additional information was sufficient to
realise a padding oracle attack, in the style of [93]. Thus, while SSL/TLS may be
provably IND-CCA secure in theory, it turned out not to be in practice. Suitable
countermeasures involve making it hard for an attacker to learn the cause of de-
cryption failures and were incorporated into the TLS specification from version 1.1
onwards. Meanwhile, building an accurate model of SSL/TLS’s symmetric encryp-
tion scheme and proving its security has turned out to be a complex task that was
only recently completed in [78]. Even there, however, it was necessary to assume
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that all decryption failures are indistinguishable (since, otherwise, attacks like those
of [93, 27, 2, 3] are possible). A similar story could be told for MAC-then-encryption
configurations of IPsec, to which the theory in [69] and the attacks of Chapter 4 both
apply.
In this chapter we propose to strengthen the existing security definitions for sym-
metric encryption by letting the adversary distinguish various possible decryption
errors. Our main purpose is to build models that better reflect the reality of cryp-
tographic implementations, and to surface the security issues that arise from doing
so. We are not the first to make this relaxation (see, for example, [79, 80]), but we
are the first to systematically explore its consequences, with some surprising con-
sequences for our understanding of symmetric encryption. Our approach requires
the adoption of a slightly different syntax for encryption schemes to the standard
one. Now, our decryption algorithm will either return a message from the message
space, or an error message from a predetermined finite set of values which we refer
to as the error space. Technically, then, encryption schemes with multiple errors
are a slightly different object from single-error schemes. This approach allows us
to handle schemes that can fail in a finite number of distinguishable ways that will
be indicated in practice by different error messages. It also enables us to treat at-
tacks in which indistinguishable error messages are returned (perhaps because they
are all encrypted, as is the case in SSL/TLS), but in which the errors are returned
at a discrete set of times. We note that our approach is equally applicable to the
asymmetric setting; here we will restrict our scope to the symmetric setting only.
5.2 The Multiple-Error Setting
A multiple-error encryption scheme is defined similarly as in Section 2.3.1 with the
following main difference. To a scheme we associate a positive integer n and a set of
symbols S⊥ = {⊥1,⊥2, . . . ,⊥n}. We refer to this set as the error space of the scheme;
it allows the decryption algorithm to indicate invalid ciphertexts with distinct error
messages within the error space. The symbol ⊥ will be used interchangeably to
denote a specific error symbol or a variable assuming values from the error space.
Most of the security notions for symmetric encryption that we presented in Chapter 2
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apply equally to multiple-error encryption schemes. Note that in our definitions
the decryption oracle always returns whatever the decryption algorithm outputs, as
opposed to having the experiment return a special symbol if the ciphertext is invalid.
Thus the notions that include a decryption oracle are implicitly strengthened by
permitting the encryption schemes to have more than one error message.
We now introduce two notions of indistinguishability under ciphertext-validity at-
tack, which can be seen as a strengthened adaption of a similar notion defined by
Bauer et al. [7] to the symmetric setting. Here, in addition to an encryption oracle
the adversary is given access to a ciphertext-validity oracle which indicates whether
a ciphertext is valid or not, and if not, returns the exact error message output by
the decryption algorithm.
Definition 5.1: IND-CVA and IND$-CVA. Let SE = (K, E ,D) be a multiple-
error encryption scheme. For an adversary A and a bit b, define experiments
Expind-cva-bSE (A) and Expind$-cva-bSE (A) as shown in Figure 5.1. Both experiments
start by calling K to generate a key K and initialise the states. In the former ex-
periment the adversary A is given access to a left-or-right encryption oracle LoR(·),
and in the latter it is given a special encryption oracle Enc$(·) instead. In both
experiments the adversary is additionally given a ciphertext-validity oracle Val(·).
The ciphertext-validity oracle uses  to indicate that the queried ciphertext was
valid or has been previously output by the encryption oracle.
In both experiments, the adversary’s goal is to output a bit b′ as its guess of the
challenge bit b, and the experiment returns b′ as well. The corresponding advantages
of an adversary A are given by:
Advind-cpaSE (A) = Pr
[
Expind-cva-1SE (A) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Expind-cva-0SE (A) = 1
]
,
Advind$-ccaSE (A) = Pr
[
Expind$-cva-1SE (A) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Expind$-cva-0SE (A) = 1
]
.
The scheme SE is said to be IND-CVA (or IND$-CCA) secure, if for every adversary A
with reasonable resources its advantage Advind-cvaSE (A) (respectively Advind$-cvaSE (A))
is small.
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Expind-cva-bSE (A) Expind$-cva-bSE (A)
(K,σ, %)← K
i← 0, C← ()
b′ ← ALoR(·),Val(·) b′ ← AEnc$(·),Val(·)
return b′
LoR((m0,m1))
if |m0| 6= |m1| then return  
(c, σ)← EK(mb, σ)
i← i+ 1, Ci ← c
return c
Enc$(m)
(c, σ)← EK(m,σ)
if b = 0 then c←$ {0, 1}|c|
i← i+ 1, Ci ← c
return c
Val(c)
(m, %)← DK(c, %)
if m ∈M if m ∈M or c ∈ C
then m←  
return m
Figure 5.1: Experiments to define IND-CVA and IND$-CVA security. For IND-CVA
the boxed code is excluded, whereas for IND$-CVA the boxed code replaces the code
adjacent to it.
It is possible to extend the above two notions to the stateful setting. Interestingly, in
the presence of a left-or-right encryption oracle, the sfVal(·) oracle reduces to a Val(·)
oracle, and therefore IND-sfCVA (defined in the obvious way) would be syntactically
equivalent to the IND-CVA experiment. In the case of indistinguishability from
random bits, an analogous equivalence is not evident from the syntax. We define
this notion below.
Definition 5.2: IND$-sfCVA. Let SE = (K, E ,D) be a multiple-error encryp-
tion scheme. For an adversary A and a bit b, define experiment Expind$-sfcva-bSE (A)
as shown in Figure 5.2. The experiment starts by calling K to generate a key K and
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initialise the states. The adversary A is given access to a special encryption oracle
Enc$(·), and a stateful ciphertext-validity oracle sfVal(·). The stateful ciphertext-
validity oracle returns  until the queries become out-of-sync.
The adversary’s goal is to output a bit b′ as its guess of the challenge bit b, and the
experiment returns b′ as well. The corresponding advantage of an adversary A is
given by:
Advind$-sfcvaSE (A) = Pr
[
Expind$-sfcva-1SE (A) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Expind$-sfcva-0SE (A) = 1
]
.
The scheme SE is said to be IND$-sfCVA secure, if for every adversary A with
reasonable resources its advantage Advind$-sfcvaSE (A) is small.
Expind$-cva-bSE (A)
(K,σ, %)← K
i← 0, j ← 0
C← (), sync← 1
b′ ← AEnc$(·),sfVal(·)
return b′
Enc$(m)
(c, σ)← EK(m,σ)
if b = 0 then c←$ {0, 1}|c|
i← i+ 1, Ci ← c
return c
sfVal(c)
j ← j + 1
(m, %)← DK(c, %)
if j > i or c 6= Cj
then sync← 0
if sync = 1 or m ∈M
then m←  
return m
Figure 5.2: Experiment to define IND$-sfCVA security.
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We now turn our attention to integrity of ciphertexts, as defined in Section 2.4
and its stateful variant in Section 2.5. When extending these notions to schemes
with multiple errors, some ambiguity arises as to how to interpret the try oracle’s
functionality. That is, should the try oracle indicate only whether a ciphertext is
valid or not, or should it additionally return the exact error message output by the
decryption algorithm if the ciphertext is invalid? While the syntax of our definitions
from Chapter 2 conforms to the latter interpretation, formulations conforming to
the former interpretation are also common in the literature. For single-error schemes
the two interpretations are equivalent, but as we shall see in the next section this
does not hold in general. For each of the standard and stateful notions we consider
both variants and we denote the weaker variant (i.e. the one that is less informative
to the adversary) with ‘∗’.
Definition 5.3: Ciphertext Integrity in the Multiple-Error Setting. Let
SE = (K, E ,D) be a symmetric encryption scheme. For an adversary A define the
experiments Expint-atkSE (A) for ATK ∈ {CTXT,CTXT∗, sfCTXT, sfCTXT∗} as shown
in Figure 5.3. The experiments start by calling K to generate a key K and initialise
the states. The adversary A is then given access to an encryption oracle Enc(·),
and either a try oracle Try(·) or a stateful try oracle sfTry(·). The output of Try(·)
is suppressed with  in the event that the queried ciphertext is valid or if it has
been previously output by the encryption oracle. Similarly, the output of sfTry(·)
is suppressed if the queried ciphertext is valid or in-sync. In the ‘∗’ variants, error
messages are masked with ⊥, and thus made indistinguishable to the adversary.
The adversary’s goal is to make a valid query not previously output by the encryption
oracle, or in the stateful case, a valid out-of-sync query. For each experiment, the
adversary’s advantage is defined as:
Advint-atkSE (A) = Pr
[
Expint-atkSE (A) = 1
]
.
The scheme SE is said to be INT-ATK secure, if for every adversary A consuming
reasonable resources, its advantage Advint-atkSE (A) is small.
Although an encryption scheme may have multiple error messages, not all error
messages may be ‘available’ to the adversary. In particular an adversary may not be
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Expint-ctxtSE (A) Expint-ctxt∗SE (A)
(K,σ, %)← K
i← 0, C← ()
win← 0
AEnc(·),Try(·)
return win
Enc(m)
(c, σ)← EK(m,σ)
i← i+ 1, Ci ← c
return c
Try(c)
(m, %)← DK(c, %)
if c 6∈ C and m 6∈ S⊥
then win← 1
if m 6∈ S⊥ then m←  
else m←⊥
return m
Expint-sfctxtSE (A) Expint-sfctxt∗SE (A)
(K,σ, %)← K
i← 0, j ← 0, C← ()
sync← 1,win← 0
AEnc(·),sfTry(·)
return win
Enc(m)
(c, σ)← EK(m,σ)
i← i+ 1, Ci ← c
return c
sfTry(c)
j ← j + 1, (m, %)← DK(c, %)
if j > i or c 6= Cj
then sync← 0
if sync = 0 and m 6=⊥
then win← 1
if m 6∈ S⊥ then m←  
else m←⊥
return m
Figure 5.3: Experiments to define ciphertext integrity in the multiple-error setting.
For INT-CTXT and INT-sfCTXT the boxed code is excluded, whereas for INT-CTXT∗
and INT-sfCTXT∗ the boxed code replaces the code adjacent to it.
able to produce (invalid) ciphertexts that generate all possible error messages. We
introduce a simple security notion that captures exactly this situation. Informally
an encryption scheme is error-invariant if no efficient adversary can generate more
than one of the possible error messages. Of course any single-error scheme is trivially
error invariant.
Definition 5.4: INV-ERR security. Let SE = (K, E ,D) be a symmetric en-
cryption scheme with error space S⊥. For any ⊥∈ S⊥ and an adversary A, define
the experiment Expinv-errSE,⊥ (A) as shown in Figure 5.4. A key K is first generated by
calling K . The adversary A is then given access to an encryption oracle Enc(·) and
a decryption oracle Dec(·).
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Expinv-errSE,⊥ (A)
(K,σ, %)← K
win← 0
AEnc(·),Dec(·)
return win
Enc(m)
(c, σ)← EK(m,σ)
return c
Dec(c)
(m, %)← DK(c, %)
if m ∈ S⊥ and m 6=⊥
then win← 1
return m
Figure 5.4: INV-ERR experiment for symmetric encryption schemes.
The adversary’s goal is to submit a ciphertext to the decryption oracle which results
in an error message not equal to ⊥ . The experiment outputs a bit indicating the
adversary’s success. We define the advantage of an adversary A with respect to ⊥
as:
Advinv-errSE,⊥ (A) = Pr
[
Expinv-errSE,⊥ (A) = 1
]
.
The scheme SE is said to be INV-ERR secure if there exists a unique ⊥∈ S⊥ such
that for every adversary A with reasonable resources its advantage Advinv-errSE,⊥ (A) is
small.
Finally we will also consider message authentication schemes that return multiple
errors. Similarly this requires replacing the role of the error message ⊥ with a set
of error messages Q⊥ = {⊥1,⊥2, . . . ,⊥n}. The UF-CMA and SUF-CMA security
notions that we presented in Section 2.2.2 are thus automatically strengthened by
permitting the message authentication schemes to return more than one error mes-
sage. We do not consider the weaker variant (analogous to the ∗ variant for integrity
of ciphertexts) where the adversary only returns whether a message-tag pair is valid
or not.
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5.3 Relations and Separations
5.3.1 Preliminary Note.
An implication from security notion X to security notion Y, indicated by X −→ Y,
means that any scheme which is X-secure is also Y-secure. More formally there
exists a constant κ > 0 such that for any symmetric encryption scheme SE and any
Y adversary Ay there exists a X adversary Ax (consuming similar resources) such
that:
AdvySE(Ay) ≤ κ ·AdvxSE(Ax)
A separation from security notion X to security notion Y indicated by X 6−→ Y, means
that there exists an encryption scheme which meets notion X but for which we can
exhibit an attack showing that it does not meet notion Y. The separation is interest-
ing only if there exists some scheme which meets security notion X, as otherwise the
implication X −→ Y is vacuously true. Our separations can be categorised into two
types. In the former we will assume that there exists some scheme SE which meets
notion X, and use it to construct a scheme SE which meets notion X but is insecure
in the Y sense. From the foregoing discussion, such an assumption is in some sense
minimal. In the second type of separations we will assume the existence of pseudo-
random functions and UF-CMA MACs to construct a scheme which meets notion X
but not notion Y. In this paper for all separations of the latter type we will have
that X −→ IND-CPA. It is a well-known result that the existence of IND-CPA-secure
symmetric encryption implies the existence of pseudorandom functions [56, 53, 48].
In addition a pseudorandom function can be combined with an almost-universal
hash function to obtain a variable-input-length pseudorandom function, which in
turn yields a UF-CMA MAC. Thus from a theoretical viewpoint the underlying as-
sumptions for either type of separation are equivalent.
Note that when proving a separation we do not require the scheme to have distinct er-
ror messages, as we are interested solely in the existence of a counterexample showing
that the relation under question cannot be established. Secondly any multiple-error
scheme which is secure under some notion X implies the existence of a single-error
scheme which is also secure under notion X (simply by mapping all error messages to
a single error message). Consequently it is best to prove separations using schemes
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with an error space of minimal cardinality. It then follows that the separation also
holds for all schemes of higher error-space cardinality.
5.3.2 Straightforward Relations.
In the previous section we explained how the standard security notions can be
extended to the multiple-error setting and introduced new ones. Proposition 5.1
depicts some basic relations between these security notions. These relations are
self-evident and we state them without proofs.
Proposition 5.1.
IND-sfCCA // IND-CCA // IND-CVA // IND-CPA
IND$-sfCCA //
//
IND$-CCA // IND$-CVA // IND$-CPA
IND$-sfCVA
OO
INT-sfCTXT //
//
INT-CTXT // INT-CTXT∗
INT-sfCTXT∗
OO
5.3.3 Revisiting Classic Relations.
If a single-error symmetric encryption scheme satisfies both passive confidentiality
(IND-CPA) and integrity of ciphertexts (INT-CTXT), then Theorem 2.2 guarantees
that it also offers confidentiality against chosen-ciphertext attacks. Theorem 2.3 ex-
tends this result to the stateful setting. Often, when analysing a particular scheme,
its chosen-plaintext security and ciphertext integrity are proved first, and then these
classic results are used to guarantee chosen-ciphertext security. Indeed, the combi-
nation of IND-CPA and INT-CTXT (or their stateful versions) has come to be the
accepted security notion for authenticated encryption. We proceed to re-examine
these relations in the context of multiple-error encryption schemes.
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The following theorem serves as the basis for the two separations in Corollaries 5.3
and 5.4, showing that the classic relations no longer hold for multiple-error schemes.
We point out that in proving the separations, we adopt the stronger interpretations
of ciphertext integrity so as to make the results as strong as possible.
Theorem 5.2: IND-CPA ∧ INT-sfCTXT 6−→ IND-CCA. Let F : Ke × {0, 1}` →
{0, 1}n be a pseudorandom function, and let MA = (Km, T ,V) be a UF-CMA secure
MAC with tag length `tag < n . Consider the stateful symmetric encryption scheme
SE1 having message space {0, 1}n−`tag and error space {⊥0,⊥1} shown in Figure 5.5.
For any IND-CPA adversary Acpa and any INT-sfCTXT adversary Aint against SE1,
both making at most 2` − 1 encryption queries, there exist two corresponding adver-
saries Aprf and Auf using roughly the same resources as Acpa and Aint, respectively,
such that:
Advind-cpaSE1 (Acpa) ≤ 2 ·Adv
prf
F (Aprf) , (5.1a)
Advint-sfctxtSE1 (Aint) ≤ Advuf-cmaMA (Auf) . (5.1b)
Moreover there exist efficient adversaries Acca and A′uf such that:
Advind-ccaSE1 (Acca) = 1−Advuf-cmaMA (A′uf) . (5.1c)
Proof. The correctness of the constructed scheme is easy to verify and we therefore
proceed to prove the first part of the theorem. For any adversary Acpa, making at
most 2` − 1 encryption queries, we construct Aprf as follows. Adversary Aprf runs
Km to get a key for the MAC, it then runs Acpa and provides it with a simulation
of its left-or-right encryption oracle. Essentially Aprf selects a uniformly random bit
d and uses its own oracle together with its MAC key to encrypt md according to
the construction in Figure 5.5, where the pseudorandom function is replaced by its
own oracle. Finally, if Acpa’s output is equal to d, then Aprf outputs 1 otherwise
it outputs 0. Now when Aprf’s oracle is instantiated with F it provides Aprf with
a perfect simulation of the IND-CPA experiment. On the other hand when Aprf’s
oracle is a random function, the ciphertexts returned to Acpa provide no information
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Algorithm K
Ke ←$Ke
Km ← Km
σ ← 1, %← 1
K ← Ke ‖ Km
return (K,σ, %)
Algorithm EK(m,σ)
τ ← TKm(〈σ〉` ‖ m)
c← FKe(〈σ〉`)⊕ (m ‖ τ)
σ ← σ + 1 mod 2`
return (c, σ)
Algorithm DK(c, %)
if |c| 6= n then %← 0
if % = 0 then
return (⊥0, %)
w ← FKe(〈%〉`)⊕ c
parse w as m ‖ τ
v ← VKm(〈%〉` ‖ m, τ)
if v = valid
then %← %+ 1 mod 2`
else
%← 0
if m[1] = 0 then
m←⊥0
else m←⊥1
return (m, %)
Figure 5.5: The scheme SE1 of Theorem 5.2.
about d, i.e. d is information-theoretically hidden. Therefore we have that:
AdvprfF (Aprf) = Pr
[
Ke ←$Ke : AFKe (·)prf = 1
]
− Pr
[
f ←$ Func(`, n) : Af(·)prf = 1
]
= Pr
[
d←$ {0, 1} : Expind-cpa-dSE1 (Acpa) = d
]
− 1
2
=
1
2
+
1
2
·Advind-cpaSE1 (Acpa)−
1
2
=
1
2
·Advind-cpaSE1 (Acpa) .
Inequality (5.1a) thus follows, and we now prove the second inequality.
For any adversary Aint making at most 2` − 1 encryption queries, adversary Auf
proceeds as follows. It samples a key Ke for the pseudorandom function F and
then runs adversary Aint. It simulates the encryption oracle by using its own tag-
ging oracle and the pseudorandom function under the sampled key. In addition it
also maintains an ordered list of the messages Aint queries to the encryption oracle
together with their corresponding ciphertexts. It then simulates the try oracle as
follows. As long as Aint’s queries are in sync, i.e. they match the ciphertexts in
Auf’s list in the exact same order, it returns  . Alternatively consider Aint’s first
out-of-sync query ci, let this be its i
th try query. In this case Auf first checks that
|ci| = n and if not it halts, otherwise it computes the XOR of ci and FKe(〈i〉`). It
then parses the result into a message and a tag, prepends the message with the
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string 〈i〉`, submits it together with the tag to its verification oracle and halts.
Note that due to the scheme’s construction Aint can only win within its first 2`− 1
try queries. Since we are interested in bounding its advantage we only need to
consider the case where i ≤ 2`−1 . Now Auf provides Aint with a perfect simulation
of the INT-sfCTXT experiment until Aint makes its first out-of-sync try query, at
which point Aint will either win or lose the experiment (again due to the scheme’s
construction). Moreover because Auf’s only verification query corresponds to an out-
of-sync query and Aint can only make at most 2` − 1 encryption queries, it follows
that the message prepended with 〈i〉` could not have been previously queried by Auf
to its tagging oracle. Thus whenever Aint wins Auf also wins, and inequality (5.1a)
follows.
We conclude the proof by describing adversary Acca which breaks the IND-CCA
security of SE1. The adversary submits (0 ‖ 0n−`tag−1, 1 ‖ 0n−`tag−1) to the left-or-
right oracle and gets in return a ciphertext c∗. It then submits c∗ ⊕ (0n−`tag−1 ‖1)
to the decryption oracle. If the decryption oracle returns ⊥0 then Acca outputs 0,
otherwise it outputs 1. Due to the scheme’s construction, this adversary will always
win except for the case where the decryption oracle returns m 6∈ {⊥0,⊥1}. However
this would imply a MAC forgery. Adversary Acca can then be easily transformed
into a UF-CMA adversary A′uf against MA such that equation (5.1c) holds.
Combining Theorem 5.2 and Proposition 5.1 yields the desired separations.
Corollary 5.3: IND-CPA ∧ INT-CTXT 6−→ IND-CCA. Let F : Ke × {0, 1}` →
{0, 1}n be a pseudorandom function, and let MA = (Km, T ,V) be a UF-CMA secure
MAC with tag length `tag < n . Then there exists a symmetric encryption scheme
that is both IND-CPA secure and INT-CTXT secure but that is not secure in the
IND-CCA sense.
Corollary 5.4: IND-CPA ∧ INT-sfCTXT 6−→ IND-sfCCA. Let F : Ke × {0, 1}` →
{0, 1}n be a pseudorandom function, and let MA = (Km, T ,V) be a UF-CMA secure
MAC with tag length `tag < n . Then there exists a symmetric encryption scheme
that is both IND-CPA secure and INT-sfCTXT secure but that is not secure in the
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IND-sfCCA sense.
Note that in proving Theorem 5.2 we resorted to a stateful scheme. Only a stateful
scheme can be INT-sfCTXT secure, and therefore the counterexample used to prove
Corollary 5.4 needs to be stateful. The same cannot be said however about the
separation in Corollary 5.3, and in fact it can be proven more generally using a
stateless scheme, but we omit the details for the sake of brevity.
5.3.4 New Relations.
We now go on to investigate how chosen-ciphertext security can be obtained in
the multiple-error setting. Given how useful Theorem 2.2 and Theorem 2.3 have
turned out to be, it would make sense to attempt to derive analogous relations that
hold more generally. The following theorem extends the relation of Theorem 2.2 to
schemes with multiple errors.
Theorem 5.5: IND-CVA ∧ INT-CTXT −→ IND-CCA. Let SE = (K, E ,D) be a
symmetric encryption scheme. For any IND-CCA adversary Acca there exist adver-
saries Acva and Aint consuming similar resources to Acca such that:
Advind-ccaSE (Acca) ≤ Advind-cvaSE (Acva) + 2 ·Advint-ctxtSE (Aint) . (5.2)
Proof. To any IND-CCA adversary Acca we can associate an IND-CVA adversary
Acva and an INT-CTXT adversary Aint . Both Acva and Aint operate by running
Acca, and then attempt to simulate its environment as follows. Adversary Acva
forwards Acca’s left-or-right queries to its own left-or-right oracle, and forwards
decryption queries to its validation oracle. If the ciphertext turns out to be invalid it
returns the error message to Acca, otherwise it aborts. It then outputs whatever Acca
outputs. Adversary Aint picks a bit uniformly at random, and uses this together with
its encryption oracle to simulate Acca’s left-or-right oracle. It forwards decryption
queries to its verification oracle and returns any error messages back to Acca.
Let W represent the event Expind-cca-bSE (Acca) = b where b is picked uniformly at
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random. Let E represent the event that Acca makes a valid decryption query. We
then have that:
Pr [W ] = Pr
[
W ∧ E ]+ Pr [W ∧ E ]
≤ Pr [W ∧ E ]+ Pr [ E ] .
We now bound each of the terms on the right-hand side of the last inequality. Note
that Aint simulates Acca’s environment perfectly until the point where Acca makes a
valid decryption query. Thus it follows that whenever E occurs, Aint wins the INT-
CTXT experiment. On the other hand if E does not occur, then Acva’s simulation
of Acca’s environment is perfect. Consequently whenever event W ∧E occurs, Acva
wins the IND-CVA experiment. Equation (5.2) follows by combining the above and
noting that:
Advind-atkSE (A) = 2 · Pr
[
b←$ {0, 1} : Expind-atk-bSE (A) = b
]
− 1 . (5.3)
A similar relation can be established for stateful chosen-ciphertext security, and each
of these relations can be re-proven for security notions involving indistinguishability
from random bits. We state these relations below.
Proposition 5.6.
IND-CVA ∧ INT-sfCTXT −→ IND-sfCCA
IND$-CVA ∧ INT-CTXT −→ IND$-CCA
IND$-sfCVA ∧ INT-sfCTXT −→ IND$-sfCCA
5.3.5 Necessity of Strong Ciphertext Integrity.
The above relations can be seen as strengthened variants of Theorems 2.2 and 2.3,
where we replaced CPA security with CVA security and adopted the stronger notions
of ciphertext integrity. It is natural to ask whether the left-hand side of each relation
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can be somehow relaxed. We have seen in Corollaries 5.3 and 5.4 that reverting from
CVA security to CPA security is not an option. However it is not evident whether it
is necessary to require the stronger variants of ciphertext integrity. Theorem 5.7 an-
swers this question by means of a separation, proving that strong ciphertext integrity
is necessary for Theorem 5.5 to hold.
Theorem 5.7: IND-CVA ∧ INT-CTXT∗ 6−→ IND-CCA. Let SE = (K, E ,D) be a
symmetric encryption scheme with a large message space M and an error space
{⊥0}, such that it is both IND-CVA secure and INT-CTXT∗ secure. Let the length
of its ciphertexts be bounded above by 2` for some integer `. Consider the scheme
SE having message space M and error space {⊥0,⊥1} shown in Figure 5.6. For
any IND-CVA adversary Acva making qe left-or-right queries, and any INT-CTXT∗
adversary Aint making qt try queries, there exist adversaries A1cva, A2cva, and A1int
(consuming similar resources to Acva and Aint) such that:
Advind-cvaSE (Acva) ≤ Advind-cvaSE (A1cva) +
1
2
·Advind-cvaSE (A2cva) +
qe
|M| , (5.4a)
Advint-ctxt∗SE (Aint) ≤ Advint-ctxt∗SE (A1int) +
qt
|M| . (5.4b)
Moreover there exists an adversary Acca, making at most (` + maxm∈M(|m|) + 1)
decryption queries and one left-or-right query such that:
Advind-ccaSE (Acca) = 1 . (5.4c)
The intuition behind the separation is as follows. In the INT-CTXT∗ experiment
the adversary does not get to see the decryption error symbols, whereas in the
IND-CVA experiment he does not get access to the plaintext corresponding to valid
decryption queries. We therefore introduce a weakness in the scheme that can only
be exploited when the adversary has access to both the plaintext and the error
symbols from a decryption oracle. The new scheme is defined such that during
key generation a message from the message space is chosen at random. Encryption
is then redefined such that this particular message always encrypts to the same
ciphertext. If an adversary knows this message it would then be able to distinguish
the left oracle from the right oracle by querying this message twice. The decryption
algorithm is defined so that it leaks the encryption of this message through the
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Algorithm K
(K,σ, %)← K
m∗ ←$M
(c∗, σ)← EK(m∗, σ)
(m, %)← DK(c∗, %)
K0 ← (K,m∗, c∗)
return (K0, σ, %)
Algorithm EK0(m,σ)
if (m = m∗) then
c← c∗
else
(c, σ)← EK(m,σ)
return (0 ‖ c, σ)
Algorithm DK0(c, %)
parse c as b ‖ c′
if (b = 0) then
if (c′ = c∗) then
m← m∗
else
(m, %)← DK(c′, %)
else
ψ ← 〈|c∗|〉` ‖ c∗
if 〈c′〉−1 ≤ |ψ| then
d← ψ[〈c′〉−1]
m←⊥d
else m←⊥0
return (m, %)
Figure 5.6: The scheme SE of Theorem 5.7.
error symbols. However the adversary needs to decrypt this ciphertext in order to
mount the distinguishing attack just described, and hence this vulnerability is only
exploitable in the IND-CCA game.
Proof. Correctness of the constructed scheme follows easily from the correctness of
the original scheme, and we thus proceed to prove equation (5.4a). Adversary A1cva
starts by picking a message m∗ uniformly at random from the message space and
computes ψ by querying (m∗,m∗) to its left-or-right oracle. A1cva also submits c∗ to
its ciphertext-validity oracle to maintain the states of its oracles synchronised and
thereby correctly simulate SE . It then runs Acva and simulates its oracles according
to the construction in Figure 5.6 using its own oracles. Note that A1cva provides a
perfect simulation to Acva, unless the latter queries m∗. In that case A1cva aborts
and outputs a bit chosen uniformly at random.
Let W and W 1 represent respectively the events Expind-cva-bSE (Acva) = b and
Expind-cva-dSE (A1cva) = d where b and d are picked uniformly at random. Further-
more let E denote the event that Acva makes an encryption query which includes
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m∗. We then have that:
Pr
[
W 1
]
= Pr
[
W ∧ E ]+ 1
2
· Pr [ E ]
Pr
[
W 1
]− 1
2
· Pr [ E ] + Pr [W ∧ E ] = Pr [W ∧ E ]+ Pr [W ∧ E ]
Pr
[
W 1
]
+
1
2
· Pr [ E ] ≥ Pr [W ]
Advind-cvaSE (A1cva) +
1
2
· Pr [ E ] ≥ Advind-cvaSE (Acva) . (5.5)
It now remains to bound Pr [ E ]. Note that (due to the details of SE ’s construction)
Acva can recover the encryption of m∗ from its ciphertext-validity oracle, and conse-
quently we cannot bound Pr [ E ] using an information-theoretic argument. Instead
we construct adversary A2cva such that if Acva can do significantly better than what
is information-theoretically possible, then A2cva breaks the IND-CVA security of SE .
Adversary A2cva proceeds exactly as A1cva, except that it computes c∗ by querying
(m+,m∗) to its left-or-right oracle for some message m+ chosen uniformly at ran-
dom. Then if at any point during its runtime Acva queries m∗, A2cva outputs 1 else
it outputs 0. It then follows that:
Advind-cvaSE (A2cva) = Pr
[
Expind-cva-1SE (A2cva) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Expind-cva-0SE (A2cva) = 1
]
≥ Pr [ E ]− 2qe|M| . (5.6)
The second line follows from the fact that by definition A2cva outputs 1 exactly when
E occurs; whereas in the second experiment A2cva has no information about m∗ and
hence an information theoretic argument can be applied. Combining equations (5.5)
and (5.6) yields equation (5.4a).
Adversary A1int picks a message m∗ uniformly at random, computes c∗ using its
encryption oracle, and then queries c∗ to its try oracle to maintain the states syn-
chronised. It then runs Aint and simulates its environment using its own oracles.
Specifically it forwards encryption queries to its own encryption oracle and prepends
the resulting ciphertexts with a 0 bit. If Aint queries m∗ it returns 0 ‖ c∗. As re-
gards try queries, it returns ⊥ for ciphertexts starting with a 1 bit, and for all other
queries it chops off the first bit and forwards the remaining ciphertext to its own
try oracle. This provides Aint with a perfect simulation of its environment. Let
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Z and Z1 represent respectively the events that Aint and A1int win the INT-CTXT∗
experiment, and let F represent the event that Aint queries 0‖c∗ to its verification
oracle without querying m∗ to its encryption oracle. We then have that:
Pr [ Z ] = Pr
[
Z ∧ F ]+ Pr [ Z ∧ F ]
≤ Pr [ Z1 ]+ Pr [ F ]
Advint-ctxt∗SE (Aint) ≤ Advint-ctxt∗SE (A1int) +
qt
|C| . (5.7)
The bound on Pr [ F ] follows from the fact that unless Aint queries m∗ to its encryp-
tion oracle, it has no partial information about c∗. Thus equation (5.4b) follows from
equation (5.7) by noting that |C| is at least as large as |M| (from the correctness of
SE).
We now conclude the proof by describing adversary Acca . Note (from the construc-
tion of SE) that the decryption of 1‖〈i〉` leaks the ith bit of the string ψ = 〈|c∗|〉`‖c∗
through the returned error message. Thus Acca starts by making a series of ` decryp-
tion queries, 1‖〈0〉`, 1‖〈1〉`, 1‖〈2〉`, . . . , 1‖〈`−1〉`, to recover the value |c∗|. It then
makes a second series of decryption queries, 1‖〈`〉`, 1‖〈`+1〉`, . . . , 1‖〈`−1+ |c∗|〉`,
to recover c∗. It can now recover the message m∗ by querying the ciphertext 0‖c∗
to its decryption oracle. Having recovered m∗, it submits the pair (m∗,m◦) to its
left-or-right oracle, where m∗ 6= m◦. If the returned ciphertext is equal to 0‖c∗ the
adversary outputs 0, otherwise it outputs 1. This adversary is always successful,
and hence equation (5.4c) follows.
Note: Theorem 5.7 holds irrespective of whether the scheme SE is stateless or
stateful, and in either case the construction of Figure 5.6 yields a scheme SE that
is correspondingly stateless or stateful. This is the main reason for prepending
ciphertexts with an extra 0 bit during encryption, and for decrypting ciphertexts
starting with a 1 separately. If one is happy to further assume that the scheme SE
is stateless, then a slightly simpler construction is sufficient to prove the separation.
Theorem 5.7 also serves as a separation between INT-CTXT∗ and INT-CTXT, show-
ing that the latter is strictly stronger. Separations similar to that of Theorem 5.7
corresponding to the relations of Proposition 5.6 can also be established.
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Proposition 5.8.
IND-CVA ∧ INT-sfCTXT∗ 6−→ IND-sfCCA
IND$-CVA ∧ INT-CTXT∗ 6−→ IND$-CCA
IND$-sfCVA ∧ INT-sfCTXT∗ 6−→ IND$-sfCCA
5.3.6 More Separations
We now present a separation showing that IND-CVA is strictly stronger than IND-
CPA. We actually show something slightly stronger, in that the separation also holds
for schemes which are error invariant. This separation further serves to point out
that, even for single-error schemes, Theorem 5.5 does not reduce to the relation of
Bellare and Namprempre from [17].
Theorem 5.9: IND-CPA ∧ INV-ERR 6−→ IND-CVA. Let F : Ke × {0, 1}` →
{0, 1}n be a pseudorandom function, where ` is sufficiently large. Then the sym-
metric encryption scheme SE2 having message space ∪k≥1{0, 1}nk and error space
{⊥} shown in Figure 5.7 is such that, for any IND-CPA adversary Acpa making q en-
cryption queries totalling µ bits of plaintext, there exists a corresponding adversary
Aprf (consuming similar resources to Acpa) with:
Advind-cpaSE2 (Acpa) ≤ 2 ·Adv
prf
F (Aprf) +
(µ
n
+ q
)(q − 1
2`
)
. (5.8a)
Moreover there exists an efficient adversary Acva such that:
Advind-cvaSE2 (Acva) = 1 . (5.8b)
Proof. It is easy to verify that the constructed scheme is correct, and since its error
space contains only a single element it is trivially INV-ERR. We therefore proceed
to prove that it is IND-CPA secure. For any adversary Acpa we construct adversary
Aprf as follows. Adversary Aprf selects a uniformly random bit d, runs Acpa and
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Algorithm K
K ←$Ke
σ ← ε, %← ε
return (K,σ, %)
Algorithm EK(m,σ)
if |m| 6∈ {αn : α ≥ 1}
then return ⊥
p← |m|/n
parse m as m1 ‖ . . . ‖ mp
mp+1 ← 0n, c0 ←$ {0, 1}`
for i← 1 to p+ 1 do
ci ← FK(c0 + i)⊕mi
c← c0 ‖ c1 ‖ . . . ‖ cp+1
return (c, σ)
Algorithm DK(c, %)
if |c| 6∈ {`+ αn : α ≥ 2}
then return ⊥
q ← (|c| − `)/n
parse c as c0 ‖ . . . ‖ cq
for i← 1 to q do
mi ← FK(c0 + i)⊕ ci
if mq 6= 0n then m←⊥
else m← m1 ‖ . . . ‖ mq−1
return (m, %)
Figure 5.7: The scheme SE2 of Theorem 5.9.
simulates its left-or-right encryption oracle. It does so by using its own oracle to
encrypt md according to the construction in Figure 5.7, where the pseudorandom
function is replaced by Aprf’s oracle. Then if Acpa’s output is equal to d, Aprf
outputs 1 otherwise it outputs 0. Note that when Aprf’s oracle is instantiated with
F it provides Aprf with a perfect simulation of the IND-CPA experiment. On the
other hand when Aprf’s oracle is a random function, the ciphertexts returned to Acpa
provide no information about d, unless Aprf’s oracle is queried on the same input
more than once. Let E denote the event that Aprf queries its oracle on the same
input more than once when simulating the left-or-right oracle. We then have that:
AdvprfF (Aprf) = Pr
[
K ←$Ke : AFK(·)prf = 1
]
− Pr
[
f ←$ Func(`, n) : Af(·)prf = 1
]
AdvprfF (Aprf) + Pr
[
f ←$ Func(`, n) : Af(·)prf = 1
]
=
Pr
[
d←$ {0, 1} : Expind-cpa-dSE2 (Acpa) = d
]
bounding the left-hand side and using equation (5.3) on the right-hand side,
AdvprfF (Aprf) +
1
2
· (1− Pr [ E ]) + Pr [ E ] ≥ 1
2
+
1
2
·Advind-cpaSE2 (Acpa)
AdvprfF (Aprf) +
1
2
· Pr [ E ] ≥ 1
2
·Advind-cpaSE2 (Acpa) .
Furthermore it can be shown that (cf. [12, Lemma 10]):
Pr [ E ] ≤
(µ
n
+ q
)(q − 1
2`
)
.
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By combining the above we get inequality (5.8a). Now, adversary Acva proceeds as
follows. It queries the message pair (1n ‖ 1n, 1n ‖ 0n) to the left-or-right oracle, and
gets an `+ 3n bit long ciphertext in return. It then takes this ciphertext, truncates
the last n bits, and submits it to the validation oracle. If the oracle returns ⊥ the
adversary outputs 0 (left), else if  is returned it outputs 1 (right). It is easy to see
that Acva always succeeds and therefore its advantage is 1.
Earlier in this chapter we noted that if the IND-sfCVA experiment is defined in the
obvious way, it would be syntactically equivalent to the IND-CVA experiment. In
the case of indistinguishability from random bits, an analogous equivalence is not
evident from the syntax. Theorem 5.10 settles this in the negative, showing that for
indistinguishability from random bits the stateful notion is strictly stronger.
Theorem 5.10: IND$-CVA ∧ INV-ERR 6−→ IND$-sfCVA. Let F : Ke × {0, 1}` →
{0, 1}n be a pseudorandom function, where ` is sufficiently large. Let MA =
(Km, T ,V) be a single-error MAC where T : Km × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}`tag is pseu-
dorandom. Consider the symmetric encryption scheme SE3 having message space
∪k≥1{0, 1}nk and error space {⊥} shown in Figure 5.8. For any IND$-CVA adver-
sary Acva making q encryption queries totalling µ bits of plaintext, there exist three
adversaries A1prf, A2prf, and Auf with:
Advind$-cvaSE3 (Acva) ≤ Adv
prf
F (A1prf) + AdvprfT (A2prf) + Advuf-cmaMA (Auf)
+
µ
n
·
(
q − 1
2`
)
+
q(q − 1)
2`+n+1
. (5.9a)
Moreover there exist efficient adversaries Asfcva and A′uf such that:
Advind$-sfcvaSE3 (Asfcva) = 1−Advuf-cmaMA (A′uf) . (5.9b)
Proof. The constructed scheme is similar to that of Theorem 5.9, except that it
does not append the message with a block of 0’s, and the ciphertext is additionally
authenticated with a MAC. As before the scheme is trivially INV-ERR since its error
space contains only a single element. We will prove that the scheme is IND$-CVA
secure in two steps. For any adversary Acva we first construct adversary Auf and
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Algorithm K
Ke ←$Ke
Km ←$Km
K ← Ke ‖ Km
σ ← ε, %← ε
return (K,σ, %)
Algorithm EK(m,σ)
if |m| 6∈ {αn : α ≥ 1}
then return ⊥
p← |m|/n
parse m as m1 ‖ . . . ‖ mp
c0 ←$ {0, 1}`
for i← 1 to p do
ci ← FKe(c0 + i)⊕mi
c← c0 ‖ c1 ‖ . . . ‖ cp
τ ← TKm(c)
return (c ‖ τ, σ)
Algorithm DK(ψ, %)
if |ψ| 6∈ {`+ `tag + αn : α ≥ 1}
then return (⊥, %)
parse ψ as c ‖ τ
v ← VKm(c, τ)
if (v 6= valid) then
return (⊥, %)
q ← (|c| − `)/n
parse c as c0 ‖ . . . ‖ cq
for i← 1 to q do
mi ← FKe(c0 + i)⊕ ci
m← m1 ‖ . . . ‖ mq
return (m, %)
Figure 5.8: The scheme SE3 of Theorem 5.10.
an IND$-CPA adversary Acpa against SE3 . In the second step we then show how to
construct adversaries A1prf and A2prf from any such IND$-CPA adversary. Combining
the two steps yields the desired result.
Adversary Auf runs Ke to obtain a key for F , picks a bit uniformly at random, and
then runs Acva . It then uses the random bit, the PRF indexed by the generated
key, and its own tagging oracle to simulate an Enc$(·) oracle for Acva according to
the construction of Figure 5.8. It handles validation queries by parsing the queried
ciphertext into a ‘message’ and a tag, and forwards the two to its verification oracle.
Adversary Acpa runs Acva, and simulates its encryption oracle using its own oracle.
To all validation queries it responds with ⊥ , and it outputs whatever Acva outputs.
Note that Acpa also makes q encryption queries totalling µ bits of plaintext. Now let
W represent the event that Acva wins the IND-CVA experiment, and let F represent
the event that it makes a successful validation query. It then follows that:
Pr [W ] ≤ Pr [W ∧ F ]+ Pr [ F ] .
We can assume without loss of generality that Acva never queries to its validation
oracle a ciphertext that was previously returned by the encryption oracle. We can
then bound each of the terms on the right-hand side of the inequality as follows. First
note that Auf provides Acva with a perfect simulation of the IND-CVA experiment,
and clearly whenever E occurs Auf successfully forges a tag for a new message.
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Contrarily if F does not occur then Acpa simulates Acva’s environment perfectly,
and thus whenever W ∧ F occurs, Acpa wins the IND-CPA experiment. This yields:
Advind$-cvaSE3 (Acva) ≤ Adv
ind$-cpa
SE3 (Acpa) + Advuf-cmaMA (Auf) . (5.10)
We now move to the second step of the proof and bound Acpa’s advantage. Towards
this aim we define a hybrid experiment ExpH, similar in spirit to the two IND$-
CPA experiments corresponding to each bit value. The hybrid experiment proceeds
exactly as the Expind$-cpa-1SE3 experiment except for one detail. In the encryption
oracle the intermediate string which constitutes the unauthenticated ciphertext is
replaced with a uniformly random string of the same length and the MAC is then
applied to this string instead. Thus we have that:
Advind$-cpaSE3 (Acpa) =
(
Pr
[
Expind$-cpa-1SE3 (Acpa) = 1
]
− Pr [ ExpH(Acpa) = 1 ]
)
+
(
Pr [ ExpH(Acpa) = 1 ]− Pr
[
Expind$-cpa-0SE3 (Acpa) = 1
])
. (5.11)
Now we consider each of the above terms in the braces separately, and in each case
consider Acpa’s success in distinguishing between the two experiments. For any
adversary Acpa distinguishing between the two experiments in the first term we can
associate a PRF adversary A1prf against F . Adversary A1prf proceeds by running
Km to obtain a key for MA, and then runs Acpa . It simulates its encryption
oracle by using MA under the obtained key and its own oracle to recreate the
encryption algorithm of Figure 5.8. Then A1prf outputs whatever Acpa outputs. Note
that if A1prf’s oracle is instantiated with F , it perfectly simulates a ‘real’ encryption
oracle for Acpa . On the other hand if its oracle is a random function it simulates
the encryption oracle of the hybrid experiment as long as it does not query the
random function on the same input more than once. Let E1 denote the event that
A1prf queries its oracle on the same input more than once when simulating Acpa’s
encryption oracle, let Zb represent the event that Exp
ind$-cpa-b
SE3 (Acpa) = 1, and let
ZH represent the event that ExpH(Acpa) = 1. The first term on the right hand
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side of equation (5.11) can then be bounded as follows:
Pr [ Z1 ]− Pr [ ZH ] ≤ Pr
[
Z1 | E1
]− Pr [ ZH | E1 ]+ Pr [ E1 ]
≤ Pr
[
K ←$Ke : A1prfFK(·) = 1
]
− Pr
[
f ←$ Func(`, n) : A1prff(·) = 1
]
+ Pr [ E1 ]
≤ AdvprfF (A1prf) +
µ
n
·
(
q − 1
2`
)
. (5.12)
The bound on Pr [ E1 ] follows from Lemma 10 in [12]. Now for any adversary Acpa
distinguishing between the two experiments in the second term we construct a PRF
adversary A2prf against T . Adversary A2prf runs Acpa and simulates its encryption
oracle as follows. It first verifies that queried message is in the message space and
outputs ⊥ otherwise. It then samples a random string of length ` + |m|, where
m is the queried message, and submits it to its own oracle. It then appends the
oracle’s output to the random string and returns it to Acpa. Now when A2prf’s oracle
is instantiated with T , it provides Acpa with a perfect simulation of the hybrid
experiment. Alternatively if its oracle is a random function it simulates the ‘random’
encryption oracle of the IND$-CPA experiment, as long as it does not query the same
string more than once. Let E2 denote this event, we then have that:
Pr [ ZH ]− Pr [ Z0 ] ≤ Pr
[
ZH | E2
]− Pr [ Z0 | E2 ]+ Pr [ E2 ]
≤ Pr
[
K ←$Km : A2prfTK(·) = 1
]
− Pr
[
f ←$ Func(∗, n) : A2prff(·) = 1
]
+ Pr [ E2 ]
≤ AdvprfF (A2prf) +
q(q − 1)
2`+n+1
. (5.13)
The second term on the right-hand-side of the last inequality results from a birthday
bound on event E2. Combining equations (5.10) (5.11) (5.12) (5.13) yields inequal-
ity (5.9a). This proves that scheme SE3 is IND$-CVA secure. To conclude the proof
we now describe an adversary Asfcva that breaks the IND$-sfCVA security of this
scheme. Adversary Asfcva queries two distinct messages m1 and m2 to its encryp-
tion oracle in this exact order, and gets in return two corresponding ciphertexts
c1 and c2. It then makes an out-of-sync query c2 to the validation oracle. If the
oracle returns  it outputs 1 otherwise it outputs 0. Now if the encryption oracle
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returned a ‘real’ encryption the validation oracle will always return  . Alterna-
tively if c2 is a random string the probability that the validation oracle returns  
is bounded by Advuf-cmaMA (otherwise there exists a trivial adversary against MA).
Inequality (5.9b) thus follows.
5.4 Multiple-Error Authenticated Encryption
In Section 2.4 we presented the IND-CCA3 notion, put forward by Shrimpton in [90],
as a concise and elegant security notion for authenticated encryption. For single-
error schemes this notion is equivalent to to the combination of chosen plaintext
security and ciphertext integrity. We now present a natural extension of this notion
to the multiple error setting in terms of indistinguishability from random bits. Then
in Theorem 5.11 we show that this characterisation is equivalent to the combination
of chosen-plaintext security, weak chosen ciphertext integrity, and error invariance.
Definition 5.5: IND$-CCA3 for multiple-error symmetric encryption.
Let SE = (K, E ,D) be a multiple-error symmetric encryption scheme with error space
S⊥. For an adversary A, an error message ⊥∈ S⊥ and a bit b, define experiment
Expind$-cca3-bSE,⊥ (A) as shown in Figure 5.9. First K is called to generate a key K, an
initial encryption state σ, and an initial decryption state %. The adversary A is then
given access to a special encryption oracle Enc$(·) and a special decryption oracle
Dec∅(·). When b = 1 both oracles behave as normal encryption and decryption
oracles. When b = 0 then Enc$(·) will return a random bit string (of the same
length as an actual ciphertext would have been), and Dec∅(·) will always return ⊥
(unless the queried ciphertext was output by Enc$(·), in which case it will return  ).
The adversary’s goal is to output a bit b′, as its guess of the challenge bit b. The
experiment returns b′ as well and, for ⊥∈ S⊥ and an adversary A, the advantage is
defined as:
Advind$-cca3SE,⊥ (A) = Pr
[
Expind$-cca3-1SE,⊥ (A) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Expind$-cca3-0SE,⊥ (A) = 1
]
.
The scheme SE is said to be IND$-CCA3 secure if there exists ⊥∈ S⊥ such that for
every adversary A with reasonable resources its advantage Advind$-cca3SE,⊥ (A) is small.
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Expind$-cca3-bSE,⊥ (A)
(K,σ, %)← K
i← 0, C← ()
b′ ← AEnc$(·),Dec∅(·)
return (b′)
Enc$(m)
(c, σ)← EK(m,σ)
if b = 0 then c←$ {0, 1}|c|
i← i+ 1, Ci ← c
return c
Dec∅(c)
(m, %)← DK(c, %)
if b = 0 then m←⊥
if c ∈ C then m←  
return m
Figure 5.9: Experiment to define IND$-CCA3 security for multiple-error schemes.
Theorem 5.11: IND$-CPA ∧ INT-CTXT∗ ∧ INV-ERR ←→ IND$-CCA3.
Let SE = (K, E ,D) be a symmetric encryption scheme with error space S⊥.
• For any ⊥∈ S⊥ and any adversary Acca3 there exist adversaries Acpa, Aint and
Aerr (consuming similar resources to Acca3) such that:
Advind$-cca3SE,⊥ (Acca3) ≤ Advind$-cpaSE (Acpa)+Advint-ctxt∗SE (Aint)+Advinv-errSE,⊥ (Aerr) .
(5.14)
• For any ⊥∈ S⊥ and any three adversaries A′cpa, A′int and A′err there exist three
corresponding adversaries A1cca3, A2cca3 and A3cca3 (consuming similar resources
to A′cpa, A′int and A′err, respectively) such that:
Advind$-cpaSE (A′cpa) ≤ Advind$-cca3SE,⊥ (A1cca3) , (5.15a)
Advint-ctxt∗SE (A′int) ≤ 2 ·Advind$-cca3SE,⊥ (A2cca3) , (5.15b)
Advinv-errSE,⊥ (A′err) ≤ 2 ·Advind$-cca3SE,⊥ (A3cca3) . (5.15c)
Proof. We prove the first part of Theorem 5.11 by showing that for any ⊥∈ S⊥
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and any IND$-CCA3 adversary Acca3 we can construct three adversaries Acpa, Aint,
Aerr that correspond to the IND$-CPA, INT-CTXT∗, and INV-ERR experiments re-
spectively. Moreover whenever Acca3 is successful, then at least one of the three
constructed adversaries will also be successful. Each of the three adversaries runs
Acca3 and attempts to simulate its environment as follows. Acpa forwards encryp-
tion queries to its own Enc$(·) oracle and responds to decryption queries always with
⊥. It then outputs whatever Acca3 outputs. As for Aint and Aerr, these respond
to Acca3’s encryption queries using their own encryption oracle, and hence always
returns a valid encryption. Furthermore Aint forwards any decryption queries that
Acca3 makes to its Try(·) oracle, and always returns ⊥. Finally Aerr forwards all
decryption queries to its own decryption oracle.
Now let Zb represent the event that Exp
ind-cca3-b
SE,⊥ (Acca3) = 1. For b = 1 let E and
F denote the respective events where Acca3 queries a ciphertext c to its decryption
oracle such that Dec∅(c) ∈ S⊥ \ {⊥}, and Dec∅(c) ∈M. We then have that:
Pr [ Z1 ] = Pr
[
Z1 ∧ F ∧ E
]
+ Pr
[
Z1 ∧ F ∧ E
]
+ Pr [W ∧ E ]
≤ Pr [ Z1 ∧ F ∧ E ]+ Pr [ F ∧ E ]+ Pr [ E ] .
Acca3’s advantage can then be expressed as:
Advind$-cca3SE,⊥ (Acca3) = Pr [ Z1 ]− Pr [ Z0 ]
≤ (Pr [ Z1 ∧ F ∧ E ]− Pr [ Z0 ]) + Pr [ F ∧ E ]+ Pr [ E ] .
Now each of the three terms on the right-hand side of the last inequality can be
bounded as follows. Note that Aerr provides Acca3 with a perfect simulation of the
IND$-CCA3 experiment for the case when b = 1. Thus whenever E occurs, Aerr wins
the INV-ERR experiment for ⊥. On the other hand if E does not occur then Aint
provides Acca3’s with a perfect simulation of the IND$-CCA3 experiment for the case
when b = 1. This is true until F occurs, at which point Aint wins the INT-CTXT∗
experiment. Finally if E and F do not occur, then Acpa provides Acca3 with a perfect
simulation of IND$-CCA3 experiment. It then follows that the first term corresponds
to Acpa’s advantage. Combining the above yields inequality (5.14). Note that each
of the three adversaries uses similar resources as Acca3.
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The second part of the theorem is easier to prove. Adversary A1cca3 runs A′cpa,
forwards encryption queries to its own Enc$(·) oracle and outputs whatever A′cpa
outputs. Since this provides A′cpa with a perfect simulation of its environment,
it follows that they both have the same advantage. Adversary A2cca3 runs A′int
and simulates its oracles using its Enc$(·) oracle and its Dec∅(·) oracle. If at any
point A′int queries a ciphertext (not previously returned by the encryption oracle)
which decrypts successfully, then A2cca3 halts and outputs 1. Otherwise it outputs
a uniformly-random bit. Note that when b = 1 A2cca3 provides A′int with a perfect
simulation of its environment, but when b = 0 A′int has zero probability of winning.
Inequality (5.15b) then follows from:
Advind$-cca3SE,⊥ (A2cca3) = Expind$-cca3-1SE,⊥ (A2cca3)−Expind$-cca3-0SE,⊥ (A2cca3)
=
1
2
· (1−Advint-ctxt∗SE (A′int)) + Advint-ctxt∗SE (A′int)−
1
2
=
1
2
·Advint-ctxt∗SE (A′int)) .
Adversary A3cca3 proceeds in a similar fashion. It runs A′err and simulates its ora-
cles using its Enc$(·) oracle and its Dec∅(·) oracle. If at any point A′int queries a
ciphertext which returns an error symbol in S⊥ \ {⊥}, then A3cca3 halts and outputs
1. Otherwise it outputs a uniformly-random bit. Again when b = 1 A3cca3 provides
A′err with a perfect simulation of its environment, but when b = 0 A′err has zero
probability of winning. Inequality (5.15c) then follows as in the previous case. Fi-
nally note that in all three cases the respective constructed IND$-CCA3 adversaries
use the same resources as A′cpa, A′int and A′err.
It can be similarly shown that:
Proposition 5.12.
IND-CPA ∧ INT-CTXT∗ ∧ INV-ERR←→ IND-CCA3 .
It is easy to see that IND$-CCA3 security guarantees IND$-CCA security in the
multiple error setting. In fact we can say something slightly stronger, as indicated
in Proposition 5.13. The proof is straightforward and we omit it.
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Proposition 5.13.
IND$-CCA3 −→ IND$-CVA ∧ INT-CTXT −→ IND$-CCA
IND-CCA3 −→ IND-CVA ∧ INT-CTXT −→ IND-CCA
5.5 The Security of Encode-then-Encrypt-then-MAC
Results of Bellare and Namprempre [17] and Krawczyk [69] provide formal evi-
dence for preferring Encrypt-then-MAC (EtM) over other generic compositions like
MAC-then-encrypt (MtE). On the other hand, by combining results from [69] and
[13], it can be shown that MtE is actually IND-CCA secure when instantiated with
CBC-mode encryption or a secure stream cipher (instantiated using counter-mode
encryption, for example). Thus the analysis of [17, 69] does not help to separate
EtM and MtE when both are suitably instantiated.
Nonetheless practical secure communications systems (employing CBC and counter-
mode encryption) based on EtM have so far proved themselves less vulnerable to
attack than ones based on MtE. For example, attacks on TLS in [27, 2, 3] and the
IPsec attacks from Chapter 4 exploit weaknesses in specific MtE constructions, while
attacks against deployed EtM constructions seem rarer.
Reconsidering the EtM and MtE compositions in the multiple-error setting provides
new formal grounds for preferring the EtM composition. In what follows, we show
that the EtM composition enjoys a robust form of security (in a sense to be made
precise). We then go on to show how the above-mentioned attacks on specific MtE
constructions can be captured in our multiple-error setting.
To make our considerations more realistic, in place of EtM, we actually consider an
encode-then-encrypt-then-MAC (EEM) composition, where the encoding step ac-
counts for the pre-processing (such as padding) that is common in practical schemes.
Similarly, we will consider the MAC-then-Encode-then-Encrypt (MEE) composition
in place of MtE when discussing attacks.
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Algorithm K
(Ke, σ, %)← Ke
Km ← Km
K ← Ke ‖ Km
return (K,σ, %)
Algorithm EK(m,σ)
u← EC(m)
(c, σ)← EKe(u, σ)
τ ← TKm(c)
return (c ‖ τ, σ)
Algorithm DK(ψ, %)
if |ψ| < `tag + 1 then
return (⊥0, %)
parse ψ as c ‖ τ
v ← VKm(c, τ)
if v ∈ Q⊥ then
return (v, %)
(u, %)← DKe(c, %)
if u ∈ S⊥ then
return (u, %)
m← DC(u)
return (m, %)
Figure 5.10: The generic Encode-then-Encrypt-then-MAC composition EEM with
distinguishable decryption failures.
Encoding Schemes. Formally an encoding scheme1 ES = (EC,DC) is a pair of
algorithms with an associated word space W ⊆ {0, 1}∗ and error space U⊥. The
encoding algorithm EC, which may be probabilistic, takes as input a word w ∈ W
to return a codeword u ∈ {0, 1}∗. The deterministic decoding algorithm DC takes
as input a codeword u ∈ {0, 1}∗ to return a word in W or an error message in U⊥.
We require that for all w ∈ W it hold (with probability 1) that w = DC(EC(w)).
Furthermore, an encoding scheme is said to be length-regular if for all w1, w2 ∈ W
such that |w1| = |w2| it holds (with probability 1) that |EC(w1)| = |EC(w2)| .
Our EEM composition is specified in Figure 5.10. Theorem 5.14 shows that the
EEM composition is robust, in the sense that it provides IND-CVA and INT-CTXT
security, and therefore IND-CCA security, in the multiple-error setting. The result
holds irrespective of the encoding scheme used (and any error messages it returns)
and independent of whatever error messages the encryption component returns, so
long as the encryption component is IND-CPA and the MAC is SUF-CMA.
Theorem 5.14: EEM provides IND-CVA + INT-CTXT. Suppose SE = (Ke, E ,D)
is a symmetric encryption scheme with message space M and error space S⊥.
Let MA = (Km, T ,V) be a MAC with error space Q⊥ producing tags of length
`tag. Let ES = (EC,DC) be a length-regular encoding scheme with word space
1Note that in the next chapter we will define encoding schemes differently.
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M, error space U⊥, and whose range is contained in M. Figure 5.10 then de-
fines a symmetric encryption scheme EEM with message space M and error space
S⊥= S⊥∪Q⊥∪U⊥∪{⊥0}, for some ⊥0 6∈ S⊥∪Q⊥∪U⊥. For any IND-CVA adversary
Acva and any INT-CTXT adversary Aint against EEM, there exist adversaries Acpa,
A1suf, and A2suf such that:
Advind-cvaEEM (Acva) ≤ Advind-cpaSE (Acpa) + Advsuf-cmaMA (A1suf) , (5.16)
Advint-ctxtEEM (Aint) ≤ Advsuf-cmaMA (A2suf) . (5.17)
Moreover, these adversaries consume similar resources to Acva and Aint.
Proof. Correctness of the constructed scheme follows easily from the correctness of
its constituent schemes, and we thus proceed to prove its security. We start by
proving inequality (5.16).
Adversary Acpa simply runs Km to get a key for the MAC and then runs Acva. It
answers its left-or-right encryption queries by first encoding both messages, it then
submits them to its own oracle, computes a tag for the resulting ciphertext and
returns the ciphertext concatenated with the tag. Validation queries are handled by
extracting the tag from the submitted ciphertext, verifying the tag on the remaining
string using the derived MAC key, and returning the output toAcva. If the submitted
ciphertext is shorter than `tag it returns ⊥0 instead. It then outputs whatever Acva
outputs.
Adversary A1suf runs Ke to get an encryption key, picks a bit uniformly at random,
and uses these together with its tagging oracle to simulate Acva’s left-or-right oracle.
It handles decryption queries by extracting the tag from the submitted ciphertext,
and submitting the tag together with the remaining string to its verification oracle,
and forwards the output to Acva. If the submitted ciphertext is shorter than `tag it
returns ⊥0 instead.
Now let W represent the event Expind-cva-bEEM (Acva) = b where b is picked uniformly
at random. Let E represent the event that Acva makes a validation query which
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returns an error message in S⊥ \ Q⊥. We then have that:
Pr [W ] = Pr
[
W ∧ E ]+ Pr [W ∧ E ]
≤ Pr [W ∧ E ]+ Pr [ E ] .
We bound each term on the right-hand side of the last inequality as follows. Note
that A1suf simulates Acva’s environment perfectly until one of Acva’s queries results
in a forgery for A1suf. It then follows that whenever E occurs, A1suf wins the SUF-
CMA experiment. On the other hand if E does not occur, then Acpa’s simulation
of Acva’s environment is perfect. Consequently whenever event W ∧E occurs, Acpa
wins the IND-CPA experiment. Equation (5.16) then follows by combining the above
and using equation (5.3).
Adversary A2suf runs Ke to get an encryption key, picks a bit uniformly at random,
and uses these together with its tagging oracle to simulate Aint’s encryption oracle.
For each encryption query that Aint’s submits, it first encodes the message and then
encrypts it with EK . It then obtains a tag for the resulting ciphertext from its
own oracle, and returns the ciphertext concatenated with the tag. Queries to the
Try(·) oracle are handled by extracting a tag from the ciphertext, and submitting
tag together with the remaining string to its verification oracle, and the output is
returned to Aint. On the other hand if the submitted ciphertext cannot be parsed ⊥0
is returned. Note that A2suf provides Aint with a perfect simulation of the INT-CTXT
experiment until the point at which Aint makes a successful try query. Moreover
whenever Aint forges a ciphertext, A2suf’s corresponding verification query will also
constitute a forgery. Inequality (5.17) thus follows.
As a complement to the above result, it is instructive to model attacks on instanti-
ations of the MAC-then-Encode-then-Encrypt (MEE) composition in our multiple-
error setting.
• TLS uses a MEE composition in which the encoding step involves the addition
of padding having a specific format. This format should be checked for upon
decryption, with a failure resulting in an error message. Likewise, the MAC
verification may fail, resulting in an error message. Error messages in TLS
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are encrypted in general, and MAC failures and padding failures are indicated
by the same error message. The attacks on TLS [27] and on DTLS [2] use
timing differences to distinguish MAC failures from padding failures. These
differences can be modelled by introducing distinct error messages for the two
failure events (even if at the byte level, the messages are indistinguishable).
• Certain configurations of IPsec use a MEE composition to cryptographically
protect IP packets. The security of these configurations were studied in detail
in Chapter 4. Here, the encoding step includes a padding portion as well as
a header portion, and it is the ability to discern between malformed padding
and a malformed header that gives rise to the attacks in Chapter 4. In fact,
malformed padding leads to packets being silently dropped, while malformed
headers lead to encrypted error messages being sent on the network. Again,
the attacks can be modelled by introducing distinct error messages for the
different events, even though one of the events does not result in an actual
error message being sent (since the absence of a message also leaks information
to the adversary).
• The recent Lucky 13 attack on TLS [3] exploits timing differences arising in
HMAC’s verification algorithm. More specifically each compression function
evaluation in HMAC results in additional processing time during decryption
that can be detected by the adversary from the time delay in returning TLS’s
MAC failure message; the size of the delay relates to the amount of TLS
padding previously removed and can be used to infer plaintext in an extension
of Vaudenay’s padding oracle attack [93]. This timing channel can be modelled
in our framework by transforming HMAC into a multiple-error MAC. Then
the error messages that this version of HMAC returns can be easily predicted
from the length of the string on which the tag is to be verified. It follows from
this observation that any proof of SUF-CMA security for the usual single-error
HMAC can be extended to this multiple-error version of HMAC. So, while this
multiple-error HMAC is still SUF-CMA secure, its interaction with the TLS
padding renders the MEE composition used in TLS insecure. By contrast, as
established in Theorem 5.14, an EEM composition would not be compromised
by such an implementation flaw.
Finally, we point out that it is also possible to prove that EEM provides IND-CCA3
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security if its MAC component only has a single error message. We omit the details.
5.6 Summary
Our work can be seen to fall in line with other approaches in cryptography, such
as nonce-based symmetric encryption [85], where one aims to design cryptographic
schemes whose security is more resilient to flaws introduced during implementation.
Nonce-based encryption schemes only require a nonce as their auxiliary input (except
for the secret key), which need be neither random, nor secret, nor unpredictable; in
fact it can even be adversarially generated (as long as no value is ever repeated).
Thus nonce-based schemes alleviate the security requirements for generating and
handling the auxiliary input in the scheme’s implementation and are therefore less
prone to implementation vulnerabilities. Similarly our work can be seen as relaxing
the assumption that decryption failures are indistinguishable to the adversary, an
assumption that is implicit in almost every treatment of symmetric encryption found
in the literature. By adopting a syntax where distinct decryption failure return
distinct error messages, and proving security in this framework, one obtains schemes
whose security is more resilient to implementation flaws.
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In this chapter we study symmetric encryption in the presence of ciphertext frag-
mentation. We formalise this setting and define notions for confidentiality, bound-
ary hiding, and denial of service in the presence of ciphertext fragmentation. The
chapter concludes with constructions of encryption schemes that meet these notions.
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6.1 Introduction
The work in this chapter is motivated by the SSH attack of Albrecht, Paterson and
Watson, described in Section 3.5, and the IPsec attacks by Degabriele and Paterson,
described in Chapter 4. What is common to these attacks is that they exploit
the data fragmentation mechanisms in each of the corresponding protocols. Data
sent over networks is often fragmented, meaning that it is broken up into smaller
pieces, or packets. If the data is encrypted, the receiver first has to determine what
constitutes a complete ciphertext in order to decrypt it and obtain the underlying
message. An exception to this, is when on-the-fly decryption is required, but this
is known to reduce security [58]. Reconstruction of the original ciphertext by the
receiver can be accomplished by various methods. As we saw in earlier chapters,
SSH uses an encrypted length field that tells the receiver how many bytes are needed
before the complete ciphertext has arrived. IPsec on the other hand, employs the
system of Identification field, More Fragments flag, and Fragment Offset field that
it inherits from IP. The SSH and IPsec attacks highlight the conflicts that can arise
between confidentiality and support for data fragmentation.
With the exception of [79], ciphertext fragmentation has been ignored by the theoret-
ical community. Security models tend to abstract out data fragmentation, possibly
on the assumption that it is immaterial to the security of encryption schemes. Fur-
thermore, ciphertext fragmentation is not only detrimental to confidentiality, but
also to more practical security goals, such as traffic analysis. In fact the SSH de-
signers’ decision to encrypt the length field (as opposed to the case of TLS where
the length field is in the clear) appears to be intended to mitigate traffic analysis,
since a cleartext length field allows the delineation of ciphertext boundaries, thereby
immediately revealing the ciphertext lengths. Moreover the mechanisms required to
support ciphertext fragmentation may introduce new types of security vulnerabili-
ties. Consider SSH for instance, there an adversary is able to exploit the bit-flipping
property of the CBC and CTR modes (see Section 2.3.3) to alter the length field
that occupies the first 32 bits of plaintext. If the length is maliciously increased
to a very large value (say, 232 − 1, the maximum possible value for a 32-bit field),
then the receiver will continue listening for ciphertext fragments awaiting message
completion until 232 bytes of data have been received. Only then will SSH’s MAC
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verification be conducted and the message rejected. The application (or user) re-
ceiving data from the SSH connection experiences this as an SSH connection hang,
a form of Denial-of-Service. As explained in Section 3.2, OpenSSH limits the value
of the length field to 218 so as to mitigate against such DoS attacks. However this
comes at the expense of limiting the maximum message length.
In this work we seek to strike the right balance between two conflicting aims: keep-
ing the generality and simplicity of traditional security definitions for symmetric
encryption; and developing a framework that can be used to provide meaningful
provable security analyses of practical schemes when deployed in environments that
permit ciphertext fragmentation attacks.
To this end, we initiate a general study of the security of symmetric encryption
schemes against fragmentation attacks, not only in terms of message confidentiality,
but also in terms of length-hiding and prevention of fragmentation-enabled Denial-of-
Service (DoS) attacks against the receiver. To the best of our knowledge, the latter
two goals for encryption, i.e. length-hiding (or, more precisely, hiding ciphertext
boundaries in a ciphertext stream) and DoS prevention have not been previously
studied, partly because the corresponding threats are not present if encryption is
treated as being atomic. The adversarial capabilities we define are general enough
to model a wide class of fragmentation attacks, including but not limited to the ones
from [1, 30].
We complement our new security definitions with efficient cryptographic construc-
tions based on standard primitives meeting the new goals. While it may be relatively
easy to achieve each security goal independently, it transpires that it is not straight-
forward to achieve two or three of the aforementioned goals simultaneously and one
of our schemes is the first to do so.
6.1.1 Related Work
Our fragmented approach bears more than a passing resemblance to work on on-
line encryption [11, 5, 6, 24, 41, 42, 43, 58]. However, whereas the on-line setting
concerns a single continuous message and ciphertext, with each block of plaintext
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leading to a block of ciphertext being output during encryption (and vice-versa dur-
ing decryption), our setting concerns atomic encryption (reflecting how many secure
protocols operate) but allows fragmented decryption of ciphertexts. Moreover, we
extensively treat the case of active adversaries, a topic that has not achieved much
attention in the on-line literature, and we consider more than just confidentiality
security notions.
Paterson and Watson [79] presented a formal analysis of SSH in counter mode, as im-
plemented in OpenSSH, in a security model that captures ciphertext fragmentation.
This obviously bears some similarity to our work, but there are some important
differences in scope as well as in the approach that we adopt. While the aim of
[79] is to prove secure the OpenSSH implementation of SSH-CTR in a more realistic
security model, our scope is to study encryption schemes supporting ciphertext frag-
mentation and their security more generally. In the context of our scope, the work
of Paterson and Watson suffers from the following limitations. Firstly they do not
consider boundary-hiding and denial-of-service security. Secondly, a correctness re-
quirement is completely missing. As we shall see this is non-trivial to define. Thirdly,
their confidentiality definition [79, Definition 2], which is also based on Bellare et
al.’s IND-sfCCA notion, is tailored specifically to work with SSH. In particular, the
security experiments refer directly to quantities that are SSH specific. For instance
the length field, sequence number and buffer as used by SSH are also crucial for the
definition of security in [79]. Furthermore, a stateful-failing behaviour, where if one
decryption call fails all subsequent decryption calls will also fail, is incorporated in
the security experiment in [79]. We believe it should be up to the scheme whether
to behave in such a way, enforcing it as part of the security experiment results in a
weaker security notion. Overall we find our definition to be simpler, cleaner, and at
the same time more general.
6.2 Symmetric Encryption Supporting Fragmentation
6.2.1 Unified Syntax
Morphology. We now extend the definition of symmetric encryption from Sec-
tion 2.3.1 for the case of fragmented ciphertexts. As before we will have that
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M ∈ {0, 1}∗ and C ∈ {0, 1}∗; in addition we will allow schemes to have multiple
errors as in Chapter 5. Complications arise when considering encryption schemes
in the presence of ciphertext fragmentation. For instance, a single ciphertext can
be split up in multiple fragments (Fig. 6.1, requiring recombination of the decryp-
tions of the various fragments) or a single fragment can contain multiple ciphertexts
(Fig. 6.2, where one might like to decrypt to a list of messages).
Definition 6.1: Symmetric encryption scheme supporting fragmentation.
A symmetric encryption scheme supporting fragmentation SE = (K, E ,D) with asso-
ciated message space M ∈ {0, 1}∗, ciphertext space C = {0, 1}∗ and error messages
S⊥ is defined by three algorithms:
• The randomised key generation algorithm K returns a secret key K and initial
states σ0 and %0.
• The randomised and stateful encryption algorithm
E : K ×M× Σ→ C × Σ
takes as input the secret key K ∈ K, a plaintext m ∈ M, and the current
encryption state σ ∈ Σ, and returns a ciphertext in C together with an updated
state. For any ` ∈ N and any m = [m1, . . . ,m`] ∈ M`, we write (c, σ) ←
EK(m, σ0) as shorthand for (c1, σ1) ← EK(m1, σ0), (c2, σ2) ← EK(m2, σ1), . . .
(c`, σ`)← EK(m`, σ`−1) where c = [c1, . . . , c`] and σ = σ`.
• The deterministic and stateful decryption algorithm
D : K × {0, 1}∗ × Σ→ ({0, 1} ∪ {¶} ∪ S⊥)∗ × Σ
takes the secret key K, a ciphertext fragment f ∈ {0, 1}∗, and the cur-
rent decryption state % to return the corresponding plaintext fragment m ∈
({0, 1} ∪ {¶} ∪ S⊥)∗ together with the updated state %. For any ` ∈ N and
any f = [f1, . . . , f`] ∈ ({0, 1}∗)`, we write (m, %)← DK(f , %0) as shorthand for
(m1, %1) ← DK(f1, %0), (m2, %2) ← DK(f2, %1), . . . (m`, %`) ← DK(f`, %`−1),
where m = m1 ‖ . . . ‖ m` and % = %`.
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1 2 3 4 5
Figure 6.1: A single ciphertext c1 = (12) cut up in multiple fragments f1 = (1) and
f2 = (2).
1 2 3 4 5
Figure 6.2: A single fragment f1 = (12345) spanning multiple ciphertexts c1 = (12)
and c2 = (345).
Note that the decryption algorithm is assumed to be able to handle ciphertexts
which decrypt to multiple plaintext messages, or to a mixture of plaintexts and er-
ror symbols, or possibly to nothing at all (perhaps because the input ciphertext is
insufficient to enable decryption to yet output anything, giving a significant differ-
ence from the atomic setting where decryption always outputs something). We use
the symbol ¶ 6∈ {0, 1} ∪ S⊥ to denote the end of plaintext messages, enabling an
application making use of the decryption algorithm to parse the output uniquely
into a sequence of elements of M and errors from S⊥.
While we enforce that from a decryption of a sequence of ciphertext fragments,
the corresponding message boundaries are easy to distinguish, we make no such
requirement for ciphertexts. Indeed, given a sequence of ciphertext fragments, it will
not be a priori clear what the constituent ciphertexts are (and in fact, in Section 6.4,
we want to model schemes which hide these boundaries as a security goal). Looking
ahead, the absence of clear ciphertext boundaries (in a sequence of fragments) will
cause challenging parsing problems for our CCA definitions: in order to ‘forbid’
decryption of the challenge ciphertext, a prerequisite is that this challenge ciphertext
can be located accurately in the sequence of ciphertext fragments!
1 2 3 4 5
Figure 6.3: Fragments f1 = (12) and f2 = (345) coincide exactly with the two
ciphertexts c1 = (12) and c2 = (345).
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Correctness. If a single message is encrypted and the corresponding ciphertext
is subsequently decrypted, we expect that the message is returned. When multi-
ple messages are encrypted and the fragments correspond exactly to the ciphertext
(Fig. 6.3), again we expect to retrieve the original messages.
However, we expect something stronger, namely that regardless of how we fragment
the ciphertext(s), the original message(s) are returned. For instance in the situation
depicted in Fig. 6.1 two ciphertexts c1 = (12) and c2 = (345) are produced by the
encryption oracle, and the adversary subsequently submits fragments f1 = (1) and
f2 = (2) to its decryption oracle. We require that after reception of the second
fragment (or earlier), the ciphertext c1 gets decrypted (formalised by the correct
message being output). Similarly, in Fig. 6.2, after reception of the single fragment
spanning two ciphertexts, we expect both messages to be returned (with correct
message boundaries indicated).
Finally, we require correct decryption, even when an extra string is added to the
original (string of) ciphertexts. This forces correct decryption once a complete
valid ciphertext has been received, even if it is followed by an invalid ciphertext
fragment. For instance, in the situation depicted in Fig. 6.5 two ciphertexts c1 = (12)
and c2 = (345) are produced by the encryption oracle, the adversary subsequently
submits fragments f1 = (1) and f2 = (234
′5′) to its decryption oracle, and we still
want to see the first ciphertext decrypted properly.
With this intuition in mind, we are almost ready to give our definition of correctness
for a symmetric encryption scheme supporting fragmentation. We first define a map
¶ : ({0, 1}∗∪ S⊥)∗ → ({0, 1}∪{¶}∪ S⊥)∗ by ¶(m1, . . . ,m`) = m1 ‖ ¶ ‖ . . .¶ ‖ m` ‖
¶. Note that ¶ is injective but not surjective.
Definition 6.2: Correctness Requirement. For all (K,σ0, %0) that can be
output by K and for all m ∈ M∗ and f ∈ ({0, 1}∗)∗, it holds (with probability 1)
that if (c, σ) ← EK(m, σ0) and ||(c) prefixes ||(f), and if (m′, %) ← DK(f , %0) then
m′ is prefixed by ¶(m).
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1 2 3 4 5
Figure 6.4: Correct decryption for overly long fragments: Given valid ciphertexts
c1 = (12) and c2 = (345) and fragment f1 = (123), what should the decryption of
f1 be?
1 2 3 4′ 5′
Figure 6.5: Two consecutive fragments f1 = (1) and f2 = (234
′5′). The second
fragment completes the first ciphertext c1 = (12), so we expect that to be decrypted
at this point, even though ciphertext c2 = (345) in the second fragment has been
modified to produce a possibly invalid ciphertext.
Alternatives. Our choice for correctness (Definition 6.2) might seem natural, but
it is not the only way to define it. Certainly, if a single, honestly generated ciphertext
is cut up into multiple fragments, then decrypting all those fragments ought to result
in the original message. This extends to a situation where (the concatenation of)
multiple ciphertexts is split up into fragments in such a way that every ciphertext
boundary coincides with a fragment boundary (this implies that every fragment is
a substring of a single ciphertext). However, when allowing a single fragment to
extend over multiple ciphertexts (see Fig. 6.4 for an example), it is not immediately
clear what ‘correct’ entails. Let us briefly consider three possible interpretations.
Fault: The ciphertext is deemed invalid, and ⊥ is returned.
Flush: The message is returned, and any surplus ciphertext is ignored.
Buffer: The message is returned, and any surplus ciphertext is considered as start-
ing a new ciphertext (buffering).
We have opted for a strict version of the final interpretation in our correctness
definition, which intuitively requires some sort of buffering to take place in the de-
cryption algorithm. Thus our choice of definition for correctness inherently requires
any scheme that supports fragmentation to have a stateful decryption algorithm.
SSH is a prime example of a stateful scheme that buffers (although it keeps more
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state than just the buffer). Next we classify two different degrees of statefulness
that a scheme may have.
6.2.2 Degrees of Statefulness
In Chapter 2 we considered stateful schemes as a special type of symmetric en-
cryption schemes, and saw that such schemes are able to meet stronger notions of
security. However when considering ciphertext fragmentation we see that schemes
need to be stateful. Thus we will mainly consider stateful schemes, and as a special
case we will consider schemes that employ only a ‘minimal’ form of state necessary
to support fragmentation. For each notion of security we will first present a ‘strong’
variant following similar ideas to the security notions in Section 2.5. These notions
will generally be met only by schemes which maintain a non-minimal state. Then
we will present weakened variants of these notions which can be met by schemes
within the special subclass having minimal state.
Stateful schemes. This includes all schemes supporting ciphertext fragmenta-
tion, and no restriction is imposed on the nature of the state that is maintained
by the decryption algorithm. The encryption algorithm may or may not be state-
ful. This covers most practical encryption schemes, which, in the non-fragmented
scenario, would normally be considered stateful. For instance, this can be used to
model the situation where encryption and decryption are both based on a counter
that increases depending on the number of messages or ciphertexts processed.
Stateless beyond buffering (sbb) schemes. This is a subclass of the above
category, which is intuitively an extension of standard (atomic), stateless encryption
schemes that makes handling fragmented ciphertexts possible. Namely, we specify
three properties which intuitively capture the behaviour of a buffer, and require that
the decryption state satisfy these properties. Our formulation allows us to identify
states that essentially act as buffers, without imposing any restrictions on the state’s
internals or format. Again the encryption algorithm may or may not be stateful.
This is in line with [16] where the statefulness of a scheme is determined solely by
the statefulness of the decryption algorithm. More formally, we have:
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Definition 6.3: Stateless beyond buffering (sbb). A symmetric encryption
scheme supporting fragmentation is called stateless beyond buffering (or sbb for
short) if it is correct (Definition 6.2) and satisfies the following additional conditions
1. The initial decryption state is empty, that is for all (K,σ0, %0) that can be out-
put by K, %0 = ε; for simplicity’s sake, we will often simply write
(K,σ)← K for sbb schemes.
2. The decryption state is empty after decryption of each ciphertext obtained
from encryption, i.e. for all K that can be output by K, for all σ ∈ Σ, for
all m ∈ M, it holds (with probability 1) that if (c, σ) ← EK(m,σ) and if
(m′, %)← DK(c, ε), then % = ε.
3. The scheme satisfies literal decryption: for allK ∈ K and for all f = (f1, . . . , f`),
when f ′ = f1 ‖ . . . ‖ f`, then DK(f , ε) = DK(f ′, ε).
The first condition is straightforward and its purpose is to ensure that the decryption
algorithm is not initialised with any state information. The second condition says
that for legitimately generated ciphertexts, the decryption state is flushed when the
end of a ciphertext is detected. Put differently, this condition ensures that no state
information is maintained across ciphertexts, i.e. the decryption of one ciphertext
does not depend on previous ciphertexts. However this ‘stateless’ behaviour is only
guaranteed as long as the ciphertexts are generated by the encryption algorithm.
In particular for an adversarially-generated sequence of ciphertext fragments, de-
pending on the scheme at hand, a number of outcomes are possible. After a few
ciphertext fragments the decryption algorithm may detect the end of a ciphertext
and return ¶, possibly following ⊥∈ S⊥ if the ciphertext was deemed invalid, or
after some plaintext if the ciphertext was understood to be valid. Alternatively the
decryption may never recover, in the sense that it will never return ¶ but possibly
it may return a sequence of outputs in ({0, 1} ∪ S⊥)∗. From the second property it
follows that state can only be maintained across fragments belonging to the same
ciphertext. The literal decryption property then says that the decryption state will
not (or does not need to) keep track of how the ciphertext was fragmented, since it
will not affect the output of the decryption algorithm.
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6.3.1 The Stateful Notion
When considering the security of a scheme supporting fragmentation, the first thing
to note is that fragmentation matters only in the CCA setting: if there is no de-
cryption oracle, then whether decryption is fragmented or atomic is immaterial to
the security of the scheme. In the context of fragmentation, we will replace the
usual notion of chosen-ciphertext attacks by chosen-fragment attacks (CFA). Our
first notion, IND-sfCFA is tailored for stateful schemes and it is inspired by Bellare
et al.’s [16] notion of IND-sfCCA (for atomic schemes) presented in Section 2.5. Re-
call that for IND-sfCCA, an adversary has unlimited access to the decryption oracle;
there are no ‘prohibited’ queries. Instead, to avoid trivial attacks (by the adversary
simply relaying its challenge ciphertext for decryption) a syncing mechanism is used.
Initially the decryption oracle is in-sync and its output (to the adversary) will be
suppressed. Only when the adversary causes the decryption oracle to be out-of-sync
(by deviating from the ciphertext stream output by the encryption oracle) will the
purported plaintexts (or error messages) be returned.
For atomic schemes, this is relatively straightforward to define, but for schemes sup-
porting fragmentation, some ambiguity arises. Consider again the scenario sketched
in Fig. 6.5. The first fragment is in-sync and any plaintext output corresponding to it
will be suppressed. In the second fragment a deviation from the challenge ciphertext
stream occurs. However, part of the fragment is still in-sync and certainly outputting
the full decryption would—mindful of the correctness requirement—reveal (part of)
the plaintext (12). We will need to formalise this by officially declaring part of the
fragment in-sync, and part of it out-of-sync. The ambiguity arises with regards to
the boundary we should use: is sync lost already at ‘3’ (being the first symbol of a
ciphertext that is not completed properly) or only at ‘4’ (being the first symbol of
the fragment that actually deviates)?
In our definition of IND-sfCFA (Definition 6.4) we opted for the strongest inter-
pretation, namely where synchronisation is lost at the ciphertext boundary. Since
this results in synchronization potentially being lost earlier, the decryption oracle
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consequently suppresses less of its output, making it the stronger option.
Definition 6.4: IND-sfCFA. Let SE = (K, E ,D) be an encryption scheme
supporting fragmentation. For an adversary A and a bit b, define experiment
Expind-sfcfa-bSE (A) as depicted in Fig. 6.6. The experiment starts by calling K to
generate a key K and initialise the states. The adversary A is given access to a
left-or-right encryption oracle LoR(·) and a stateful decryption oracle sfDec(·). The
stateful decryption oracle can be queried on any sequence of ciphertext fragments,
but as long as the decryption queries are in sync the output will be artificially
suppressed.
The adversary’s goal is to output a bit b′ as its guess of the challenge bit b, and the
experiment returns b′ as well. The corresponding advantage of an adversary A is
given by:
Advind-sfcfaSE (A) = Pr
[
Expind-sfcfa-1SE (A) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Expind-sfcfa-0SE (A) = 1
]
.
The scheme SE is said to be IND-sfCFA secure, if for every adversary A with rea-
sonable resources its advantage Advind-sfcfaSE (A) is small.
A few words of explanation about the workings of sfDec(·) are in order. Recall that
C  F denotes the greatest common prefix of C and F . Thus the test condition
C F = C checks whether C is a prefix of F . The while loop starts by gathering the
sequence of complete ciphertexts that have been relayed from the left-or-right oracle
to the decryption oracle, concatenates them into one string, appends the subsequent
ciphertext output by LoR(·) (if this exists), and stores the output in C. Then if F
(the concatenation of all ciphertext fragments submitted for decryption) is a prefix
of C, the queries are deemed to be in sync and the output is suppressed. Otherwise
the sync flag is set to 0 and the output string corresponding to the first out-of-sync
ciphertext and onwards is returned.
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Expind-sfcfa-bSE (A)
(K,σ, %)← K
i← 0, j ← 0, sync← 1
C ← ε, F ← ε,M ← ε
C← (), M← ()
b′ ← ALoR(·),sfDec(·)
return b′
LoR((m0,m1))
if |m0| 6= |m1| then return  
(c, σ)← EK(mb, σ)
i← i+ 1, Ci ← c, Mi ← mb
return c
sfDec(f)
(m, %)← DK(f, %)
F ← F ‖ f , M ←M ‖ m
if sync = 1 then
while C  F = C and j < i
j ← j + 1
C ← C ‖ Cj
if F  C = F then m← ε
else
sync← 0
m′ ← ¶(M1, . . . , Mj−1)
m←M %m′
return m
Figure 6.6: Experiment to define IND-sfCFA security.
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Expind-sbbcfa-bSE (A)
(K,σ, %)← K
i← 0, F ← ε, C← ()
b′ ← ALoR(·),Dec(·)
return b′
LoR((m0,m1))
if |m0| 6= |m1| then return  
(c, σ)← EK(mb, σ)
i← i+ 1, Ci ← c
return c
Dec(f)
M ← ε, prefix← 0
len← |f |
for k = 1 to len
(m, %)← DK(f [k], %)
m′ ← m′ ‖ m
F ← F ‖ f [k]
if % = ε and m′[|m′|] = ¶ then
if F ∈ C then m′ ← ε
M ←M ‖ m′
F ← ε,m′ ← ε
for all c ∈ C
if F  c = F then prefix← 1
if prefix = 0 then
M ←M ‖ m′,m′ ← ε
return M
Figure 6.7: Experiment to define IND-sbbCFA security.
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6.3.2 A Notion for SBB Schemes
Similarly to the stateful notions from [16], Definition 6.4 protects against attacks
which replay and reorder ciphertexts. In order for a scheme to protect against
such attacks it needs to maintain a decryption state across ciphertexts. Hence IND-
sfCFA is ‘too strong’ for SBB schemes, as the second requirement of Definition 6.3
explicitly rules out the ability to maintain states across ciphertexts. Accordingly for
SBB schemes we propose an analogous but weaker notion of confidentiality which
does not capture replay and reordering of ciphertexts. In this setting detecting
prohibited queries, which would lead to trivial win conditions, becomes challenging.
In fact we resort to specific properties of SBB schemes in this definition, specifically
literal decryption and the property that no state is maintained across ciphertexts.
Inside the decryption oracle we exploit the literal decryption property to decrypt
ciphertext fragments incrementally, i.e. bit by bit. Then we can detect ciphertext
boundaries by looking for a condition where the last output symbol is ¶ and the
decryption state is empty. Since Definition 6.5 makes use of properties specific to
SBB schemes, it only guarantees a meaningful notion of security for this subclass of
schemes, and not schemes supporting fragmentation in general.
Definition 6.5: IND-sbbCFA. Let SE = (K, E ,D) be an encryption scheme
supporting fragmentation that is stateless-beyond-buffering. For an adversary A and
a bit b, define experiment Expind-sbbcfa-bSE (A) as depicted in Fig. 6.7. The experiment
start by calling K to generate a key K and initialise the states. The adversary A
is then given access to a left-or-right encryption oracle LoR(·) and a decryption
oracle Dec(·). The decryption oracle can be queried on any sequence of ciphertext
fragments, except that the output corresponding to a ciphertext previously output
by the left-or-right oracle will be artificially suppressed.
The adversary’s goal is to output a bit b′ as its guess of the challenge bit b, and the
experiment returns b′ as well. The corresponding advantage of an adversary A is
given by:
Advind-sbbcfaSE (A) = Pr
[
Expind-sbbcfa-1SE (A) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Expind-sbbcfa-0SE (A) = 1
]
.
The scheme SE is said to be IND-sbbCFA secure, if for every adversary A with
138
6.4 Boundary Hiding
reasonable resources its advantage Advind-sbbcfaSE (A) is small.
Note that M now represents the string that is returned by the decryption oracle in
response to the queried fragment f ; accordingly this is always reset at the beginning.
The variable F accumulates bits corresponding to a single ciphertext, and is kept
to monitor whether this ciphertext was previously output by the encryption oracle.
The contents of F are maintained across calls to the decryption oracle, and are
only reset when a ciphertext boundary is encountered. Similarly, m′ accumulates
the plaintext bits corresponding to a single message. If after processing f , F does
not yet contain a complete ciphertext, but it contains a prefix of a ciphertext that
was previously output by the encryption oracle, the corresponding plaintext is not
output but is stored in m′ instead.
6.4 Boundary Hiding
It is conventional wisdom that an encryption scheme cannot hide entirely the mes-
sage length from an adversary. In practice however, the message length can convey
information about the nature of the message. For instance the IPsec attacks from
Chapter 4 identify ICMP error messages from their length. As another example,
traffic analysis has been used to derive approximate transcripts of encrypted Voice
over IP (VoIP) conversations [96]. Traffic analysis is a real concern, and in prac-
tice heuristic countermeasures are commonly employed to mitigate such attacks.
Practical protocols like TLS, SSH, and IPsec use variable-length padding, while
IPsec additionally provides the ability to insert dummy messages/packets. A recent
study by Dyer et al. [38] shows that none of the aforementioned countermeasures,
together with others that have been proposed in the literature, are effective in pre-
venting HTTP fingerprinting. However their attacks do not rely solely on ciphertext
lengths.
The ability to fragment ciphertexts without affecting correct decryption may be ex-
ploited as an alternative (heuristic) means to frustrate traffic analysis. Ciphertext
lengths may no longer be evident from a stream of randomly-fragmented ciphertexts
flowing across a channel. However this requires the encryption scheme to not reveal
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ciphertext boundaries. We therefore formalise the goal of hiding ciphertext bound-
aries within a concatenation of ciphertexts as an intermediate security goal towards
this heuristic strategy and preventing traffic analysis in general.
We give definitions for both the passive and the active adversary cases. The passive
case is the one that is commonly assumed in the traffic analysis literature [38, 96].
Here the adversary merely monitors encrypted traffic and tries to infer information
from ciphertext lengths and other information such as network packet timings, but
without giving away its presence by actively modifying network traffic. By hiding the
ciphertext boundaries, the adversary can no longer determine individual ciphertext
lengths, except of course, for the total volume being sent. As we will see, achieving
security in the passive case is relatively straightforward. Much more challenging is
achieving security in the active case. For example, it was already pointed out by
Albrecht et al. [1] that SSH, while attempting to hide ciphertext boundaries, fails to
do so against active, fragmented attacks (there is a simple bit-flipping attack which
works irrespective of whether CBC or CTR mode encryption is used in the SSH
construction).
6.4.1 Security Definitions
Definition 6.6: BH-CPA and BH-sfCFA. Let SE = (K, E ,D) be an encryp-
tion scheme supporting fragmentation. For an adversary A and a bit b, define
experiments Expbh-cpa-bSE (A) and Expbh-sfcfa-bSE (A) as shown in Figure 6.8. Both ex-
periments start by calling K to generate a key K and initialise the states. The
adversary A is given access to a special left-or-right encryption oracle LoR(·): on
input two vectors of messages, either the left or the right result is returned, but
with the caveat that the concatenation of ciphertexts is returned only if it has the
same length in both worlds (but note that we do not insist that the two vectors of
messages contain the same number of components). In the latter experiment the
adversary is additionally given a stateful decryption oracle sfDec(·) identical to that
used in the IND-sfCFA experiment. The adversary can query this oracle on any
sequence of ciphertext fragments, but as long as the decryption queries are in sync
the output is artificially suppressed.
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Expbh-cpa-bSE (A) Expbh-sfcfa-bSE (A)
(K,σ, %)← K
i← 0, j ← 0, sync← 1
C ← ε, F ← ε,M ← ε
C← (), M← ()
b′ ← ALoR(·) b′ ← ALoR(·),sfDec(·)
return b′
LoR((m0,m1))
σ0 ← σ, σ1 ← σ
(c0, σ0)← EK(m0, σ0)
(c1, σ1)← EK(m1, σ1)
c0 ← ||(c0), c1 ← ||(c1)
if |c0| 6= |c1| then return  
σ ← σb
for k = 1 to |cb|
i← i+ 1
Ci ← cb(k), Mi ←mb(k)
return cb
sfDec(f)
(m, %)← DK(f, %)
F ← F ‖ f , M ←M ‖ m
if sync = 1 then
while C  F = C and j < i
j ← j + 1
C ← C ‖ Cj
if F  C = F then m← ε
else
sync← 0
m′ ← ¶(M1, . . . , Mj−1)
m←M %m′
return m
Figure 6.8: Experiments to define BH-CPA and BH-sfCFA security. For BH-CPA
the boxed code is excluded, whereas for BH-sfCFA the boxed code replaces the code
adjacent to it.
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In both experiments, the adversary’s goal is to output a bit b′ as its guess of the
challenge bit b, and the experiment returns b′ as well. The corresponding advantages
of an adversary A are given by:
Advbh-cpaSE (A) = Pr
[
Expbh-cpa-1SE (A) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Expbh-cpa-0SE (A) = 1
]
,
Advbh-sfcfaSE (A) = Pr
[
Expbh-sfcfa-1SE (A) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Expbh-sfcfa-0SE (A) = 1
]
.
The scheme SE is said to be BH-CPA (or BH-sfCFA) secure, if for every adversary A
with reasonable resources its advantage Advbh-cpaSE (A) (respectively Advbh-sfcfaSE (A))
is small.
Analogously to the case of confidentiality, we can define a natural SBB variant of
this notion by replacing the stateful decryption oracle sfDec(·) in Fig. 6.8 with the
decryption oracle Dec(·) from Fig. 6.7. As before the resulting experiment, displayed
in Fig. 6.9, assumes properties that are specific to SBB schemes, and hence this
security notion is only meaningful for SBB schemes.
Definition 6.7: BH-sbbCFA. Let SE = (K, E ,D) be an encryption scheme sup-
porting fragmentation that is stateless-beyond-buffering. For an adversary A and a
bit b, define the experiment Expind-sbbcfa-bSE (A) as depicted in Fig. 6.9. The experi-
ment starts by calling K to generate a key K and initialise the states. The adversary
A is given access to a special left-or-right encryption oracle LoR(·): on input two
vectors of messages, either the left or the right result is returned, but with the caveat
that the concatenation of ciphertexts is returned only if it has the same length in
both worlds (but note that we do not insist that the two vectors of messages contain
the same number of components). The adversary is additionally given a decryption
oracle Dec(·). It can query the decryption oracle on any sequence of ciphertext frag-
ments, except that the output corresponding to a ciphertext previously output by
the left-or-right oracle will be artificially suppressed.
The adversary’s goal is to output a bit b′, as its guess of the challenge bit b, and the
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Expbh-sbbcfa-bSE (A)
(K,σ, %)← K
i← 0, F ← ε, C← ()
b′ ← ALoR(·),Dec(·)
return b′
LoR((m0,m1))
σ0 ← σ, σ1 ← σ
(c0, σ0)← EK(m0, σ0)
(c1, σ1)← EK(m1, σ1)
c0 ← ||(c0), c1 ← ||(c1)
if |c0| 6= |c1| then return  
σ ← σb
for k = 1 to |cb|
i← i+ 1
Ci ← cb(k)
return cb
Dec(f)
M ← ε, prefix← 0
len← |f |
for k = 1 to len
(m, %)← DK(f [k], %)
m′ ← m′ ‖ m
F ← F ‖ f [k]
if % = ε and m′[|m′|] = ¶ then
if F ∈ C then m′ ← ε
M ←M ‖ m′
F ← ε,m′ ← ε
for all c ∈ C
if F  c = F then prefix← 1
if prefix = 0 then
M ←M ‖ m′,m′ ← ε
return M
Figure 6.9: Experiment to define BH-sbbCFA security.
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experiment returns b′ as well. We define the advantage of an adversary A as:
Advind-sbbcfaSE (A) = Pr
[
Expind-sbbcfa-1SE (A) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Expind-sbbcfa-0SE (A) = 1
]
.
The scheme SE is said to be IND-sbbCFA secure, if for every adversary A with
reasonable resources its advantage Advind-sbbcfaSE (A) is small.
It turns out that the above definition, which we argue is the natural analogue of the
boundary-hiding definition in the stateful setting, is unsatisfiable by any ‘reasonable’
SBB encryption scheme, see the note at the end of this section. As such our coverage
of boundary hiding in the SBB setting will be somewhat limited.
Relating Boundary Hiding to Indistinguishability. We now establish a few
relations between notions of boundary hiding and notions of indistinguishability
which we will use in later Sections. Theorem 6.1 states that for length-regular1
schemes boundary hiding implies left-or-right indistinguishability. Intuitively this
follows because the special left-or-right oracle in the BH-ATK notions can be used
to simulate the left-or-right oracle in the IND-ATK notions. The requirement on
length-regularity ensures that a valid query to the IND-ATK oracle results in a valid
query to the BH-ATK oracle. Other than that the proof is straightforward and we
omit it. Moreover, it is not too hard to show that BH-ATK is strictly stronger than
IND-ATK: take any IND-ATK secure scheme and append each ciphertext with a
special marker string, e.g., 1128.
Theorem 6.1: BH-ATK −→ IND-ATK. Let SE = (K, E ,D) be a length-regular
symmetric encryption scheme supporting fragmentation. For any ATK ∈ {CPA,
sbbCFA, sfCFA} and any IND-ATK adversary Aind there exists a BH-ATK adversary
Abh consuming similar resources to Aind such that:
Advind-atkSE (Aind) ≤ Advbh-atkSE (Abh) .
Intuitively the concatenation of multiple random strings is indistinguishable from a
1An encryption scheme is said to be length-regular if for all m1,m2 ∈ M where |m1| = |m2| it
holds (with probability 1) that |EncK(m1)| = |EncK(m2)| .
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single random string of the same length. It then follows that schemes having cipher-
texts indistinguishable from random strings should also hide ciphertext boundaries.
This is stated more formally, for the passive setting2, in the following theorem.
Again it is not hard to show that this implication is strict: take any BH-CPA secure
scheme and re-encode its ciphertexts by doubling every bit, i.e., 0→ 00 and 1→ 11.
Theorem 6.2: IND$-CPA −→ BH-CPA. Let SE = (K, E ,D) be a symmetric en-
cryption scheme supporting fragmentation. For any BH-CPA adversary Abh there
exists an IND$-CPA adversary Aind$ consuming similar resources to Abh such that:
Advbh-cpaSE (Abh) ≤ 2 ·Advind$-cpaSE (Aind$) .
Proof. For any adversary Abh we construct adversary Aind$ as follows. Adversary
Aind$ picks a bit d uniformly at random and then runs Abh. Then Aind$ uses this bit
and its own encryption oracle to simulate the special left-or-right encryption oracle
to Abh. That is, it uses d to pick the message vector, it encrypts each message in the
vector componentwise, and returns their concatenation. If Abh’s output is equal to
d, then Aind$ outputs 1 else it outputs 0. Now when Aind$ is run in the IND$-CPA
experiment with b = 1 it provides Abh with a perfect simulation of the BH-CPA
experiment with random bit d. Otherwise if b = 0 the responses to Abh’s queries are
completely independent to the bit d because they are random strings of appropriate
length. We thus have that:
Advind$-cpaSE (Aind$) = Pr
[
Expind$-cpa-1SE (Aind$) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Expind$-cpa-0SE (Aind$) = 1
]
= Pr
[
d← {0, 1} : Expbh-cpa-dSE (Abh) = d
]
− 1
2
=
1
2
+
1
2
·Advbh-cpaSE (Abh)−
1
2
=
1
2
·Advbh-cpaSE (Abh) .
2It can be shown that this implication does not hold in the stateful setting, in fact the stateful
InterMAC construction of Section 6.6.2 serves as a separating example.
145
6.4 Boundary Hiding
6.4.2 Unsatisfiability of SBB Boundary Hiding
We now outline a general attack, applicable to any practically relevant scheme,
showing that the BH-sbbCFA definition given in Figure 6.9 is unsatisfiable. The
reader is recommended to first refer to the next section where security against Denial
of Service attacks is introduced and defined.
Let SE = (K, E ,D) be any SBB encryption scheme supporting fragmentation that
is n-DOS-sbbCFA secure for some value n. Furthermore, let m1 and m2 be any
two messages such that |EK(m1)| < |EK(m2)| . An adversary can then query the
message-vector pair ([m1,m2], [m2,m1]) to the special left-or-right oracle and get a
concatenation of ciphertexts c∗. It then chops off the last |EK(m2)| bits from c∗ to
get c′, and submits the string c′‖c′‖. . .‖c′ (possibly in fragments) to the decryption
oracle. The number of copies of c′ that are included in this string is such that its
total length exceeds n. Now if c∗ corresponds to the first message vector then c′
will be a prohibited ciphertext and all output will be suppressed by the decryption
oracle. On the other hand if c∗ corresponds to the second message vector, then by the
correctness of the scheme c′ will not be a prohibited ciphertext and the concatenated
string is guaranteed to produce some output by the n-DOS-sbbCFA security of the
scheme. Thus the presence or absence of any output from the decryption oracle will
indicate to the adversary which message vector was encrypted.
While our formulation of BH-sbbCFA is quite natural, one could argue that the rea-
son it is unsatisfiable is because the set of prohibited ciphertexts C depends on the
challenge bit b. A possible workaround would be to additionally split the returned
concatenation of ciphertexts cb according to the lengths of the ciphertexts in c1−b,
and include the resulting set of ciphertexts in C as well. However we do not know if
this definition is satisfiable either. Accordingly it remains an open question whether
a meaningful and satisfiable definition of BH-sbbCFA is conceivable or not. More
generally, we do not know whether this limitation is due to our inability to formu-
late such a definition, or because the goal of boundary hiding inherently requires
protecting against replay and reordering attacks.
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6.5 Denial of Service
In this section we study fragmentation-related Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. This
is, to the best of our knowledge, the first formal treatment of DoS prevention as a
property of a symmetric encryption scheme. In Section 6.1 we mentioned an example
of a fragmentation-related attack that constitutes DoS. In that attack, by carefully
tampering with only a few bits in one of the transmitted ciphertexts, the adversary
managed to ‘confuse’ the decryption algorithm so that it would produce no output
until a huge amount of ciphertext is received. Informally this kind of attack is what
our security notions will attempt to capture. More specifically, we will equip the
adversary with an encryption oracle and a decryption oracle. Its goal will be to
produce a sequence of ciphertext fragments whose concatenation is at least n bits
long, where each of these fragments decrypts to the empty string. We will then
quantify the DoS security of a scheme via the minimum value of n such that no
‘efficient’ adversary is successful in producing such a sequence of fragments.
The countermeasure adopted by SSH to mitigate against such attacks (see Sec-
tion 3.2) is to limit the maximum ciphertext length to n bits; thereby ensuring that
the decryption algorithm will produce an output after at most n bits of ciphertext.
In the case of OpenSSH n is set to 221. We consider this to be a serious limitation
since it affects the usability of the scheme. If two parties wish to exchange large files,
it is understood that this may require waiting for large amounts of ciphertext before
recovering it at the receiver side, and this should be allowed. What we wish to avoid
is cases where the communicating parties are exchanging short messages, but the
adversary is able to tamper with the ciphertexts in such a way that the receiver has
to wait for a large amount of ciphertext before producing an output. Thus we aim
to formulate DoS security in a way that allows lowering n without necessarily re-
stricting the maximum message size in the message space. To accommodate this we
exclude trivial win conditions of the type where a passive adversary forwards cipher-
texts (or fragmentations thereof) of length n or higher from the encryption oracle
to the decryption oracle. In essence we will insist that the sequence of fragments
by which the adversary wins be generated by an active adversary. In the stateful
setting this means that we will require the ‘winning’ sequence of fragments to occur
after the adversary has become active. In the SBB setting, trivial win conditions
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will be trickier to catch. We now formulate the two definitions more precisely.
6.5.1 Security Definitions
Definition 6.8: n-DOS-sfCFA. Let SE = (K, E ,D) be an encryption scheme
supporting fragmentation. For an adversary A and a positive integer n, define the
experiment Expn-dos-sfcfaSE (A) as depicted in Fig. 6.10. The experiment starts by
calling K to generate a key K and initialise the states. The adversary A is then
given access to an encryption oracle Enc(·), and a stateful decryption oracle sfDec(·).
The adversary’s goal is to submit to the stateful decryption oracle sfDec(·) an out-
of-sync sequence of fragments whose combined length is at least n bits, such that
all fragments return no output upon decryption. In the event that the adversary
succeeds, the experiment returns 1, and 0 otherwise. The output of the stateful
decryption oracle is never suppressed.
We define the advantage of an adversary A as:
Advn-dos-sfcfaSE (A) = Pr
[
Expn-dos-sfcfaSE (A) = 1
]
.
The scheme SE is said to be n-DOS-sfCFA secure, if for every adversary A with
reasonable resources its advantage Advn-dos-sfccaSE (A) is small.
The initial lines of code in the decryption oracle work as before: their purpose is
to detect when the queries become out of sync, i.e. when the adversary becomes
active. Once the queries have become out of sync, the variable F is used to store
the last concatenation of out-of-sync fragments that did not return any output upon
decryption. If at any point the size of F exceeds n, the win flag is set. In the
case where the first out-of-sync fragment returns no output upon decryption, only
the out-of-sync portion of that fragment is stored in F . That is, we measure the
ciphertext from the point at which the tampering has occurred. This excludes trivial
win conditions, resulting say from a legitimately-produced long ciphertext (longer
than n bits) where the last bit is flipped by the adversary. Permitting such win cases
would also require limiting a scheme’s maximum message size for it to be secure.
We now define an analogous DoS security notion in the SBB setting. As before
148
6.5 Denial of Service
Expn-dos-sfcfaSE (A)
(K,σ, %)← K
C ← ε, F ← ε, C← ()
i← 0, j ← 0
sync← 1,win← 0
AEnc(·),sfDec(·)
return win
Enc(m)
(c, σ)← EK(m,σ)
i← i+ 1, Ci ← c
return c
sfDec(f)
(m, %)← DK(f, %)
if sync = 1 then
F ← F ‖ f
while C  F = C and j < i
j ← j + 1
C ← C ‖ Cj
if F  C 6= F then
sync← 0
if m = ε then F ← F % C
else F ← ε
else
if m = ε then F ← F ‖ f
else F ← ε
if sync = 0 and |F | ≥ n then win← 1
return m
Figure 6.10: Experiment to define n-DOS-sfCFA security.
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we want to exclude win conditions where the adversary merely forwards (possibly
fragmented) ciphertexts from the encryption oracle to the decryption oracle. While
in the stateful setting the adversary is considered active if he reorders or replays
ciphertext, in the SBB setting we will consider this behaviour to be passive. Thus
adversarial strategies that exploit reorderings and replays are deemed invalid in the
SBB setting. This distinction between the stateful and SBB settings is present in all
security notions considered in this chapter. Adapting this ideology to DoS security,
if the winning sequence of fragments coincides with the start of a new ciphertext,
we do not want it to correspond to a fragmentation of a long ciphertext that was
previously output by the encryption oracle. Moreover, it should not be prefixed by
a previously-output ciphertext, or by a prefix of a previously-output ciphertext. A
sequence of fragments that satisfies these requirements is said to be non-trivial.
Definition 6.9: n-DOS-sbbCFA. Let SE = (K, E ,D) be an encryption scheme
supporting fragmentation. For an adversary A and a positive integer n, define the
experiment Expn-dos-sfcfaSE (A) as depicted in Fig. 6.11. The experiment starts by
calling K to generate a key K and initialise the states. The adversary A is then
given access to an encryption oracle Enc(·), and a decryption oracle Dec(·). The
adversary’s goal is to submit to the decryption oracle Dec(·) a non-trivial sequence
of fragments whose combined length is at least n bits, such that all fragments return
no output upon decryption. In the event that the adversary succeeds, the experiment
returns 1, and 0 otherwise. The output of the decryption oracle is never suppressed.
We define the advantage of an adversary A in this experiment as:
Advn-dos-sbbcfaSE (A) = Pr
[
Expn-dos-sbbcfaSE (A) = 1
]
.
The scheme SE is said to be n-DOS-sbbCFA secure if, for every adversary A with
reasonable resources, its advantage Advn-dos-sbbcfaSE (A) is small.
Once again we exploit literal decryption to decrypt ciphertext fragments incremen-
tally. This allows the decryption oracle to detect ciphertext boundaries in order to
filter out trivial win conditions. The variable F stores the concatenation of all ci-
phertext bits belonging to the current ciphertext. If the end of ciphertext is detected
(by checking for the condition where % = ε and m′[|m′|] = ¶), then F is reset. The
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Expn-dos-sbbcfaSE (A)
(K,σ, %)← K
F ← ε, C← ()
i← 0, q ← 0
tmp← 0,win← 0
AEnc(·),Dec(·)
return win
Enc(m)
(c, σ)← EK(m,σ)
i← i+ 1, Ci ← c
return c
Dec(f)
M ← ε,m′ ← ε
len← |f |
for k = 1 to len
(m, %)← DK(f [k], %)
m′ ← m′ ‖ m
F ← F ‖ f [k]
if % = ε and m′[|m′|] = ¶ then
M ←M ‖ m′
F ← ε,m′ ← ε
if M ‖ m′ 6= ε then q ← |F |
if |F | − q ≥ n then
tmp← 1
for all c ∈ C
if |F % c| < n then tmp← 0
win← tmp
return M ‖ m′
Figure 6.11: Experiment to define DOS-sbbCFA security.
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variable q points to the end of the last received fragment within F that produced an
output. Each time a fragment is received the decryption oracle checks whether the
concatenation of fragments that did not produce an output, i.e. F [q + 1, |F |], is at
least n bits long. If so it further verifies that after all possible replayed ciphertext
prefixes are removed, it still is at least n bits long.
A Note on DoS and Ciphertext Integrity. In an attempt to limit our scope
we did not formulate a notion of ciphertext integrity for schemes supporting frag-
mentation. Nonetheless, we wish to emphasise that DoS security does not imply
ciphertext integrity, nor the other way round. While a notion of ciphertext integrity
would ensure that an adversarially generated ciphertext is never accepted, it does
not guarantee at which point it will be rejected. Thus, as in the case of SSH, it may
be that a ciphertext can only be rejected once the (possibly very large) ciphertext
has been received in full. On the other hand, if a scheme is n-DOS-sfCFA secure
it does not guarantee that adversarially generated ciphertexts will be rejected. We
purposefully chose to maintain this separation between the two notions, as we feel
that the two security goals are rather different. This said, a combination of the two
security notions has practical significance, since it guarantees that any tampering in
the communication would be detected within n bits. Intuitively it is easy to see that
the InterMAC constructions, presented in the next section, achieve this combined
security goal.
6.6 Constructions
6.6.1 Applying Instantaneously Decodable Postprocessing (IDP)
We now present a simple transformation for converting a symmetric encryption
scheme to an encryption scheme that supports ciphertext fragmentation. In addition
we will see that if the scheme that we start with is IND-sfCCA secure, then the
constructed scheme will be IND-sfCFA secure. Similarly if we start with a scheme
that is IND-CCA secure, the constructed scheme will satisfy IND-sbbCFA security.
The construction will make use of an instantaneously decodable encoding scheme.
Later we will see that if we allow the encoding scheme to be keyed and probabilistic,
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the construction can in addition achieve boundary hiding against passive adversaries.
Accordingly, within the scope of this chapter, we will extend the syntax of encoding
schemes as follows.
Generalised Encoding Schemes. An encoding scheme ES = (Kc, EC,DC) is a
triple of algorithms with an associated word space W ⊆ {0, 1}∗. The randomised
key-generation algorithmKc takes no input and returns a secret keyK. The encoding
algorithm EC, which may be probabilistic, takes as input a secret key K and a word
w ∈ W to return a codeword u ∈ {0, 1}∗. The deterministic decoding algorithm
DC takes as input a secret key K and a codeword u ∈ {0, 1}∗ to return a word
w ∈ W ∪ {ε}, possibly followed by other outputs. For any key K, we denote the
range of the encoding algorithm by ECK(W) .
Definition 6.10: Instantaneous Decodability. An encoding scheme ES =
(Kc, EC,DC) with associated word space W ⊆ {0, 1}∗, is said to be instantaneously
decodable if for all keys K that can be output by Kc , it holds that:
1. For all w ∈ W, and all s ∈ {0, 1}∗, if u← ECK(w) then (w, s)← DCK(u ‖ s).
2. For all s ∈ {0, 1}∗, if no u ∈ ECK(W) is a prefix of s then (ε, s)← DCK(s).
Note that instantaneous decodability does not require the encoding scheme to be
keyed. In fact any keyless encoding scheme that is prefix-free is also instantaneously
decodable. Later in this section we will give an example of a keyed encoding scheme
that is instantaneously decodable. Throughout we assume that Kc, EC, and DC are
efficiently computable algorithms.
Construction 6.1: The IDP Construction. Let SE = (Ke, E ,D) be a sym-
metric encryption scheme with associated message space M and ciphertext space
C. Let ES = (Kc, EC,DC) be an instantaneously decodable encoding scheme with
an associated word space that contains C. Then the construction specified in Fig-
ure 6.12 yields an encryption scheme supporting fragmentation SE = (K, E ,D) with
an associated message spaceM. Furthermore if SE is stateless, then SE is stateless
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Algorithm K
Kc ← Kc
(Ke, σ, %)← Ke
K ← Kc ‖ Ke
return (K,σ, (%, ε))
Algorithm EK(m,σ)
(c, σ)← EKe(m,σ)
u← ECKc(c)
return (u, σ)
Algorithm DK(f, (%, α))
m′ ← ε, w ← f
α← α ‖ f
while (w 6= ε)
(w,α)← DCKc(α)
if (w 6= ε) then
(m, %)← DKe(w, %)
m′ ← m′ ‖ m ‖ ¶
return (m′, (%, α))
Figure 6.12: The constructed scheme SE using instantaneously decodable post-
pocessing.
beyond buffering.
Correctness of the constructed scheme SE follows immediately from the correctness
of SE and the instantaneous decodability of ES . Furthermore if SE ’s decryption
algorithm is stateless, the only state that D maintains is the buffer α. Now the buffer
is always initialised to ε , and it is easy to see that after decrypting any complete
ciphertext, the buffer will always be empty. Finally, because all submitted fragments
are appended to the buffer from which ciphertexts are then extracted and submitted
to D, decryption is independent of the fragmentation pattern. Hence the scheme
also satisfies literal decryption, and consequently is stateless beyond buffering.
Note that by instantiating the encoding scheme with a prefix-free encoding, we
get a very efficient transformation for converting a ‘standard’ symmetric encryption
scheme to an encryption scheme that supports fragmentation. We next show the nice
property that if we start from a scheme that is IND-sfCCA secure, the transformation
yields a scheme that is IND-sfCFA secure.
Theorem 6.3: IDP is IND-sfCFA secure. Let SE = (K, E ,D) be the scheme from
Construction 6.1, composed from a symmetric encryption scheme SE = (Ke, E ,D)
and an instantaneously decodable encoding scheme ES = (Kc, EC,DC). Then for any
IND-sfCFA adversary Asfcfa against SE, there exists an IND-sfCCA adversary Asfcca
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against SE such that:
Advind-sfcfaSE (Asfcfa) ≤ Advind-sfccaSE (Asfcca) , (6.1)
where Asfcca consumes similar resources to Asfcfa.
Proof. For any adversary Asfcfa we construct adversary Asfcca as follows. Adversary
Asfcca runs Kc to generate an encoding key and then runs Asfcfa . It then uses
the encoding key together with its left-or-right oracle to simulate Asfcfa’s left-or-
right oracle as per Construction 6.1, keeping record of the ciphertexts it returns.
Asfcfa’s decryption queries are handled by maintaining a buffer to which the queried
fragments are appended. Then Asfcca repeatedly applies the decoding algorithm to
the buffer until no codeword can be extracted, and submits the codewords, in the
same order, to its own stateful decryption oracle. When the queries become out
of sync, the returned messages are appended with ¶, concatenated together, and
the resulting string is returned to Asfcfa. Asfcca uses its records to keep track of
when Asfcfa’s queries become out of sync. This is necessary since the first out of
sync query might correspond to an encryption of ε, and Asfcfa would not be able to
distinguish this case from a message being suppressed because it is in sync. Finally
Asfcca outputs whatever Asfcfa outputs.
From the instantaneous decodability of ES it follows that Asfcca’s decryption queries
will be in sync if and only if Asfcfa’s decryption queries are in sync. Therefore Asfcca
provides Asfcfa with a perfect simulation of its environment. Thus:
Pr
[
d←$ {0, 1} : Expind-sfcfa-dSE (Asfcfa) = d
]
≤
Pr
[
b←$ {0, 1} : Expind-sfcca-bSE (Asfcca) = b
]
,
and equation (6.1) follows.
The following analogous theorem is implied by a similar proof which we omit to
avoid repetition.
Theorem 6.4: IDP is IND-sbbCFA secure. Let SE = (K, E ,D) be the scheme
from Construction 6.1, composed from a symmetric encryption scheme SE = (Ke, E ,D)
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Exprpe-bES (A)
K ← Kc
b′ ← AEoR(·)
return b′
EoR(`)
w ←$ {0, 1}`
u← ECK(w)
if b = 0 then
u←$ {0, 1}|u|
return u
Figure 6.13: Experiment to define randomness preserving encodings.
with stateless decryption, and an instantaneously decodable encoding scheme ES =
(Kc, EC,DC). Then for any IND-sbbCFA adversary Asbbcfa against SE, there exists
an IND-CCA adversary Acca against SE such that:
Advind-sbbcfaSE (Asbbcfa) ≤ Advind-ccaSE (Acca) ,
where Acca consumes similar resources to Asbbcfa.
Construction 6.1 shows that IND-sfCFA and IND-sbbCFA security are not hard to
attain. However when we instantiate the encoding scheme with a prefix free en-
coding, ciphertext boundaries will inevitably be revealed. While this is what allows
the constructed scheme to support ciphertext fragmentation, it obviously conflicts
with the goal of boundary hiding. We partly solve this conflict by employing a
keyed encoding scheme, which reveals ciphertext boundaries solely to the holder of
the encoding key. We now formulate a security property for encoding schemes that
will allow Construction 6.1 to achieve IND$-CPA security, and by Theorem 6.2 hide
ciphertext boundaries from passive adversaries.
Definition 6.11: Randomness Preserving Encodings. Let L be a non-empty
set of positive integers, and let ES = (Kc, EC,DC) be an encoding scheme with
associated word space W = ⋃`∈L{0, 1}`. For an adversary A and a bit b define
the experiment Exprpe-bES (A) as shown in Figure 6.13. The experiment starts by
calling Kc to generate an encoding key Kc. The adversary A is then given access
to an encode-or-random oracle EoR(·), that it can query on any length value ` ∈ L.
Depending on the value of b, the oracle will either return an encoding of a random
string of length `, or a random string of the same length as that encoding. The
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adversary’s goal is to output a bit b′, as its guess of the challenge bit b, and the
experiment returns b′ as well. We define the adversary’s rpe-advantage as:
AdvrpeES (A) = Pr
[
Exprpe-1ES (A) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Exprpe-0ES (A) = 1
]
.
The encoding scheme ES is said to be a randomness preserving encoding (RPE)
scheme, if for every adversary A with reasonable resources its advantage AdvrpeES (A)
is small.
Theorem 6.5: IDP is IND$-CPA secure. Let SE = (Ke, E ,D) be a symmet-
ric encryption scheme with associated message space M and ciphertext space C.
Let ES = (Kc, EC,DC) be an encoding scheme with an associated word space that
contains C. Define the encryption scheme supporting fragmentation SE = (K, E ,D)
according to Construction 6.1. For any IND$-CPA adversary Aind$ against SE, there
exist adversaries A′ind$ and Arpe such that:
Advind$-cpaSE (Aind$) ≤ Adv
ind$-cpa
SE (A′ind$) + AdvrpeES (Arpe) , (6.2)
where A′ind$ and Arpe consume similar resources to Aind$.
Proof. To prove Theorem 6.5 we introduce we introduce a hybrid experiment ExpH,
similar in spirit to the two IND$-CPA experiments corresponding to each bit value.
The hybrid experiment proceeds exactly as Expind$-cpa-1SE , except that the encryption
oracle returns encodings of random strings instead. More specifically, after comput-
ing an encryption under SE of the queried message, it picks uniformly at random
a string of the same length as the ciphertext, and returns an encoding under ES of
this string instead. We then have that:
Advind$-cpaSE (Aind$) =
(
Pr
[
Expind$-cpa-1SE (Aind$) = 1
]
− Pr [ ExpH(Aind$) = 1 ]
)
+
(
Pr [ ExpH(Aind$) = 1 ]− Pr
[
Expind$-cpa-0SE (Aind$) = 1
])
. (6.3)
Now we consider each of the above terms in the braces separately. For any adversary
Aind$ distinguishing between the two experiments in the first term, we construct
an IND$-CPA adversary A′ind$ against SE . Adversary A′ind$ runs Kc to obtain an
encoding key and then runs Aind$ . It then simulates Aind$’s encryption oracle in
accordance with the IDP construction, except that it uses its own oracle to compute
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encryptions under SE . It then outputs whatever Aind$ outputs. Note that when
A′ind$’s oracle returns real ciphertexts, it provides Aind$ with a perfect simulation of
the IND$-CPA experiment with a bit value of one. Alternatively when A′ind$’s oracle
returns random strings, it provides Aind$ with a perfect simulation of the hybrid
experiment. Hence:
Pr
[
Expind$-cpa-1SE (Aind$) = 1
]
− Pr [ ExpH(Aind$) = 1 ] ≤ Advind$-cpaSE (A′ind$)
(6.4)
Similarly, for any adversary Aind$ distinguishing between the two experiments in
the second term, we construct an RPE adversary Arpe against ES . Adversary Arpe
runs Ke to obtain an encryption key and then runs Aind$ . It simulates Aind$’s
encryption oracle by computing an encryption of the queried message under SE ,
it then queries its own oracle with the length of this ciphertext and forwards the
response to Aind$. It then outputs whatever A′cpa outputs. When Arpe’s oracle
returns encodings of random strings, it provides Aind$ with a perfect simulation of
the hybrid experiment. Otherwise when Arpe’s oracle returns random strings, it
provides Aind$ with a perfect simulation of the IND$-CPA experiment with a bit
value of zero. Therefore:
Pr [ ExpH(Aind$) = 1 ]− Pr
[
Expind$-cpa-0SE (Aind$) = 1
]
≤ AdvrpeES (Arpe) . (6.5)
Combining equations (6.3),(6.4), and (6.5) yields equation (6.2), as desired.
We now complete the IDP construction by showing a simple instantiation of an
encoding scheme that is both instantaneously decodable and randomness preserving.
The encoding scheme is constructed from a pseudorandom function family mapping
n bit strings to l bit strings, and is presented in Figure 6.14.
Theorem 6.6: IDP Instantiation. Let F : K × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}l be a function
family indexed by the set K. Then Figure 6.14 defines an instantaneously decodable
encoding scheme ES = (Kc, EC,DC) with word space W =
⋃
`≤ l{0, 1}`. Moreover,
for any RPE adversary Arpe against ES making at most q queries, there exists a
PRF adversary Aprf such that:
AdvrpeES (Arpe) ≤ AdvprfF (Aprf) +
(
q2
2n+1
)
, (6.6)
where adversary Aprf consumes similar resources to Arpe.
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Algorithm Kc
K ←$K
return K
Algorithm ECK(w)
x←$ {0, 1}n
y ← 〈|w|〉l ⊕ FK(x)
u← x ‖ y ‖ w
return u
Algorithm DCK(u)
if |u| ≤ n+ l then
return (ε, u)
len← FK(u[1, n])⊕ u[n+ 1, l]
if |u| − n− l < len then
return (ε, u)
w ← u[n+ l + 1, n+ l + len]
z ← u[n+ l + len + 1, |u|]
return (w, z)
Figure 6.14: The encoding scheme of Theorem 6.6 that is both instantaneously
decodable and randomness preserving.
Proof. We first outline why the encoding scheme is instantaneously decodable. Note
that the decoding algorithm first recovers the length field and then uses this value
to determine where the codeword ends. Thus the first requirement of Definition 6.10
is satisfied. As for the second requirement, note that the only case where the input
string s is not prefixed by a valid code word is either when its length is less than
or equal to n + l, or the recovered length value is greater than the length of the
remaining string. In both cases the decoding algorithm returns (ε, s), as required.
We now prove that the encoding scheme is randomness preserving. To do this, we
show that from any RPE adversary Arpe, we can build a PRF adversary Aprf against
F . Adversary Aprf runs Arpe, and simulates its oracle by sampling random strings of
the queried length and encoding them according to the construction of Figure 6.14
and computing PRF values using its own oracle. Aprf keeps a record of all the n bit
strings that it samples, and if at any point a collision occurs it outputs 0 and halts.
Otherwise Aprf outputs whatever Arpe outputs. Note that when Aprf is instantiated
with F , it responds to Arpe’s queries with real encodings of random strings. On the
other hand if its oracle is a random function it returns uniformly random strings
(since it never queries its oracle on the same value more than once). Let Zb represent
the event Exprpe-bES (Arpe) = 1, and let E represent the event that a collision occurs
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when sampling n bit strings. Then we have that:
AdvrpeES (Arpe) = Pr
[
Z1 ∧ E ]− Pr [ Z0 ∧ E ]+ (Pr [ Z1 ∧ E ]− Pr [ Z0 ∧ E ])
≤ Pr [ Z1 ∧ E ]− Pr [ Z0 ∧ E ]+ Pr [ E ] .
Applying a birthday bound to E, and substituting for the other terms we get:
AdvrpeES (Arpe) ≤ Pr
[
K ←$K : AFK(·)prf = 1
]
− Pr
[
f ←$ Func(n, l) : Af(·)prf = 1
]
+
(
q2
2n+1
)
. (6.7)
Equation (6.6) then follows from equation (6.7).
The IDP construction is attractive in terms of efficiency, modularity, and versatility.
If we look at prior constructions, we see that achieving confidentiality and hiding
boundaries while supporting fragmentation was already a source of conflict. Consider
SSH for instance. Its effort to encrypt the length field can be interpreted as an
attempt to hide boundaries. When instantiated with CBC encryption, it is easy to
see that SSH achieves BH-CPA security, but as evidenced by the attack from [1] (see
Section 3.5) it is insecure in the IND-sfCFA sense. Alternatively if we look at TLS, the
result of [78] implies that it is IND-sfCCA secure. Moreover the length field contained
in the header works as a prefix free encoding, and therefore by Theorem 6.3, TLS
is IND-sfCFA secure. However since the header is in cleartext the scheme obviously
does not achieve BH-CPA security.
6.6.2 The InterMAC Construction
We now move to a more ambitious goal, to simultaneously achieve all three of our
security notions. In comparison to the IDP construction and SSH, we now addition-
ally consider boundary hiding against active adversaries and DoS security. None of
the schemes considered thus far achieve boundary hiding in the active setting. To see
the difficulty with this consider once more the case of SSH. Given a concatenation
of ciphertexs, the adversary can now flip the first bit and submit it bit by bit to its
decryption oracle until an error is returned, which marks the first ciphertext bound-
ary. In addition to achieving boundary hiding security in the active setting, the
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Algorithm K
(Ke, σe, %e)← Ke
Km ← Km
K ← Ke ‖ Km
σ ← (σe, 0)
%← (%e, ε, ε, 0, 0, 0)
return (K,σ, %)
Algorithm EK(m, (σe, i))
c← ε, b← 0, i← i+ 1
for j = 1 to |m|/`m
p← 1 + (j − 1).`m
q ← j.`m
m′ ← m[p, q]
if q = |m| then b← 1
(c′, σe)← EKe(b ‖ m′, σe)
τ ← TKm(〈i〉 ‖ 〈j〉 ‖ c′)
c← c ‖ c′ ‖ τ
return (c, (σe, i))
Algorithm DK(f, (%e, α,m, i, j, fail))
w ← ε, α← α ‖ f
while |α| ≥ N
c← α[1, `c], τ ← α[`c + 1, N ]
α← α[N + 1, |α|]
j ← j + 1
v ← VKm(〈i〉 ‖ 〈j〉 ‖ c, τ)
if v =⊥ and fail = 0 then
w ← w ‖⊥, fail← 1
else if fail = 1 then
w ← w ‖⊥
else
(m′, %e)← DKe(c, %e)
m← m ‖ m′[2, `m + 1]
if m′[1] = 1 then
w ← w ‖ m ‖ ¶
i← i+ 1, j ← 0,m← ε
return (w, (%e, α,m, i, j, fail))
Figure 6.15: The stateful InterMAC construction IM.
scheme that we present in this section also achieves N -DOS-sfCFA security without
limiting the maximum message size to N bits.
Our proposed scheme breaks a message into equal-sized segments and encrypts them
separately. It then appends a MAC tag to each intermediate ciphertext and con-
catenates them to produce the final ciphertext. The sender and receiver keep a state
which contains a message and a segment number to be used in the MAC computa-
tion. Each segment uses a bit flag to indicate the last segment in a message. We
now describe the construction in more detail.
Construction 6.2: InterMAC. Let SE = (Ke, E ,D) be a symmetric encryption
scheme such that its message space contains {0, 1}`m+1, for some desired `m ∈ N.
Furthermore let E be length-regular, such that it maps all messages of length `m
to ciphertexts of length `c. Let MA = (Km, T ,V) be a message authentication
code with associated tag length `tag and message space {0, 1}∗. Then the state-
ful InterMAC construction, specified in Figure 6.15, yields an encryption scheme
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supporting fragmentation IM = (K, E ,D) with message space {{0, 1}`m}+. The
ciphertext segment size N associated to the stateful InterMAC construction is given
by N = `c + `tag.
At first sight Figure 6.15 may seem daunting. Accordingly we now give an informal
description. Each message is split into chunks of `m bits, a bit is then prepended to
each chunk and encrypted separately. For all chunks of plaintext except the last, the
prepended bit is set to zero. For each of these ciphertexts c′, a MAC tag is computed
over the concatenation of the encoded message counter 〈i〉, the encoded segment
index 〈j〉, and the ciphertext. These ciphertext-tag pairs are then concatenated
to yield the final ciphertext. Decryption starts by appending the input ciphertext
fragment f to the buffer string α, and resetting the output plaintext string w. The
while loop then extracts ciphertext segments from the buffer one at a time. Each
segment is parsed into a ciphertext and a MAC tag, and the tag is then verified.
The returned output string w is then constructed as follows. For valid ciphertexts,
i.e. ciphertexts where all segments contain a valid tag, the plaintext is only returned
when the last ciphertext segment has been received. Alternatively, once an invalid
segment is encountered, the⊥ symbol is returned for that segment and every segment
(irrespective of its validity) that is received thereafter.
Theorem 6.7: InterMAC is N-DOS-sfCFA secure. Let IM = (K, E ,D) be the
InterMAC scheme from Construction 6.2, composed from a symmetric encryption
scheme SE = (Ke, E ,D) and message authentication codeMA = (Km, T ,V). Let its
segment size be N . Then for any N -DOS-sfCFA adversary Ados against IM, there
exists a UF-CMA adversary Auf against MA such that:
AdvN-dos-sfcfaIM (Ados) ≤ Advuf-cmaMA (Auf) , (6.8)
where Auf consumes similar resources to Ados.
Proof. Consider the Expn-dos-sfcfaIM (Ados) experiment for n = N . At any point in
time, let F ∗ be the concatenation of all ciphertext fragments queried by Ados, and
let u be the largest non-negative integer such that the substring F ∗[1, uN ] is in
sync. Let E represent the event that |F ∗| ≥ (u + 1)N and sfDec(·) did not return
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any output after receiving the first ((u + 1)N) bits. For the case of InterMAC, if
the adversary wins the experiment then E must have occurred. We now bound the
probability of event E occurring, by constructing an adversary Auf that breaks the
UF-CMA security of MA.
Adversary Auf runs Ke to get an encryption key and initialise the states. It then runs
Ados and uses the encryption key together with its tagging oracle to simulate Ados’s
encryption oracle (as per Construction 6.2). In addition it maintains an ordered
list of all the ciphertexts it returns, together with their corresponding messages.
Ados’s decryption queries are then handled as follows. Auf maintains the string
F ∗ (as defined above), and uses it together with the other list to keep track of
when Ados becomes active. Moreover it maintains the decryption counters i and
j (as per Construction 6.2). While Ados’s queries are in sync, it uses its list to
simulate the decryption oracle. When it happens that |F ∗| ≥ (u + 1)N , it parses
F ∗[uN + 1, (u+ 1)N ] into a ciphertext c and a MAC tag τ , submits the pair (〈i〉 ‖
〈j〉 ‖ c, τ) to its verification oracle, and halts.
Note that until |F ∗| ≥ (u+ 1)N happens, Auf’s simulation of Ados’s environment is
perfect. Moreover, counters i and j ensure that the only possible time where Auf
queried a string with these values is when it computed the tag for the jth segment
of the ith ciphertext (if such a segment existed). However, since MA is a MAC
and by assumption F ∗[uN + 1, (u+ 1)N ] does not match that segment, it must be
that the corresponding ciphertext components do not match either. It thus follows
that whenever E occurs, Auf produces a valid MAC forgery and wins the UF-CMA
experiment. We then have that:
Pr
[
ExpN-dos-sfcfaIM (Ados)) = 1
]
≤ Pr [ E ] ≤ Pr
[
Expuf-cmaMA (Auf) = 1
]
,
and equation (6.8) thus follows.
Note that we only have BH-sfCFA security left to prove, since IND-sfCFA security
will then be implied by Theorem 6.1.
Theorem 6.8: InterMAC is BH-sfCFA secure. Let IM = (K, E ,D) be the
InterMAC scheme from Construction 6.2, composed from a symmetric encryption
scheme SE = (Ke, E ,D) and message authentication code MA = (Km, T ,V). Then
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ExpAbSE(A)
(K,σ, %)← K
j ← 1, sync← 1
C ← ε, F ← ε
b′ ← ALoR(·),sfDec(·)
return b′
LoR((m0,m1))
σ0 ← σ, σ1 ← σ
(c0, σ0)← EK(m0, σ0)
(c1, σ1)← EK(m1, σ1)
c0 ← ||(c0), c1 ← ||(c1)
if |c0| 6= |c1| then return  
σ ← σb, C ← C ‖ cb
return cb
sfDec(f)
m← ε, F ← F ‖ f
while |F | − jN ≥ 0
p← 1 + (j − 1)N, q ← jN
if sync = 1 then
if F [p, q] 6= C[p, q] then
sync← 0,m←⊥
else
m← m ‖⊥
j ← j + 1
return m
Figure 6.16: The auxiliary experiment used to prove Theorem 6.8.
for any BH-sfCFA adversary Asfcfa against IM, there exists adversaries Acpa, Aprf,
and Auf such that:
1
2
·Advbh-sfcfaIM (Asfcfa) ≤ Advind$-cpaSE (Acpa)+AdvprfT (Aprf)+Advuf-cmaMA (Auf) , (6.9)
where all three adversaries consume similar resources to Asfcfa.
Proof. We will prove Theorem 6.8 in two parts. For the first part of the proof we will
make use of the auxiliary experiment ExpAbIM of Figure 6.16. This is essentially
the Expbh-sfcfa-bIM experiment with a modified stateful decryption oracle. Now the
stateful decryption oracle does not return any output until the queries become out
of sync, at which point it returns ⊥ at every N -bit boundary of ciphertext that
it receives. At any point in time, let F ∗ be the concatenation of all ciphertext
fragments queried by Asfcfa, and let u be the largest non-negative integer such that
the substring F ∗[1, uN ] is in sync. Let E represent the event that in the BH-sfCFA
experiment |F ∗| ≥ (u + 1)N and sfDec(·) did not return ⊥ after receiving the first
((u+1)N) bits. Let W denote the event Expbh-sfcfa-bIM (Asfcfa) = b and let WA denote
the event ExpAdIM(Asfcfa) = d, where bits b and d are picked uniformly at random.
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We thus have that:
Pr [W ]− Pr [WA ] = Pr [W ∧ E ] + Pr [W ∧ E ]− Pr [WA ] .
Due to the details of the InterMAC construction, the two experiments are identical
if E does not occur. Bounding Pr
[
E
]
, cancelling equal terms, and then bounding
Pr [W ∧ E ] yields:
Pr [W ]− Pr [WA ] ≤ Pr [W ∧ E ] + Pr [W | E ]− Pr [WA ]
≤ Pr [W ∧ E ]
≤ Pr [ E ] . (6.10)
Using a reduction similar to that in the proof of Theorem 6.7, it follows that there
exists a UF-CMA adversary Auf such that:
Pr [ E ] ≤ Advuf-cmaMA (Auf) . (6.11)
Combining equations (6.10) and (6.11), and then multiplying by two and subtracting
one on each side of the inequality, yields:
Advbh-sfcfaIM (Asfcfa) ≤
(
2 · Pr [WA ]− 1)+ 2 ·Advuf-cmaMA (Auf) . (6.12)
Now from any adversary Asfcfa, we can construct a BH-CPA adversary A′′cpa against
IM as follows. A′′cpa runs Asfcfa, and forwards its encryption queries to its own
encryption oracle while keeping record of all ciphertexts that it returns. Decryption
queries are handled by running the sfDec(·) algorithm of Figure 6.16. Finally A′′cpa
outputs whatever Asfcfa outputs. Note that A′′cpa provides Asfcfa with a perfect
simulation of the auxiliary experiment. It then follows that:
Pr
[
WA
]
= Pr
[
d←$ {0, 1} : Expbh-cpa-dIM (A′′cpa) = d
]
. (6.13)
Combining equations (6.12) and (6.13), we obtain:
Advbh-sfcfaIM (Asfcfa) ≤ Advbh-cpaIM (A′′cpa) + 2 ·Advuf-cmaMA (Auf) , (6.14)
and then applying Theorem 6.2 yields:
Advbh-sfcfaIM (Asfcfa) ≤ 2 ·Advind$-cpaIM (A′cpa) + 2 ·Advuf-cmaMA (Auf) . (6.15)
We now move to the second part of the proof and bound the advantage of A′cpa.
Towards this aim we introduce a hybrid experiment ExpH, similar in spirit to the
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two IND$-CPA experiments corresponding to each bit value. The hybrid experiment
proceeds exactly as Expind$-cpa-1IM , except for one detail. In the encryption oracle, for
every ciphertext segment, the MAC tag is replaced with a uniformly random string
of length `tag. Then we have that:
Advind$-cpaIM (A′cpa) =
(
Pr
[
Expind$-cpa-1IM (A′cpa) = 1
]
− Pr [ExpH(A′cpa) = 1 ])
+
(
Pr
[
ExpH(A′cpa) = 1
]− Pr [Expind$-cpa-0IM (A′cpa) = 1 ]) . (6.16)
Now consider each of the above terms in the braces separately. For any adversary
A′cpa distinguishing between the two experiments in the first term, we can associate
a PRF adversary Aprf against T . Adversary Aprf runs Ke to obtain an encryption
key and initialise the states, and then runs A′cpa . It simulates its encryption oracle in
accordance with the InterMAC scheme, except that it uses its own oracle to compute
the MAC tags. It then outputs whatever A′cpa outputs. Note that if Aprf’s oracle is
instantiated with T , it perfectly simulates a ‘real’ encryption oracle for A′cpa . On
the other hand if its oracle is a random function it simulates the encryption oracle
of the hybrid experiment, as long as it does not query the random function on the
same input more than once. The counters in the InterMAC construction guarantee
that this never occurs. Therefore:
Pr
[
Expind$-cpa-1IM (A′cpa) = 1
]
− Pr [ExpH(A′cpa) = 1 ] ≤ AdvprfT (Aprf) . (6.17)
Similarly for any adversary A′cpa distinguishing between the two experiments in
the second term we construct an IND$-CPA adversary Acpa against SE . Adversary
Acpa runs A′cpa simulating its encryption oracle in accordance with the InterMAC
scheme, except that it uses its own oracle to compute encryptions under SE , and
replaces tag values with random strings of length `tag . It then outputs whatever
A′cpa outputs. When Acpa’s oracle returns real ciphertexts, it provides A′cpa with
a perfect simulation of the hybrid experiment. Alternatively when Acpa’s oracle
returns random strings, it provides A′cpa with a perfect simulation of the IND$-CPA
experiment with a bit value of zero. Hence:
Pr
[
ExpH(A′cpa) = 1
]− Pr [Expind$-cpa-0IM (A′cpa) = 1 ] ≤ Advind$-cpaSE (Acpa) .
(6.18)
Combining equations (6.15),(6.16),(6.17), and (6.18) yields (6.9), as desired.
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Algorithm K
(Ke, σ, ε)← Ke
Km ← Km
K ← Ke ‖ Km
%← (ε, ε, 0)
return (K,σ, %)
Algorithm EK(m,σ)
c← ε, τ ← 0`tag , b← 0
for j = 1 to |m|/`m
p← 1 + (j − 1).`m
q ← j.`m
m′ ← m[p, q]
if q = |m| then b← 1
(c′, σ)← EKe(b ‖ m′, σ)
τ ← TKm(τ ‖ c′)
c← c ‖ c′ ‖ τ
return (c, σ)
Algorithm DK(f, (α,m, τ0))
w ← ε, α← α ‖ f
while |α| ≥ N
c← α[1, `c], τ ← α[`c + 1, N ]
α← α[N + 1, |α|]
v ← VKm(τ0 ‖ c, τ)
τ0 ← τ
if v =⊥ and m 6=  then
w ← w ‖⊥,m← 
else if m =  then
w ← w ‖⊥
else
(m′, %e)← DKe(c, ε)
m← m ‖ m′[2, `m + 1]
if m′[1] = 1 then
w ← w ‖ m ‖ ¶
τ0 ← 0`tag ,m← ε
return (w, (α,m, τ0))
Figure 6.17: The stateless beyond buffering InterMAC construction IM∗.
6.6.3 A SBB Variant of InterMAC
Construction 6.3: SBB InterMAC. Let SE = (Ke, E ,D) be a symmetric
encryption scheme with stateless decryption, having a message space containing
{0, 1}`m+1 for some desired `m ∈ N, and error space S⊥. Furthermore let E be
length-regular, such that it maps all messages of length `m to ciphertexts of length
`c. Let MA = (Km, T ,V) be a message authentication code with associated tag
length `tag and message space {0, 1}∗. Let  be such that  6∈ S⊥. Then the SBB
InterMAC construction, specified in Figure 6.17, yields an SBB encryption scheme
supporting fragmentation IM∗ = (K, E ,D) with message space {{0, 1}`m}+. The
ciphertext segment size N associated to the stateful InterMAC construction is given
by N = `c + `tag.
The above construction works analogously to its stateful counterpart, with a few
exceptions. Counters are no longer maintained, and are therefore not included in
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the MAC tag computation and verification. Instead, the tag of the previous segment
is prepended to the ciphertext when computing the MAC tag. For the purpose of
computing the tag in the first segment of each ciphertext, the previous tag value
is set to 0`tag . In decryption, the fail flag has been dropped, and we now set m to
the special symbol  instead. Thus as before, once an invalid MAC tag is detected,
the decryption algorithm always returns ⊥ from that point onwards. Note that this
does not violate the SBB definition, see Section 6.2.2. Finally, the construction
assumes an invertible encoding mapping the triple (α,m, τ0) to a single string, such
that (ε, ε, 0`tag) is mapped to the empty string. This technicality is required for the
scheme to satisfy the SBB definition. Note that the decryption state does not contain
more information than a buffer storing all bits pertaining to the ciphertext being
decrypted. In fact it would have been functionally equivalent to let the decryption
state be such a buffer, flushed only when the end of a ciphertext is found, and
compute (α,m, τ0) from this buffer each time the decryption algorithm is invoked.
However we chose this implementation since it is less wasteful in computational
resources, and yet satisfies the SBB definition.
Theorem 6.9: SBB InterMAC is N-DOS-sbbCFA secure. Let IM∗ = (K, E ,D)
be the SBB InterMAC scheme from Construction 6.3, composed from a symmetric
encryption scheme SE = (Ke, E ,D) with stateless decryption and message authenti-
cation code MA = (Km, T ,V). Let its segment size be N . Then for any N -DOS-
sbbCFA adversary Ados against IM∗ whose encryption queries total at most µe bits,
there exist adversaries Auf and Aprf such that:
AdvN-dos-sbbcfaIM∗ (Ados) ≤ Advuf-cmaMA (Auf) + AdvprfT (Aprf) +
(
µ2e
`2m · 2`tag
)
, (6.19)
where Auf and Aprf consume similar resources to Ados.
Proof. Consider the experiment ExpN-dos-sbbcfaIM∗ (Ados) . Let F and C be as in Fig-
ure 6.11, and let u be the largest non-negative integer such that there exists a c ∈ C
satisfying F [1, uN ]  c = F [1, uN ]. Let E represent the event that |F | ≥ (u + 1)N
and Dec(·) did not return any output after receiving the first ((u + 1)N) bits. For
the case of InterMAC, if the adversary wins the experiment, then E must have oc-
curred. Furthermore, let Q represent the event that for any two ciphertexts c and c′
returned by the encryption oracle before E has occurred, there exist positive integers
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x and y, where x ≤ y, such that c[xN − `tag + 1, xN ] = c′[yN − `tag + 1, yN ] but
c[1, xN ] 6= c′[1, yN ] , or c[xN − `tag + 1, xN ] = 0`tag . Thus Q represents the event
that either two tags collide or a tag value of all zeros occurs. We then have that:
Pr
[
ExpN-dos-sbbcfaIM∗ (Ados)) = 1
]
= Pr [ E ] = Pr [ E ∧Q ] + Pr [ E ∧Q ] ,
≤ Pr [Q ] + Pr [ E | Q ] . (6.20)
We now bound the probability of event Q occurring. Towards this goal we construct
from Ados a PRF adversary Aprf against T . It starts by running Ke to get an en-
cryption key and initialise the states. It then runs Ados and uses the encryption
key together with its oracle to simulate Ados’s encryption oracle (as per Construc-
tion 6.3). In addition it maintains a list of all the ciphertexts it returns, together
with their corresponding messages. Note that by assumption event E has not oc-
curred yet, thus Aprf is able to simulate Ados’s decryption oracle by using this list.
Therefore, when Aprf’s oracle is instantiated with T it provides Ados with a perfect
simulation of its environment. Aprf runs until Ados halts or E occurs, at which point
it checks whether Q has occurred. If so it outputs 1 otherwise it outputs 0. Aprf can
check for Q as it proceeds by maintaining a list of the strings which it queried to
its oracle, indexed by the returned tag values, and check for collisions or tag values
of 0`tag while it populates the list. Consider now the case where Aprf’s oracle is a
random function. The probability of a collision in the tags can be bounded using
a standard birthday bound, while the probability of a tag value of 0`tag is given by
the number of queries divided by 2`tag . Applying the union bound on these two
probabilities, we have that:
Pr
[
f ←$ Func(`c + `tag, `tag) : Af(·)prf = 1
]
≤
(
µ2e
`2m · 2`tag+1
)
+
(
µe
`m · 2`tag
)
.
Rounding the above bound, and applying it to Aprf’s advantage formula, yields:
Pr [Q ] ≤ AdvprfT (Aprf) +
(
µ2e
`2m · 2`tag
)
. (6.21)
We now bound the second term of inequality (6.20), by constructing a UF-CMA
adversary Auf against MA from Ados. Adversary Auf proceeds similarly to Aprf.
It runs Ke and uses this key together with its tagging oracle to simulate Ados’s
encryption oracle. It also maintains a list of all the ciphertexts it returns to-
gether with their corresponding messages, and uses this to simulate Ados’s de-
cryption oracle. It then keeps on simulating Ados’s environment until it halts or
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|F | ≥ (u + 1)N . If |F | ≥ (u + 1)N happens with u > 0, it submits the pair
(F [uN − `tag + 1, uN + `c], F [uN + `c + 1, (u+ 1)N ]) to its verification oracle, and
halts. Alternatively, if |F | ≥ (u + 1)N occurs with u = 0, it submits the pair
(0`tag ‖ F [1, `c], F [`c + 1, N ]) instead. Note that until it occurs that |F | ≥ (u+ 1)N ,
Auf’s simulation of Ados’s environment is perfect. Furthermore, if Q did not occur,
it follows that the first component of the submitted pair was not previously queried
to the tagging oracle. Thus assuming Q did not occur, whenever E occurs, Auf’s
submitted pair constitutes a valid forgery. Therefore:
Pr
[
E | Q ] ≤ Advuf-cmaMA (Auf) . (6.22)
Combining equations (6.20),(6.21) and (6.22), yields (6.19), as desired.
A slightly different analysis could be used to achieve a possibly better bound for
Theorem 6.9. In particular when bounding event Q, we could have considered the
probability that both the tag and ciphertext values collide. This would lower the
birthday bound term, at the expense of introducing an extra term of the form
Advind$-cpaSE (A) . If the birthday bound is the dominant term, such an approach
would yield a tighter bound. However we opted for a simpler proof of security.
Theorem 6.10: SBB InterMAC is IND-sbbCFA secure. Let IM∗ = (K, E ,D)
be the SBB InterMAC scheme from Construction 6.3, composed from a symmetric
encryption scheme SE = (Ke, E ,D) with stateless decryption and message authenti-
cation codeMA = (Km, T ,V). Let its segment size be N . Then for any IND-sbbCFA
adversary Asbbcfa against IM∗ whose encryption queries total at most µe bits, there
exist adversaries Acpa, Aprf and Auf, such that:
Advind-sbbcfaIM∗ (Asbbcfa) ≤ Advind-cpaSE (Acpa) + 2 ·AdvprfT (Aprf)
+ 2 ·Advuf-cmaMA (Auf) +
µ2e
`2m · 2`tag−1
, (6.23)
where all four adversaries consume similar resources to Asbbcfa.
Proof. The proof of Theorem 6.10 follows the same lines as its stateful analogue. For
the first part of the proof we will make use of the auxiliary experiment ExpAbIM of
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ExpAbSE(A)
(K,σ, ε)← K
i← 0, j ← 1
fail← 0, p← 1
C← (), F ← ε
b′ ← ALoR(·),Dec(·)
return b′
LoR((m0,m1))
if |m0| 6= |m1| then return  
(c, σ)← EK(mb, σ)
i← i+ 1, Ci ← c
return c
Dec(f)
m← ε, F ← F ‖ f
while |F | − jN ≥ 0
if fail = 1 then m← m ‖⊥
else
match← 0
for all c ∈ C
if F [p, jN ]  c = F [p, jN ]
then match← 1
if F [p, jN ] = c
then p← jN + 1
if match = 0 then
m← m ‖⊥, fail← 1
j ← j + 1
F ← F [p, |F |], p← 1, j ← b|F |/Nc
return m
Figure 6.18: The auxiliary experiment used to prove Theorem 6.10.
Figure 6.18. This is essentially the Expind-sbbcfa-bIM∗ experiment, with the difference
that once the decryption oracle detects a ciphertext which is not a replay of an-
other ciphertext output by the encryption oracle, it then returns ⊥ at every N -bit
boundary of ciphertext that it receives. Now let F and C be as in Figure 6.7, and
let u be the largest non-negative integer such that there exists a c ∈ C satisfying
F [1, uN ]  c = F [1, uN ]. Let E represent the event that in the IND-sbbCFA experi-
ment |F | ≥ (u+1)N and Dec(·) did not return ⊥ after receiving the first ((u+1)N)
bits. Let W denote the event Expind-sbbcfa-bIM∗ (Asbbcfa) = b and let WA denote the
event ExpAdIM∗(Asbbcfa) = d, where bits b and d are picked uniformly at random.
We then have that:
Pr [W ]− Pr [WA ] = Pr [W ∧ E ] + Pr [W ∧ E ]− Pr [WA ] .
Due to the details of the InterMAC construction, the two experiments are identical
if E does not occur. Bounding Pr
[
E
]
, cancelling equal terms, and then bounding
Pr [W ∧ E ] yields:
Pr [W ]− Pr [WA ] ≤ Pr [W ∧ E ] + Pr [W | E ]− Pr [WA ]
≤ Pr [W ∧ E ] ≤ Pr [ E ] . (6.24)
Using a reduction similar to that in the proof of Theorem 6.9, it follows that there
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exist adversaries Auf and Aprf such that:
Pr [ E ] ≤ Advuf-cmaMA (Auf) + AdvprfT (Aprf) +
(
µ2e
`2m · 2`tag
)
. (6.25)
Combining equations (6.24) and (6.25), and manipulating terms, yields:
Pr [W ] ≤ Pr [WA ]+ Advuf-cmaMA (Auf) + AdvprfT (Aprf) + ( µ2e`2m · 2`tag
)
.
Multiplying both sides by two and subtracting one:
Advind-sbbcfaIM∗ (Asbbcfa) ≤
(
2 · Pr [WA ]− 1)+ 2 ·Advuf-cmaMA (Auf) .
+ 2 ·AdvprfT (Aprf) +
(
µ2e
`2m · 2`tag−1
)
(6.26)
Now from any adversary Asbbcfa, we can construct an IND-CPA adversary Acpa
against SE as follows. Adversary Acpa runs Km to obtain a key for the MAC and
then runs Asbbcfa . It simulates its encryption oracle in accordance with the Inter-
MAC scheme, except that it uses its own oracle to compute encryptions under SE .
In addition it maintains a list of all ciphertexts that it returns. Decryption queries
are handled by simulating the Dec(·) oracle of Figure 6.18. Finally Acpa outputs
whatever Asbbcfa outputs. Note that Acpa provides Asbbcfa with a perfect simulation
of the auxiliary experiment. It then follows that:
Pr
[
WA
]
= Pr
[
d←$ {0, 1} : Expind-cpa-dSE (Acpa) = d
]
. (6.27)
Combining equations (6.26) and (6.27) yields (6.23), as desired.
6.7 Summary
The SSH attack of [1] and the IPsec attacks of [30] serve to show that, contrary
to common belief, ciphertext fragmentation cannot always be abstracted out from
security models. In this chapter, we have initiated the formal study of symmetric
encryption in the presence of ciphertext fragmentation. In many practical settings,
such as that of secure protocols operating over TCP/IP, the underlying channel is the
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one that is implicit in our models. That is, the channel that allows adversarially-
controlled fragmentation, but which preserves the order of the fragments in the
absence of an adversary. In addition to making correctness, confidentiality, and
boundary hiding more challenging, ciphertext fragmentation introduces new secu-
rity concerns such as the DoS attacks which we described. Thus, in addition to
narrowing the gap between theory and practice, we find that the study of cipher-
text fragmentation to be of interest in its own right. We now conclude with a brief
comparison of our constructions and the SSH variants. This is shown in Table 6.1,
which lists the security notions that are met by each construction. The last col-
umn indicates which schemes are n-DOS-sfCFA or n-DOS-sbbCFA secure for a value
of n strictly smaller than the maximum message length supported by the scheme.
We reiterate that stateful InterMAC is the only scheme to achieve all four security
notions simultaneously. As explained in Section 6.4.2 we do not expect the SBB
variant of InterMAC to be BH-sbbCFA secure. However it is BH-CPA secure if the
underlying scheme is IND$-CPA secure and the underlying MAC is pseudorandom.
Although we did not prove this explicitly it follows easily by first showing that IM∗
is IND$-CPA secure and then applying Theorem 6.2.
IND-sfCFA BH-CPA BH-sfCFA n-DOS-sfCFA
n < max
m∈M
(|m|)
SSH-CBC 8 4 8 8
SSH-CTR 4 4 8 8
IDP 4 4 8 8
IM 4 4 4 4
IND-sbbCFA BH-CPA BH-sbbCFA n-DOS-sbbCFA
n < max
m∈M
(|m|)
IM∗ 4 4 8 4
Table 6.1: Security comparison of encryption schemes supporting fragmentation.
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